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MR. MUNDHEIM: Nowhere is it clearer that we live in an inter-
national context than in the world of finance, money, and capital
markets. Nevertheless, important national interests are expressed
in the regulatory and other structures that, at least at times, im-
pede the free flow of capital and the development of institutions
to serve the needs of the capital markets.
There are a number of examples of efforts to create interna-
tional forums to discuss the ways in which to accommodate the dif-
fering goals of free capital markets and appropriate regulatory
schemes. For example, the New York Stock Exchange is an active par-
ticipant in the International Federation of Stock Exchanges which
has taken some steps to harmonize the activities of exchange markets
for stocks and bonds. The University of Pennsylvania Center for
Study of Financial Institutions was the catalyst some years ago for
organizing a standing International Faculty for Corporate and Capital
Market Law comprised of academics from seven countries. All of the
members of that faculty are here today and will be participating in
the plenary sessions and in the workshops [1].
Today's conference represents a joint effort by the New York
Stock Exchange and the Center for Study of Financial Institutions
along with the American Law Institute to promote what we hope will
be a wide-ranging discussion among a diverse group of participants.
The focus of today's discussion is banking. After a brief
look at the rush of foreign banks to the U.S., we will turn to the
views of regulators from three of the leading banking countries on
key issues relating to the supervision of multinational banking or-
ganizations. In particular, we will discuss the division of respon-
sibility between the supervisory authorities of the host country
and home country. In addition, the role of international cooperation
among regulatory authorities will be canvassed. Significant multina-
tional activity requires a somewhat different regulatory response than
purely domestic activity and you will see that point illustrated in
this morning's discussion.
Further, this morning's discussion will foreshadow later dis-
cussions of the regulatory problems associated with the multinational
activities of securities firms and one of the points that the con-
ference will develop is that what is happening in the banking field
now will likely be followed, at least in certain respects, in terms
of approach and techniques in the securities business.
After the discussion of the supervisory problems, we will
focus on the U.S. scene to see how the activities of foreign banks
in the U.S. and how the development of international banking have
influenced and may in the future influence various aspects of domes-
tic bank regulation and practice.
This afternoon we will shift our emphasis from the institution
of banking to banks' stock in trade, money. That discussion will
take off from the dramatic U.S. freeze of Iranian assets. What im-
pact does that experience have on the willingness of foreigners to
hold dollars in U.S. banks in the U.S. or in their branches or sub-
11991
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sidiaries abroad? Will it spur the development of a dollar clear-
ing system outside the U.S.? The Iranian experience has also caused
a re-examination of syndicate loan practices and we will also get
an analysis of some of those practices.
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FOREIGN BANKS IN THE UNITED STATES:
Acquisitions, Branching, and Other Techniques
Dennis J. Lehr and Cameron F. MacRae III
MR. MUNDHEIM: The first subject that we want to discuss re-
lates to the entry of foreign banks into the U.S. Dennis Lehr will
start us off on that subject.
1. OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO FOREIGN BANKS
MR. LEHR: My presentation will focus heavily on certain
statutory terms whose interpretation is essential and whose history
is not as clear as one might hope. The most interesting issues re-
late to what Congress meant when it propounded the doctrine that we
have come to call "national treatment" or "parity of treatment".
Simple words like "prohibited" are now very actively being consider-
ed in the courts. I mention this because such questions will form
the backdrop of the first three speakers--myself, Cam MacRae, and
Neal Petersen--who will try to cover for you, perhaps with a bit of
overlap, some of the key provisions of the International Banking Act
[hereinafter IBA] [1]. Some of the Act's most important questions
center around the meanings of its terms.
A. Before the International Banking Act
(i) Lack of national policy
Before we get right into the analysis of statutory terms, let
us back up a little and talk about these concepts of "national treat-
ment" and "parity of treatment". The Senate report on the IBA ad-
vanced the proposition that, unlike many other forms of foreign
enterprise doing business in the U.S., foreign banks operating in
this country were not subject to a uniform national policy. This,
in fact, was true because except for those that were federally char-
tered--i.e., national bank subsidiaries--foreign banking organiza-
tions in this country were subject only to state law. This, it was
felt, produced several undesirable consequences.
First, there was a lack of uniform national policy which ham-
pered government efforts in the area of economic and monetary policy.
Many foreign deposit-taking operations were not, for example, subject
to federally imposed reserve requirements. Consequently, the Fed
argued for years that this hampered its ability to control the money
supply and, in turn, its fight to control inflation.
(ii) Competitive inequality
Second, foreign banks often enjoyed, it was felt, competitive
advantages over federally chartered domestic counterparts. The most
notable example of this was the inapplicability of the restrictions
on multiple state branching that apply to U.S. banks.
At this point, let me interrupt myself and mention two names,
as a shorthand, because we are going to be talking about them later.
When we use the expression, "the McFadden Act", we refer to that part
of U.S. banking law that restricts domestic banks from branching
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across state lines. The "Douglas amendment" to the Bank Holding
Company Act has a similar effect and prohibits holding companies
that are presently operating in one state from acquiring subsidiary
banks in another state (2]. But to continue ....
These concerns over the competitive inequality between foreign
and domestic banks operating in this country obviously underlie the
concept of parity of treatment and national treatment. The consi-
derations involving parity of treatment fostered those provisions
of the IBA that now restrict certain interstate expansion opportu-
nities of foreign banks and subject them to reserve requirements,
impose Bank Holding Company Act type restrictions on their non-bank
activities, and subject many of them to the examination, asset
maintenance, reporting, and other obligations to which national
banks are subject.
Less widely known is the fact that the notion of parity of
treatment has also been applied to eliminate or modify statutory
provisions which were considered to be unfair to foreign banks in
their efforts to compete fairly with domestic institutions. For
example--and we will hear more of this later--foreign banks may now
acquire a majority stock interest in an Edge Act corporation and
establish U.S. as well as foreign branches of such Edge Act cor-
porations.
(iii) Options
Again, to help us analyze the thrust of the IBA, let me state
briefly the ground rules applicable to foreign banks prior to the
passage of the IBA. Foreign banking institutions were then conduc-
ting their U.S. operations in one of three forms only: (1) A sub-
sidiary bank could be established with a national charter or under
state law; (2) They could establish a branch or an agency; or (3)
They could operate by means of representative offices.
Subsidiaries and branches ordinarily enjoyed retail deposit-
taking powers. The agencies, of course, could accept only so-called
credit balances. For those who are not initiated, the simplest way
to remember a credit balance is to recall that it is the kind of
account that the holder cannot add to, e.g., by deposit of addition-
al funds. They have been described as active balances that arise
from or are incident to transactions involving loans, funds in tran-
sition, letters of credit, and other identifiable events.
Except in the case of federally chartered subsidiary banks--
and there were not many subsidiaries owned by foreigners--the im-
portant issues of entry control, market expansion, and government
supervision were solely the province of state law. Consequently,
foreign banks were drawn to a handful of states--New York, Illinois,
California--offering attractive banking opportunities and a hospi-
table legal environment. In addition, prior to the passage of the
IBA, the non-banking activities of foreign bank holding companies
were not subject at all to the U.S. Bank Holding Company Act.
B. The International Banking Act of 1978
Five different pieces of legislation were introduced in
Congress during the 1960s to subject foreign banking to overall
federal regulation, but none ever got out of committee. It was not
until the mid-1970s, following the significant rise in foreign bank
operations in the U.S., that there was serious demand for a ration-
alization of foreign bank supervision at the federal level. It was
then that the idea of national treatment and parity of treatment
emerged and--with a helpful push from the OPEC nations and public
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concern in general over foreign ownership of U.S. property and in-
dustry--these concerns were focused in Congress and resulted in the
passage of the IBA. As X have indicated earlier, the IBA has brought
what I would consider sweeping changes in the structure of foreign
banking in the U.S. and I predict that those changes will continue
at an accelerating rate.
(i) Current options
First, the number of forms in which foreign banks operating
here may be conducted has been greatly increased. In addition to
federally or state chartered subsidiary banks and state chartered
branches and agencies (the principal forms of pre-IBA entry) a
foreign bank may now operate in the form of an Edge Act corporation
and may have domestic and foreign branches of such a corporation.
Including commercial lending companies (the IBA's term for Article
12 New York investment companies) the forms of operation available
to foreign banks now number at least ten.
Equally important under the IBA, foreign banks now have the
opportunity of selecting either a federal or a state charter for
branches and agencies and have the option of chartering a branch with
either limited or unlimited deposit-taking ability, further increas-
ing their flexibility.
Let me illustrate this point with three hypotheticals. Let us
take a foreign bank that wishes to establish its initial branch
office with unlimited deposit-taking powers, and that wishes such
branch to be federally chartered. A foreign bank may select any
state in the union in which to locate such a branch, so long as the
Comptroller of the Currency approves the establishment of the for-
eign bank branch and it is not prohibited by state law. Cam MacRae
is going to discuss certain provisions of the Comptroller's regula-
tion that are now being challenged in the courts [3].
Assume that our hypothetical foreign bank already has a retail
deposit-taking branch in one state and wishes to establish another
branch in another state. The foreign bank may do so if the deposit-
taking powers of the second branch are limited to those allowed to
an Edge Act corporation and--if the branch is to be federally char-
tered--its operation is expressly permitted by the law of the state
in which it is to be located. With the exception of this restric-
tion on deposit-taking powers, such a branch would have all of the
banking powers, including fiduciary powers if it asked for them, of
an existing national bank, not foreign owned.
Finally, assume a hypothetical bank wishes to establish a
federally chartered entity of some kind outside its home state that
can accept deposits from persons who are not citizens or residents
of the U.S. Such a bank could seek to establish a federally char-
tered agency. The Comptroller's regulations allow such deposits.
On the other hand, a state chartered agency of a foreign bank cannot
accept such deposits. It can only maintain credit balances. In my
view the Comptroller's regulation permiting a federally chartered
agency to accept such deposits conflicts with a section of the IBA
which prohibits receipt of such deposits.
(ii) Federal controls
As I have already suggested, the IBA establishes a substantial
level of federal control in the areas of foreign bank entry, market
expansion, and regulation. Except for the initial state branch in
the home state, all forms of state and federally chartered foreign
bank entities are now obligated to satisfy one or more requirements
of the IBA before they commence operations. There is no time to go
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into all of those now, but Neal Petersen is going to touch on some
of them later [4]. For example, a federal branch or agency of a
foreign bank must not be prohibited by state law and it must be
approved by the Comptroller.
In addition, in acting on an application to establish a federal
branch or agency, the Comptroller must consider the financial and
managerial resources and future prospects of the applicant and, in
language giving the Comptroller rather broad discretion, the IBA re-
quires the Comptroller to consider the effect of the proposal on
expansion of competition in the U.S. and in foreign commerce. That
is a rather strange provision and we will discuss the antitrust
issues a bit later [5].
(iii) Types of offices
I will conclude this part of my remarks by summarizing the
different types of offices maintained in the U.S. by foreign banks:
(1) REPRESENTATIVE OFFICES - 249
These offices must file a report with the Treasury Department
and, as far as I know, nothing much more happens with those reports
once filed. 192 banks from 48 foreign countries were represented
by these offices in 1980.
(2) COMMERCIAL LENDING COMPANIES - 6
These fit the description of the so-called Article 12 New York
investment companies.
(3) STATE CHARTERED AGENCIES - 171
(4) FEDERALLY CHARTERED AGENCIES - 5
Applications for three additional agencies are pending.
(5) EDGE ACT CORPORATIONS - 16
There are 121 foreign and domestically controlled Edge Act
corporations with 66 branches. Foreign banking organizations have
invested in only 16 of these, and one of the 16 presently has a
branch.
(6) STATE CHARTERED BRANCH WITH LIMITED DEPOSIT-TAKING POWERS
(7) FEDERALLY CHARTERED BRANCH WITH LIMITED DEPOSIT-TAKING
POWERS D 142
(8) STATE CHARTERED BRANCH WITH FULL DEPOSIT-TAKING POWERS
(9) FEDERALLY CHARTERED BRANCH WITH FULL DEPOSIT-TAKING POWERS - 12
(I0)SUBSIDIARIES - 42
A number of these represent acquisitions of existing U.S. banks.
This summary indicates that foreign banks have not yet taken
significant advantage of the federal option in branching, nor have
they taken advantage of the ability to branch Edge Act companies
that they now, or may in the future, own.
Before closing, I want to remind you of the substantial amount
of literature which has been growing in this area. A bibliography is
appended at the end of the chapter. I particularly recommend the
Fed's 1980 study of the first years of operatinq under the IBA.
(iv) Edge Act branches
I will end my comments at this point with an option that is
available to an international bank and is, I think, the wave of the
future: that is, the Edge Act route for foreign bank expansion.
The IBA amended the Edge Act by eliminating the requirement that the
directors of Edge Act corporations must be citizens of the U.S. It
also provides that the foreign bank may, with prior Fed approval,
own a majority of the shares of such corporation. I do not want to
sound like a law professor here, but an Edge Act corporation is a
rare and wondrous thing. There are three kinds of powers it has.
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One would be what I have described as general banking powers.
Those are enumerated in the Edge Act, and they run a page and a half
or so. Edge Act corporations can purchase and sell securities,
accept bills and drafts, issue letters of credit, and engage in a
wide variety of finance transactions. The second kind of power they
have--and again this creates a significant advantage over domestic
banks--is the power to purchase stock in other corporations, some-
thing which is very restricted for domestic banks. Last--and this
is a new power that all Edge Act corporations were given by the IBA--
they can branch anywhere that the Fed allows. Prior to the IBA, a
domestically-owned Edge Act corporation could not branch. By amend-
ing the Edge Act to provide for foreign bank ownership, the IBA
extended this new entry option by allowing for branches. Although
I predict that there will be significant litigation, I believe it
will come to pass that the Edge Act entry option will be the most
expeditious way to penetrate U.S. banking markets.
(v) Obstacles to Edge Act branching
MR. MUNDHEIM: Neal Petersen, has the red interposed any
obstacles to the Edge Act branching of foreign banks?
MR. PETERSEN: We have not interposed any objections in that
area. I do not think we have seen any instances yet of foreign Edge
Act branching. Most of the branching has involved the conversion
of existing domestic Edge Act subsidiaries into a branch structure.
Large banks had established a number of Edge Act subsidiaries around
the country as separate corporations; and with the change in the
Federal Reserve regulations, many of those subsidiaries were con-
verted to branches. There is nothing in the IBA that deals directly
with branching; however, we felt that the general purposes of the
Edge Act provisions and the IBA amendments to the Edge Act gave us
the authority, which we had not previously decided we had, to permit
branching.
As a result, there have been these conversions and mergers of
existing multicorporate Edge Act operations into branch structures.
These have been very routinely approved by the Board. I would ex-
pect that expansive branching by existing Edge Act corporations--
including foreign owned Edge Act corporations--would not receive
any particular objections from the Federal Reserve. I would caution
you, though, that as this trend continues, and if it develops to the
degree that Dennis Lehr suggests, there may well be some challenge
to our interpretation that branching is permitted under the Edge Act
as it was amended by the IBA. I think that issue still lingers. It
will be a particularly troublesome issue if the Board ever adopts
a version of the so-called qualified business entity concept.
In regard to qualified business entities, you may recall that
the staff suggested that the Board propose a new creature by that
name, for which an Edge Act corporation could provide a full range
of banking services including full lending and deposit-taking powers.
The test proposed at the time--about a year or so ago--was that the
qualified business entity, on an unconsolidated basis, must base
two-thirds of its business on sales or purchases from international
business. There were various other tests proposed that would measure
the qualifying "international business". This particular proposal
was not acted upon by the Board when it adopted the branching regu-
lations, because of the political fire storm in opposition that
appeared to be developing among various state regulators and regional
banks.
This concept has not gone away. The staff may well come back
[206]
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol3/iss3/1
D.J. Lehr, C r. McRae 11/ Foreign banks in the U.S.
to the Board in the near future with another attempt at redefining
the idea of qualified business entity--maybe in a somewhat different
fashion. If the Board adopts the concept, its implementation will
considerably expand the ability of Edge Act corporations to do a
full range of banking services, although to a rather discrete type
of customer. Nevertheless, this might be perceived as a significant
breach of the spirit of the McFadden Act--not necessarily the letter
of the McFadden Act--and I would expect we would find much political
and judicial effort to prevent it.
2. RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN BANKS
MR. MAC RAE: Now that Dennis Lehr has focussed on the attrac-
tive options that are available to foreign banks, I am going to
perform the typical lawyer's job of giving you the bad news and focus
on some of the more important restrictions that are applicable to
foreign banks. In so doing, I am going to try to give you a picture
of the complex "banking landscape" that we now have in the U.S. as
a result of the IBA.
A. Restrictions on Entry
First, let us examine the interstate banking restrictions.
Dennis has told you briefly about the McFadden Act [6], which limits
branching across state lines, and the so-called Douglas amendment
(71, which limits interstate acquisitions by holding companies.
In essence, the IBA made these same general restrictions appli-
cable to foreign banks--but it did so with a few "twists" and com-
promises. As a result, subject to a few important exceptions, a
foreign bank is now prohibited from maintaining a branch outside
something called its "home state". (I will tell you a little more
about home state later.) Similarly, a foreign bank is now generally
prohibited from acquiring another bank outside its home state (8].
But as I noted, there were some important exceptions that were made
available to foreign banks.
(i) Exceptions to the general rule
The first major exception for foreign banks was the so-called
grandfathering rule, which allowed a foreign bank to continue to
operate any branch or banking subsidiary that had commenced operation
(or had been applied for) on or before July 27, 1978, even though
the office was outside its home state. This meant that a bank that
had moved fast could have kept offices in, say, four or five states,
if they had at least been applied for prior to the grandfathering
date.
A second group of exceptions made it clear that the foreign
bank could still establish other offices outside its home state, pro-
vided they eschewed the taking of domestic deposits. Thus, a pleth-
ora of interstate agencies or so-called limited branches could
theoretically be permitted. (And note that the IBA actually expanded
upon the practical availability of such options, because it opened
the way for obtaining a federal license for agencies and limited
branches.)
(ii) Home state rules
obviously, the determination of a foreign bank's home state is
a crucial linch-pin to the operation of the interstate banking re-
strictions. How then does a foreign bank go about selecting its
home state? Does it just hang out a sign saying this is "home sweet
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home"? Well, it is pretty close to that.
The Federal Reserve Board issued its definitive regulations
in October of 1980, instructing banks how to go about selecting their
home state [9]. Incidentally, the foreign banks that now have multi-
state operations had until March 31, 1981, to select their home
state, and there were some fascinating deliberations going on among
certain institutions as to which state to select. Let me just quick-
ly give you some highlights of the home state selection regulation.
First, as I said, a bank can select its own home state; but
if a bank does not select it, then the Federal Reserve will gracious-
ly select it for the bank. The regulation also permits a bank to
change its home state once, but only once. This restriction was not
specifically contained in the IBA, but it was probably necessary to
prevent possible abuses of the home state concept. Obviously, if a
bank has just one branch in one state, then that has got to be its
home state. But the real fascination occurs in the case of a bank
that had offices as of July 27, 1978, in a number of states. Such a
bank may have some very tough decisions in choosing its home state.
Let me take an example. Let us say a bank had a branch in
New York and an agency in another state, such as California [10].
Under the home state rules, if the bank were to designate the state
in which its agency was located as its home state, then suddenly it
would be able to expand the powers of that agency into a full depo-
sit-taking branch and still keep its original grandfathered branch
in New York. So you could get two branches for the price of one.
Now, it would get a bit more complicated if the bank later
wished to change its selection. Let us say, after selecting Cali-
fornia as the home state, a year later the bank wanted to acquire
another bank located in New York. In such event, the bank would be
permitted to switch its home state to New York; but it would have
to give up its domestic deposit-taking powers in California, there-
by reverting to an agency status in that state.
(Iii) Three sets of rules
I am not going to spend any more time on these rules because
they can get very complicated, particularly in the acquisition area.
But I did want to tell you about them to illustrate that there are
now really three sets of principles applicable to banks in the U.S.
in the interstate area. First, there are the rules that apply to
domestic U.S. banks. Second, there are the rules that are applicable
to foreign banks that do not have any grandfathered branches (but
are still allowed out-of-state agencies and limited branches). And
third, there are the rules applicable to those lucky foreign banks
that have grandfathered facilities [11]. Thus, it is true that the
"playing field", if you will, has become a good deal more level,
but there are still some interesting variations in the terrain.
B. Non-banking Activities
I now want to move from the pure banking area, and turn to the
question of non-banking entry in the U.S. This is actually a very
important area for foreign banks, because foreign banks quite typi-
cally have a lot broader powers and non-banking operations than
American banks. They quite often engage in underwriting and distri-
bution of securities, and indeed they often have manufacturing and
industrial affiliates. in theory, the IBA attempted to apply to for-
eign banks the same types of general restrictions against non-bank-
ing entry that were previously applicable to domestic banks under
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the Bank Holding Company Act [121. Just as in the interstate bank-
ing area, they did so with some compromises.
(i) Securities
Let us take underwriting and dealing in securities. At present,
the well-known Glass-Steagall Act [131 severely limits domestic banks'
activities in that area. But if a foreign bank had an underwriting
and securities affiliate established and operating on or prior to
July 26, 1978, then it would be entitled to keep that affiliate. On
the opposite side of the coin, if a foreign bank today had any ideas
about setting up or acquiring a securities affiliate, 1 am sure Neal
Petersen would quickly tell them that that is now flatly prohibited
by the IBA. In short, with the exception of grandfathered securities
operations, foreign banks are now covered by essentially the same
restrictions on securities activities as domestic banks.
(ii) Manufacturing
The situation gets a bit more complex when one examines the
status of manufacturing or industrial subsidiaries or affiliates of
foreign banks. Let us take the case of a shoe manufacturing company.
I am sure everyone in the audience is saying, "If you cannot have an
underwriting affiliate in the U.S., certainly no foreign bank could
ever have a shoe manufacturing affiliate here." Well, that is not
true. The foreign bank may well be able to do just that. Under the
provisions of Regulation K [14] of the Federal Reserve Board--which
were quite recently promulgated and which interpret related provi-
sions of the IBA--there are ways in which a foreign bank could be
permitted to have a shoe manufacturing or other clearly non-banking
subsidiary in the U.S. Briefly, assuming the foreign bank (and any
parent holding company) qualifies for the exemptions provided in
Regulation K, then either it (or any parent company) could have a
foreign subsidiary which directly or indirectly engages in a non-
banking activity here, provided that (1) more than fifty percent of the
foreign subsidiary's consolidated assets and revenues are located in
or derived from outside the U.S. and (2) the proposed activities in
the U.S. are the same kind of activities as the foreign subsidiary
conducts abroad. Thus, to return to our hypothetical example, a
qualifying foreign bank would be permitted to let one of its foreign
subsidiaries or affiliates in the shoe manufacturing business open
up or acquire a slightly smaller shoe manufacturing operation in the
U.S. (151.
(iii) Compromises
What I am trying to illustrate here is that the rules we now
have were based on some compromises that the draftsmen of the Act and
the regulators have had to make, to take into account some existing
facts that they really could not do much about. For example, one of
those facts was that at the time of the passage of the IBA a number
of foreign banks already had in place in the U.S. facilities that
would not have been permitted to domestic banks under the Glass-
Steagall Act. Another fact of life was the significant non-banking
affiliations of a number of foreign banks.
I actually think the compromises that have been developed were
fairly enlightened, given the existing landscape the legislators and
regulators had to work with. But, just as in the interstate banking
area, one is left asking some basic questions about the underlying
restrictions that exist in our banking system. Put another way, the
interstate and non-banking activities restrictions contained in the
IBA have considerably leveled the playing field on which foreign and
domestic banks now compete; but at the same time, the field is not
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entirely level. One is thus left with the nagging question whether
the American system of restrictions, or playing field if you will,
is outdated in today's world of universal banks.
C. Dual Banking System Problems
Now I will not succeed in my goal of thoroughly confusing you
if I do not touch on one other complication for entry of foreign
banks in the U.S., which is caused by the fact that there is a dual
banking system in the U.S. Prior to 1978, foreign banks could open
a branch or agency only pursuant to a state license [16]; thus,
they were mainly exposed to only one side of our dual banking system.
However, since the enactment of the IBA, foreign banks now have the
option to seek either a federal or state license for a branch or
agency. This has exacerbated certain tensions that already existed
in the dual banking system.
Some of these tensions have been healthy. Thus, there has been
a certain amount of competition between the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency and certain state regulatory agencies to provide more options
and powers for the banks that are licensed by them, in an effort to
make their respective licenses more attractive.
For example, to compete against the fact that some perceive
federal branches and agencies as being more attractive, the New York
State Banking Department has spearheaded a legislative and regulatory
revision to permit New York State licensed agencies to issue "large
denomination obligations" that in essence are certificates of deposit
[17].
At other times this competition between regulatory agencies
might not prove to be so healthy, as there has been a bit of compe-
tition to eliminate certain protective requirements that were pre-
viously applicable to the foreign banks. For example, the Comptrol-
ler did not impose a so-called maintenance of assets requirement upon
federally licensed branches and agencies, which for a while stood in
contrast to New York's former requirement that foreign branches main-
tain a margin of 108 percent assets to liabilities. In response, the New
York Superintendent of Banks sought legislation, and implemented
regulations, to permit a relaxation of New York's requirement [18].
Finally, the competition within the system of dual banking
regulation of foreign banks has even resulted in some genteel mud-
slinging between the federal and state regulatory agencies. The New
York Superintendent of Banks and the Conference of State Banking
Supervisors had noted with some alarm that the Comptroller of the
Currency was permitting federal branches and agencies to do a few
things that state branches and agencies could not do.
For example, federal agencies were permitted under the Comptrol-
ler's regulations to take deposits from non-U.S. citizens [19]; in
contrast, neither domestic nor foreign deposits are permitted at most
state agencies. Similarly, certain foreign banks that were previously
foreclosed from obtaining a state license, because their home country
lacked so-called banking reciprocity [20], were permitted to obtain
a federal branch, under the Comptroller's interpretation of his au-
thority under the IBA.
As a result of this dichotomy, the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors and the Attorney General of New York brought a lawsuit
against the Comptroller challenging certain of the regulations that
the Comptroller had issued [21]. It is hard to predict how the ac-
tion will turn out. But the ultimate decision will turn on the in-
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terpretation of a very few possibly ambiguous phrases in the IBA.
Thus, for example, the issue of the reciprocity requirement will
primarily turn on whether the language that authorizes the Comptrol-
ler to license a branch in any state where the establishment of a
branch "is not prohibited by State law" [22] bars a federal branch
only in a state where there exists a flat prohibition against branch-
ing, as opposed to a statement of state criteria for an acceptable
foreign bank branch.
3. DIRECT ACQUISITION OF EXISTING BANKS
At this point we are running short on time, and I wish to leave
some time for Dennis Lehr to address perhaps the most controversial
area of foreign bank entry--that is, direct acquisition of existing
U.S. banks. I would only note, by way of introduction to this sub-
ject, that this is the area where the advantages of foreign banks are
perceived (and I believe rightly so) to be the most significant at
the present time.
MR. LEHR: I am going to skip most of the statistics on foreign
bank ownership. These are readily available in the Comptroller of
the Currency's studies listed in the bibliography. But for those
who cannot resist some statistics, let me just point out that of the
three hundred largest U.S. banks, only twenty-six are foreign owned,
and that includes foreign banking organizations or individuals. Un-
fortunately, the meaning of "ownership" is not agreed on in the dif-
ferent government reports. One government study uses a ten percent
ownership test and thus, if a foreigner owns ten percent of the
stock, that study includes a hundred percent of the bank's assets as
"foreign owned".
A. Antitrust Law in Banking
I have been asked to say something about antitrust law. This
area of the law presents many issues that lawyers get excited about.
In the banking context, antitrust prohibitions generally prevent one
banking organization from acquiring another, because after the acqui-
sition the combined entity will be too big--that is, it will reduce
competition in the market. Just where is, and what is, the relevant
market in any proposed combination leads to a lot of legal business.
In talking about competition in a market, we often find our-
selves in a kind of numbers game. We talk about dominated markets,
and controlled markets, and elimination of actual and potential com-
petitors. There are certain assumptions built into our antitrust
law which generally favor more, rather than fewer, competitive units.
Ultimately, these laws are supposedly applied for the benefit of the
consumers of the services of whatever business is expanding. In our
case, that would be just the everyday bank customers.
(i) Anti-competitive effects
In the context of foreign bank expansion in this country, I
believe our antitrust laws can be viewed from two perspectives.
I have considered what the federal regulators have done with respect
to the antitrust criteria that they are supposed to apply; and I
have tried to ascertain what standards they may apply in the future.
First, I will briefly summarize what the federal agency decisions
have shown in the last few years.
Recent decisions have revealed that anti-competitive effects
were of significant concern to the federal agencies in only a very
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small number of acquisition cases. As an example, we shall look at
the Fed's opinion approving the acquisition of Union Bank in Cali-
fornia by Standard Chartered of London. The opinion, I think, is
worthy of examination for the manner in which it seems to downplay
the anti-competitive effects of the transaction and its emphasis on
the pro-competitive effects. I am personally in sympathy with this
approach.
At the time Standard Chartered sought to acquire Union, Union
was the sixth largest banking organization in California. Califor-
nia has some very large banks, including Bank of America. Standard
Chartered of London had a subsidiary located in San Francisco, and
that subsidiary was the twenty-first largest bank in the state.
The impact of the transaction on actual competition, according to
the Fed, was limited to only three markets. One of the primary rea-
sons that the Fed concluded that the effect of the transaction on
existing competition in those markets was only "slightly adverse"
was because Union Bank was a relatively small competitor compared
to the largest banks in those markets. I fully agree.
However, those who oppose this view would say that in one of
the three markets--in particular, the most significant market in the
state (the Los Angeles metropolitan area)--Union Bank was the fourth
largest bank. As the fourth largest bank in that market, it, to-
gether with the three other largest banks, controlled seventy-one
percent of all deposits; that is, the four banks out of one hundred
and five in that market had seventy-one percent of the deposits.
Had this been a domestic acquisition within the state, the Fed's
decision, I believe, would have come out the other way. The Fed did
not believe there was any direct impact on potential competition.
Rather, it placed great significance on the pro-competitive aspects
of the acquisition, with particular emphasis on the representation
by Standard Chartered that it would provide Union with twenty-five
million dollars in new capital.
Here, again, was a situation that banking lawyers find quite
anomalous. Union was a bank in a weak capital condition. Yet be-
cause of our domestic antitrust laws, no eligible U.S. bank large
enough to supply the needed capital could acquire it; thus, Union
had to look out of state for help. I hope Bob Carswell later will
comment on the prospects for some loosening of those restrictions
[23].
(ii) Future trends
In short, my review of foreign acquisition decisions shows that
the federal regulators have not, to date, been significantly troubled
by the anti-competitive effects of foreign acquisitions. But what of
the future? Pressures have now been exerted on the federal agencies
by some members of Congress to consider the worldwide effect as well
as domestic competitive effects of U.S. bank acquisitions by foreign
banking organizations.
This is significant because the authority under which the do-
mestic banking agencies approve these acquisitions clearly says that
they should look only to domestic markets. The Bank Holding Company
Act and the Bank Merger Act, both direct the federal agencies to
consider competitive effects in any section of the "country", mean-
ing the U.S.; and it has been the practice of the agencies to limit
their review accordingly. Perhaps the economists at the Board and
elsewhere, for one reason or another, sometimes gratuitously mention
the effects on commerce outside the U.S. Correct me if I am wrong,
Neal, but I think in the acquisitions of Marine Midland and National
Bank of North America, the Fed made reference to the effects of the
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acquisition on international markets. To date, however, no federal
agency has denied a bank acquisition based on international market
considerations. As I indicated, my own view is that our federal
regulators should continue to look at our own domestic markets, to
which the statutes under which they operate direct them.
I find support for this view in a recent decision--handed down
on February 20, 1981, by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit [241--involving National Bank of Canada's loss of its Master
Charge business, allegedly through a Sherman Act violation by an
American financial institution. The violation of our antitrust laws,
it was alleged, occurred outside of the U.S. In the last sentence
of the opinion, the court said that "anti-competitive effect upon
U.S. commerce" must either occur within the U.S. or affect export
commerce from the U.S. Thus, I think it is irrelevant, and I hope
it will remain so, whether Standard Chartered or any other foreign
bank should choose to monopolize the markets in Indonesia, in Sri
Lanka, or anywhere else. Our regulators should just confine them-
selves to the U.S. markets.
B. Acquisition Techniques
MR. MUNDHEIM: Laying aside antitrust problems, suppose a for-
eign bank has a branch in New York and it would like to acquire a
bank in Atlanta. It has operated that New York branch since 1970.
Any problem with that?
MR. LEHR: No, because that branch is grandfathered. When I
say no, I am not current on Georgia law, but I am assuming Georgia
law does not prohibit foreign bank ownership. The foreign bank could
then acquire a bank in Georgia.
MR. MUNDHEIM: And make that its home state?
MR. LEHR: That is correct.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Now suppose that in addition to that New York
branch, a subsidiary of the foreign bank also had securities activi-
ties in the U.S. The foreign bank now acquires the Georgia bank.
You have said that it can continue to operate the New York branch and
the new Georgia bank that it acquired. Must it dispose of its secu-
rities business?
MR. LEHR: My understanding is that those securities affiliates
were also grandfathered if they were operating as of July 1978.
MR. PETERSEN: That is a correct interpretation only if the
Georgia operation is a branch or agency.
MR. MUNDHEIM: If the Georgia bank becomes a subsidiary of the
foreign bank, would there be Bank Holding Company Act problems?
Could you rely on the IBA grandfathering provisions to help solve
the Holding Company Act difficulty?
MR. LEHR: Bob, a banking lawyer would advise you to do the
transaction as a purchase of assets and assumption of liabilities,
and to go in as a full deposit-taking branch. Then you could keep
all three operations going and you would not have the Bank Holding
Company Act problem. You would get the benefit of the grandfathered
branch and the securities company in New York.
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C. Controlling Foreign Acquisitions
MR. PETERSEN: I have a comment regarding a couple of things
that Dennis Lehr and Cameron MacRae mentioned with respect to entry
alternatives. Dennis was very bullish on the Edge Act as a tech-
nique for foreign bank entry. I think I would agree with him in
terms of the future prospects for Edge Act activities.
(i) Edge Act corporations
There is an additional advantage for Edge Act corporations
which so far the Board has not taken away. Entry by way of an Edge
Act subsidiary would not make the foreign banking organization sub-
ject to the various non-banking prohibitions of the Bank Holding
Company Act, as would be the case if the foreign bank came in by way
of a branch or a direct subsidiary. When the Board originally pro-
posed its Edge Act revisions in 1979, it would have required conform-
ity to the non-bank restrictions of the Bank Holding Company Act for
any Edge Act subsidiary. Questions were raised about whether the
Fed had authority to do that, and ultimately the Fed backed off.
We still think we have the authority to review any such activities
if they are inconsistent with the purposes of the Federal Reserve
Act and the Bank Holding Company Act. But at the moment, there is a
theoretical advantage (perhaps a real one if you do not push it too
far) with respect to non-bank activities if you come in by way of an
Edge Act corporation.
(1i) Non-banking activities
Another word about non-bank activities. In some instances a
foreign bank holding company can have an ice cream manufacturing or
shoe manufacturing company subsidiary but cannot have a subsidiary
in a closely related financial field. That is anomalous. There is
a provision in section 8 of the IBA which provides that if the for-
eign bank wants to engage in an activity that is of a financial
nature or closely related to banking under Section 4(c)(8) of the
Bank Holding Company Act (governing permissible non-banking activi-
ties for bank holding companies), the foreign bank holding company
must make an application to the Federal Reserve. In that case, the
holding company does not get the benefit of the automatic ice cream
parlor exception.
The Board took the position that the statute meant that an
application is required not only if the activity is already on the
so-called laundry list (such as mortgage banking), but also if it
is generally within Division H of the standard Industrial Classifi-
cation Code (covering, generally, financial activities). The purpose
was to avoid permitting foreign banks to gain a competitive advantage
in providing financial services in the U.S.
The clearest example is an insurance activity that is not on
the 4(c) (8) laundry list, but which, if conducted by a foreign bank,
might give it a considerable advantage in competing with U.S. banks.
On the other hand, if the foreign bank had an ice cream parlor, it
would not, presumably, have any great competitive advantage over U.S.
banks. This is an example of the push-pull between the need to un-
derstand domestic concerns and the desire not to discourage foreign
bank entry into the U.S.
D. Objections to Foreign Acquisitions
MR. MUNDHEIM: When the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank sought to
acquire Marine Midland, a good deal of unfavorable publicity was gen-
erated, and one question raised was whether as a matter of policy it
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is undesirable to permit foreign acquisition of substantial U.S.
banks. The recent speculation about the acquisition of a major bank
on Long Island by a foreign bank has re-ignited that question. Fred
Heldring, what do you think about allowing foreign banks to make
acquisitions of substantial U.S. banks?
MR. HELDRING: Well, there are in my mind two issues. I go on
the assumption that no country likes--to put it in an extreme--to
have one hundred percent of its banking system owned by foreigners,
and that would include the U.S. So the question arises, what is
enough? Perhaps we have reached that point. A little clarity on
that subject would be helpful.
The second point I would like to make--which has not been dis-
cussed as much--concerns the impact upon individual communities of
acquisitions in the private sector generally and in banking in par-
ticular. The life of a community is dependent to a large extent upon
a healthy, and sound, and independent private sector. In that kind
of private sector an independent banking system plays quite an im-
portant role. To the extent that communities become branch towns or
subsidiary towns, this health and soundness of the community is en-
dangered, and we see the results of this in some cases.
I think these two questions arise when you think of the Long
Island case. it is not just because a foreign bank is involved; the
same situation would exist if any other bank acquired that particu-
lar bank on Long Island. There may not be much left on Long Island
in terms of independent banking, and that raises a question as to
what it does to a community.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Perhaps our German colleague, Professor Fritz
Kiibler, has a comment on that point of view.
MR. KUBLER: I feel that this point is particularly interesting;
and I am sure that my countrymen would be unhappy if even less than
one hundred percent of the German banks were taken over by American
banks. It might cause some uneasiness if, for instance, the Deutche
Bank were taken over.
Concerning local communities, it occurs to me that the question
is one of structure. We have been safe, but largely because the local
banks tend to be cooperatives or savings banks, which are organized
under public law. It might be possible to take over a savings bank,
but it is technically and legally so complicated that it just has not
been done so far. The question that arises for me is whether this is
primarily a structural problem, so that you need do no more than keep
banks reasonably small in the local community. Or, are banks some-
what different from normal businesses so that, because they are per-
forming a public service, they should be under some form of special
regulation as far as foreign acquisitions are concerned? I would
like to give that question back to the panel.
MR. VAGLIANO: I think the question is basically one of the
validity or non-validity of local control. Therefore the problem is
not really foreign versus American: it is actually not a foreign
bank problem. It is a question of the structure of the banking sys-
tem here, and whether the local communities benefit more or less
from local control. Of course, that is a terribly long argument.
I think there can be a political reaction in this country if
it is perceived more and more that foreign banks have special ad-
vantages. The IBA has, in a sense, attempted to bring greater clari-
ty and greater uniformity. Still, there are real advantages in terms
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of functions (either because of grandfathering, or because of the
law and the interpretations that may follow from the law, or because
of antitrust regulation) and because of the fact that reciprocity is
not really part of this whole concept. So I can foresee, and this
might particularly happen if a very large bank were acquired by for-
eign interests, that this entire subject could be reopened politi-
cally.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Neal, you had a comment?
MR. PETERSEN: Yes. In a number of Board orders approving
major foreign acquisitions, there have been rhetorical--I guess I
would put it--statements raising concerns about the market share of
foreign organizations in a particular market. However, those state-
ments have not necessarily been a factor in any decision one way or
the other. Under the present Bank Holding Company Act there are real
questions as to whether the degree of foreign market share per se
necessarily gives the Board any basis for denial.
There is an argument, I suppose, that the so-called conveni-
ence and needs tests under section 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act
could be stretched a bit to cover the problem, particularly if a
record could be developed to show that, indeed, the local market
would not be adequately served because of excessive foreign ownership.
On that point, however, the studies done to date (for example, the
General Accounting Office report and our own report on foreign bank-
ing in the U.S.) have indicated that there has been no real walking
away from local markets after foreign banks have come in. Indeed,
the evidence seems to suggest the contrary. Having said all that,
I would certainly agree with the comment that this is a political
hot potato.
There have already been a number of hearings in the Congress
of the U.S. on this subject, and there have been proposals floated
that would change the test for acquisition of banks by ban: holding
companies, both foreign and domestic holding companies. Anything
that might be adopted to change tests under the Bank Holding Company
Act, which would go beyond the present antitrust concerns and the
existing convenience and needs test, may well end up being applied
across the board to both foreign and domestic companies.
One proposal was to apply what we call a public benefits test
to either foreign bank acquisitions or--more likely--any bank acqui-
sition over a certain size. The test would be very similar in con-
cept to the so-called benefits test under section 4(c)(8) of the
Bank Holding Company Act, having to do with non-banking activities.
The test basically says, if there are any adverse effects as defined
in the statute (such as undue concentration of resources, unfair
competition, etc.) they would have to be outweighed by some public
benefit. On the other hand, if there are no adverse effects, we
interpret section 4(c) (8) to say you do not have to have a positive
public benefit. That test might be modified to require demonstration
of a positive public benefit.
There have also been some who propose an automatic cut-off if
a market share gets over a particular size in the hands of foreign
banking organizations. That would be very difficult to apply admin-
istratively and could cause some very serious problems with our
friends overseas in terms of possible retaliation. This concept is
similar to Senator Proxmire's Competition In Banking Act (which he
introduces in every Congress) which would put a limit on an acquirer
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if it would control more than a certain percentage of the deposits
in a particular state.
I think that this subject will continue to be before the
Congress notwithstanding a change in the leadership of the Congress
or a change in the Administration. Senator Heinz--who is a Republi-
can--is very, very concerned in this area. Representative Rosenthal
and Representative St. Germain on the House side--who are Democrats
--are also very concerned. So, I do not think it is a partisan
political issue; but it is a very, very important issue for many
members of Congress, in terms of the particular banking structure
in their district and, indeed, in the country. I would say the
Board has no pending proposals under consideration to make any of
these changes. I am just mentioning that these are the kinds of
ideas that have been suggested both by members of Congress and, in-
formally, by some regulators.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Fred, one minute for a final comment on this
issue.
MR. HELDRING: Right. I certainly do not want to pursue it
any further, but I want to clarify the point I made on the sound-
ness of the community. Admittedly, what I am saying applies to all
acquisitions and not only to acquisitions by foreigners. When you
have an independent local company, it will make contributions, both
in talent and in money, to vital non-profit activities in the com-
munity. As soon as that company is taken over, both organizational
and financial aid ceases. At the present time there are many com-
munities where it is mainly the bankers and lawyers who are still
involved in these kinds of effort. Now, if the bankers get acquired
and lose their independence, that may be rather serious for some of
these communities.
MR. LEHR: I want to note my deep disagreement with Fred
Heldring.
MR. MUNDHEIM: I think we should recognize that there are two
sides to this debate and we could argue the merits at length. But
we must turn to our next topic.
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Supervising Multinational Banking Organizations:
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE HOST COUNTRY
Neal L. Petersen
MR. MUNDHEIM: Assume that we have a foreign bank with a
branch or a subsidiary in the U.S. What are the supervisory respon-
sibilities of the host country? Neal, will you start us on the
answer to that question?
MR. PETERSEN: Thank you, Bob. We are now assuming Colossus
International is in the U.S., either through a subsidiary or through
a branch or agency. I want to discuss some of the supervisory prac-
tices that the U.S. applies to these institutions, and I shall use
as a working example the history of the famous Y-7 and related forms.
For those of you in the banking business those are probably code
words that you know all about, but I will explain it in a little more
detail for the others.
1. PRINCIPLES OF SUPERVISION
I shall start with a basic principle that cuts across the
board, whether you are talking about a domestic bank operation or a
foreign bank operation in the U.S. There is a fundamental principle
in our system which holds that a parent of any banking organization is
looked upon as a source of strength for its subsidiary banking opera-
tions. We apply that concept consistently in the domestic bank hold-
ing company field, and we will apply it in the international field
with respect to foreign banks having branches or subsidiaries in the
U.S.
This point of view may be somewhat different in emphasis from
the perceptions of my colleagues who would argue very strongly that
you have to look at banking on a consolidated basis worldwide, and
that it is really the home country that has the primary and last-
resort responsibility. I would not necessarily disagree with them,
but we have put a little gloss on that concept. As the host country,
we are indeed concerned with and do look to the foreign parent as a
source of strength. And we have said that--the Board said that in
February 1979 in a publicly issued policy statement [1]. The Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council (another bank regulatory
agency, made up of all the other bank regulatory agencies to coordi-
nate supervisory policies and forms) issued a very similar statement
later in 1979, in July or so [2].
Overlaying the application of this principle are the peculi-
arities of our own domestic banking system, in terms of what we
think our domestic banking system should look like and, therefore,
what foreign banks should try to do when they are here. These con-
cerns, again, have been touched on by Dennis Lehr. We have a dual
banking system. We have a strong belief in the separation of bank-
ing from investment banking and other non-banking activity. That
separation is eroded from time to time, but it is still an underlying
philosophy of bank regulation. Therefore, a lot of supervisory in-
formation we request has to do with non-bank activities--particularly
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those conducted in the U.S. We also have geographic constraints
(the so-called McFadden Act constraints) in our regulatory system
and these affect foreign bank operations; but that is not particu-
larly a supervisory matter.
2. THE SUPERVISORY FORMS
A. The Proposed Forms
What did the Federal Reserve, in executing its responsibili-
ties under the Bank Holding Company Act and under the International
Banking Act, do in recent months to deal with these kinds of con-
cerns? In 1979 the Board put out for comment its Form Y-7. As it
was proposed, Form Y-7 would have required very extensive information
on parent foreign banking organizations overseas. Time does not
permit me to discuss all of the details of what was proposed; but,
for example, we would have required from the foreign parent finan-
cial statements of various subsidiaries using accounting principles
generally accepted in the U.S. We would have required extensive
disclosure of the related interests of directors and officers of
foreign banks. We would have required extensive information with
respect to less-than-majority-owned subsidiaries of foreign banks
operating around the world. When we put this proposal out for com-
ment, it was not greeted warmly by the international banking com-
munity. However, we felt that we were pursuing "national treatment"
and requiring the same kind of detailed information we require from
everybody else.
B. Comments on the Forms
The foreign bank commentators had some legitimate points.
The comments we received were very helpful. In that regard I want
to make a practical point here--particularly for those of you who
may be from offshore or representing foreign interests. In my ex-
perience, there have been a number of occasions where foreign bank-
ers, and sometimes their counsel, are reluctant to talk to regula-
tory agencies about problems that the regulatory agency appears to
be creating for them. Sometimes they are reluctant to accept the
invitation to comment. It seems to be a tradition in some countries
that you just do not get on the record with a formal comment or have
a meeting with your regulator and argue with him or her. That is
not the case in this country. Generally, if a foreign institution
has a particular concern it is important that it make a comment.
Many foreign bankers tend to rely exclusively on trade associations
of one kind or another, which, of course, are very helpful sources
of comments. But I am urging that if there is a concern that applies
to a specific entity, for heaven's sake make your points. Indeed,
comments were made by sixty or so foreign banks and a number of trade
associations, including the Institute for Foreign Bankers. We had
a few comments from domestic banks, but not very many.
The comments on Y-7 had two general thrusts. The first, which
I will dispose of quickly, is that we did not have the authority
under the IBA to request all of this information. We felt we clear-
ly did; and nobody has challenged us on that particular point, maybe
because we backed off on some of the things we were requiring.
Another area of concern, which was a very difficult one, was
that much of the information we were requesting--in terms of finan-
cial data and so forth--was not the sort of information foreign banks
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generally disclose to their own regulators, let alone to the public.
Foreign banks were unsure whether this material would be granted
confidential treatment.
Those arguments were very strongly made and very seriously
considered by the Board. Other comments involved various technical
problems. For example, foreign banks often cannot use the account-
ing principles generally accepted in the U.S. They also argued that
it is unreasonable for us to try to examine the business interests
of their directors; that is just not done in other countries. Many
good arguments were made.
The Board considered these comments over quite a number of
months and finally approved a new set of forms. These, I think,
alleviate most of the concerns that the foreign bankers have raised,
while at the same time they give the Board and the other financial
regulatory agencies adequate information to conduct their supervisory
role.
Let me pause here and make a distinction which sometimes is
not made between regulation, the supervisory role, and the examina-
tion role. In the banking regulatory business we generally have
three functions. First is regulation, stating what you can and can-
not do. Second is supervision, which is the monitoring by way of
reports and the like of activities of regulated industries. And
third is examination, which I would describe as the visitorial power.
A lot of people confuse supervision and examination, and con-
sider them the same thing. I do not think they really are, and I
make that point because it is important in connection with the Y-7.
The Y-7 is a supervisory form. We are not proposing to take that
form, and run over to Frankfurt or Basle or London, and walk in the
door, and examine the parent institution. Not at all. The informa-
tion that we are generating through this form is an alert mechanism.
It is something that we would use to see if there are any problems
developing year by year. For example, the Y-8f form (another form
which has to do with transactions with affiliates) is filed quarterly
and is used to pick up information on trends and developments. If
we see a problem, we will address it through the usual informal
consultation with the banking institution here. There may be some
discussion with the parent, and there may be some discussion infor-
mally with the home country regulator if the problem is serious.
However, no home country visitation is involved.
C. Final Version of the Forms
What did the Board do in respect to the Y-7 and the Y-8f in
its final regulations? A summary was made of those forms, together
with an additional related form adopted by the Board. All three
forms can be obtained from any Federal Reserve Bank or the Board.
The summaries are useful in terms of describing what went on in the
regulatory process. The system we adopted to accommodate the most
serious concern of the foreign banks--the confidentiality problem--
was as follows: we divided the originally proposed Y-7 form into
two forms. The new Y-7 requires information, in part 1, that would
be publicly available to shareholders and the public in the home
country. In addition, we are not requiring the accounting principles
that are generally accepted in the U.S. In the Y-7 we will accept
financial statements prepared on the basis of the accounting proce-
dures that are used in the home country, so long as we have an ex-
planation in the initial filing of the differences between U.S.
generally accepted accounting principles and home country principles.
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The second part of the Y-7 form would require varibus kinds
of information on non-banking activities in the U.S. This is no big
problem for the foreign banker, since those records would be readily
available and would, of course, be consistent with U.S. accounting
practices.
3. SOLVING THE CONFIDENTIALITY PROBLEM: The New F.R. 2068
With respect to other, more sensitive financial information,
we handled the issue with a new form. For an example of the prob-
lem, some institutions have over-draft accounting, and it is very
difficult to figure out exactly what are earnings, or what are reve-
nues, or what are expenses. Furthermore, there are so-called hidden
reserves in a number of foreign bank operations. The use of hidden
reserves is an accounting technique that has the purpose of leveling
earnings over time, and it can result in the over-stating of liabi-
lities. We are not able, from a domestic analytical point of view,
to figure out these techniques just by looking at publicly available
foreign bank statements.
So what we did is construct a new form called F.R. 2068. It
is a confidential report on operations. This form we consider to be
a bank examination report in all respects; and this is important,
because we will treat it as highly confidential under the Freedom of
Information Act. For those of you who are not lawyers or are not
from the U.S., the Freedom of Information Act causes many problems
when it comes to bank regulatory and supervisory issues and forms.
The Freedom of Information Act basically provides that a mem-
ber of the public can obtain any document that is an official agency
document in the possession of a federal agency, unless there are
specific exemptions enabling the agency to withhold the information.
One of those exemptions, exemption 8, has to do with examination
reports. We do not give such reports out to the public, and our
action has been sustained in the courts. The courts have given a
very wide definition to the term examination report--even including
consumer examination reports, where examiners measure a bank's com-
pliance with the Truth in Lending Act, equal credit opportunity
statutes, and the like. These reports are deemed confidential exami-
nation reports, not subject to disclosure under exemption 8, even
though they have very little to do with safety and soundness.
In regard to the confidential portions of the foreign bank
reports, we obtained an opinion from the Office of Information Policy
of the Department of Justice (the part of the Justice Department
which defends Freedom of Information Act suits) that this material
may be kept confidential from the public. Of course, if the need is
shown, we will exchange this information with other bank regulatory
agencies that have a supervisory concern--such as the Comptroller of
the Currency, in the case of the federal branch, or the FDIC, in case
of an insured state branch. That is done with all examination re-
ports. With respect to other agencies in the government, some of
which have enforcement concerns (the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, for example), we will not automatically give out an examina-
tion report to any agency that asks for it in connection with an
examination or an enforcement action it may be considering. We ask
the agency, and require it, to define its request very narrowly and
to justify its need for the information. We do not permit fishing
expeditions for information, and we often have long and sometimes
heated discussions with agencies that request examination reports.
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So we think we are able to give a good deal of assurance to the
foreign banking community that the information in the F.R. 2068 will
be kept confidential. We are never in a position, however, to
guarantee confidentiality, because courts in this country conceivably
could order disclosure if a suit were filed. Nevertheless, I think
it highly unlikely that an examination report would be publicly dis-
closed. It is possible, of course, that examination reports could
be subpoenaed during the course of litigation; but if disclosure
were ordered it would be under a protective order, so that access to
the information would be limited to the court and opposing counsel.
In summary, I think we have eliminated most of the major con-
cerns on the confidentiality side--to the extent we can under our
system of law. We have (as described in Appendix II A & B) modified
these report forms considerably. These forms--the Y-7, Y-8f, and
F.R. 2068--are the principal supervisory forms used by the Federal
Reserve with respect to foreign bank operations in the U.S. The re-
ports are due four months after the close of an institution's fiscal
year; and the Reserve Banks or the Board would be willing to discuss
any specific problem that a particular institution may have in terms
of public disclosure and confidentiality. We are very flexible.
For example, in regard to the Y-7 (which is not a bank exami-
nation report and does not have the protection that I mentioned with
respect to the F.R. 2068), we would entertain a request that certain
information, which might otherwise be publicly available or dis-
closed in that form, not be disclosed, on the basis of another ex-
emption of the Freedom of Information Act grounded on trade and con-
fidential information.
Let me re-emphasize that the U.S., as a host country, is very
concerned about the impact of foreign banking operations on our own
banking structure. Because of that concern we probably require more
information than is perhaps typical of other countries with respect
to foreign entrants in those countries.
NOTES
[I] 44 Fed. Reg. 10509 (1979).
[2) 44 Fed. Reg. 44267 (1979).
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ANNUAL REPORT OF FOREIGN BANKING ORGANIZATIONS
FOREIGN BANKING ORGANIZATION CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF OPERATIONS
[Docket No. R-0256]
AGENCY: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
ACTION: Final report forms.
SUMMARY: The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has adopted final
forms for submission by foreign banks that conduct a banking business in the
United States through branches, agencies, subsidiary banks or commercial lending
companies. These forms are the Annual Report of Foreign Banking Organizations,
Form F.R. Y-7, and the Foreign Banking Organization Confidential Report of Opera-
tions, Form F.R. 2068. The reports replace the current Form F.R. Y-7 which had
been filed only by those foreign banking organizations that owned commercial
banks in the United States. A proposed F.R. Y-7 was published for comment in
November 1979, and in response to comments received the Board adopted the modified
Annual Report. In addition, the Board adopted a new report form F.R. 2068. The
information collected by these reports is designed to assist the Board in assessing
the condition of the foreign banking organization as it may affect its U.S. banking
operations. Collection of the reports is authorized by the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 and the International Banking Act of 1978.
The forms will be filed with the Federal Reserve System annually 120 days
after the end of the foreign banking organization's fiscal year. A foreign bank-
ing organization whose fiscal year ends during the period from October, 1980
through February, 1981 shall file its initial reports by June 30, 1981. All other
foreign banking organizations shall file reports within 120 days of their next
fiscal year-end. Form F.R. Y-7 shall be filed with the Federal Reserve Bank of
the District in which the foreign banking organization's United States banking
business is largest. Form F.R. 2068 shall be filed directly with the Board's
Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation. While the reports are intended
to provide information sufficient to monitor an organization's condition on an
ongoing basis, the Board also reserves the right to require the filing of addi-
tional statements and information if such would assist the Board in carrying out
its responsibilities.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stephen H. Lovette, Senior Financial
Analyst, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation (202/452-3622); or
Kathleen O'Day, Attorney, Legal Division (202/452-3786), Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Board proposed the new annual reporting re-
quirement in order to fulfill its supervisory and regulatory responsibilities
under the Bank Holding Company Act ("BHCA") and the International Banking Act.
The proposed report was intended to enable the Board to determine the organiza-
tion's compliance with U.S. laws and regulations and to assess the ability of the
organization to serve as a source of strength to its U.S. banking operations.
The proposed report requested a significant amount of financial and organization-
al information on the worldwide operations of the foreign banking organization.
Substantial adverse comment was received on the report as proposed. The
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two major areas of criticism were the amount and type of financial and share-
holder information requested and the lack of a guarantee of confidentiality for
information submitted. In response to the comments received and in an effort
to reduce the substantial burden that the proposed report would have imposed,
the Board has adopted final report requirements that address these concerns
without impairing the supervisory and regulatory usefulness of the reports.
Foreign banking organizations will be required to submit two reports on an annual
basis, a modified Form F.R. Y-7, and a new report, Confidential Report of Opera-
tions, Form F.R. 2068. The reports do not impose additional informational re-
quirements beyond those that were proposed for comment.
Form F.R. Y-7 - The Annual Report is in two sections. Section I requests
financial statements that are prepared for disclosure in the home country of the
reporting organization together with an explanation of the accounting principles
used in preparation of these statements. There is no requirement that tile state-
ments be prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in
the U.S. The reporting organization must also submit an organization chart of
its U.S. operations, and financial statements for any U.S. nonbanking company that
it controls. The report requests that the foreign banking organization provide
information on its voting securities, including the number of such securities
issued, a description of the voting rights that attach to those securities, and
an explanation of home country requirements with respect to registration of bearer
securities. The report also requests a list of all shareholders that control five
percent or more of the organization's voting securities. Many foreign banking
organizations indicated that they do not know the identity of five percent share-
holders where the securities are held in bearer form. The report has been modi-
fied to require that, when securities are held in bearer form, shareholders need
be identified only to the extent that they are known to the foreign banking or-
ganization. The proposed report also requested that the foreign banking organi-
zation list all shareholdings of its officers and directors in the foreign banking
organization and in any U.S. company in which the foreign banking organization
controlled more than five percent of the shares. The report as adopted requires
reporting of such shareholdings on an aggregate, rather than an individual, basis.
Section II of the F.R. Y-7 requests information on nonbanking activities
conducted by the foreign banking organization in the United States. The amount of
information requested has been significantly reduced from that requested by the
proposed report, in that the organization need not provide an asset, revenue or
income breakdown by individual activity conducted by a U.S. company. The in-
formation requested by this section is intended to assist in determining an or-
ganization's compliance with the nonbanking provisions of the BHC Act and the
Board's Regulation K (12 C.F.R. Part 211).
Foreign Banking Organization Confidential Report of Operations Form F.R.
2068. - The new Confidential Report of Operations requests much of the information
that was requested in Section II of the original proposal. The proposed report
received substantial adverse comment from foreign banking organizations and for-
eign bank supervisory authorities concerning the lack of assurances with respect
to confidentiality. Much of the information requested by the proposed report is
not made available by foreign banking organizations to shareholders or to the
public, and in some instances is not provided routinely even to home country
supervisors. In recognition of the nature of the information requested and tile
fact that it is not available to the public from any source, the Board has deter-
mined to collect the information in the form of a report of operations. The in-
formation will be used to enable the Board to carry out its supervisory responsi-
bilities by allowing the Board to assess the impact of the worldwide operations
of a foreign banking organization on its U.S. banking business. The Board is of
the opinion that the F.R. 2068 is exempt from disclosure under section (b)(8) of
the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8)). Board staff has consulted
with the Director of the Office of Information Law and Policy of the Department
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of Justice who concurs in the opinion that the Confidential Report of Operations
may be withheld under exemption (b)(8). The material collected in the report will
be used solely by the Board in its supervisory capacity. However, the Board may,
when requested, provide information from the report to another federal or a state
banking authority that has supervisory responsibilities with respect to a foreign
banking organization. The Board has determined to amend its Rules Regarding
Availability of Information to ensure that any information that is shared with
another supervisory authority is held strictly confidential.
The Confidential Report of Operations requests an organization chart
detailing all foreign companies in which the foreign banking organization direct-
ly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote 25 percent or more
of any class of voting stock. The proposal requested foreign banking organiza-
tions to provide an earnings statements in a fixed format. This reporting require-
ment was proposed because many foreign banks report a single net income figure and
do not disclose any revenue or expense items. The Board considers that minimum
disclosure of significant revenue and expense items is necessary for any financial
analysis that will be done by the Federal Reserve. The new proposal requires dis-
closure of revenues and expenses as calculated in accordance with local accounting
practices. This will meet the objections raised by those foreign banks that use
overdraft accounting and cannot provide interest revenue on a gross basis. The
proposal also requests an explanation or general description of the accounting
practices used in the recognition and the timing of revenue and expense items.
The reporting requirements with regard to loan loss experience, gains
and losses on securities, and hidden reserves, are essentially unchanged. However,
greater flexibility has been introduced by requesting that the information be
provided in a suggested format rather than a fixed format. The suggested format
calls for beginning balances, additions, deductions, and ending balances. The
intent of the suggested format is to avoid the submission of net figures, which
obscure the magnitude of the transactions and may distort any trend analysis.
The report provides flexibility to enable a foreign banking organization to sub-
mit requested information in a manner that will not impose any undue burden.
The remaining information requested by the Confidential Report of Opera-
tions is financial data on foreign subsidiaries. In the initial proposal, the
foreign banking organization was requested to furnish balance sheets, income state-
ments, and statements of changes in capital accounts for all material foreign
companies in which the foreign banking organization directly or indirectly owns,
controls, or holds with power to vote 25 percent or more of any class of shares.
A company was considered "material" if (1) the investment and advances to the
company exceeded 5 percent of the foreign banking organization's equity capital
accounts; (2) the company's gross income or revenue exceeded 5 percent of the
foreign banking organization's consolidated gross operating income or revenue; or
(3) the company's operations resulted in net income or net loss exceeding 5 per-
cent of the consolidated net income of the foreign banking organization. The
comments received on this proposal indicated that substantial problems exist with
respect to providing this information, particularly with respect to companies in
which the foreign banking organization owns between 25 and 50 percent of the
shares. The foreign organizations indicated that, as minority shareholders, they
did not have access to full financial statements. The Confidential Report of
Operations as adopted addresses these objections while maintaining the Board's
ability to assess the overall financial condition of the foreign banking organi-
zation. The final report requires financial statements on all majority owned,
unconsolidated, material foreign companies. The submission of financial state-
ments of unconsolidated, material investments is necessary to allow an analysis
of the strength of the foreign banking organization. An additional change deletes
the requirement that the foreign banking organization convert the statement to
U.S. dollars. The definition of "material" is unchanged from the proposal.
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With respect to investments of between 25 and 50 percent in material
foreign companies, the report requires the foreign banking organization to pro-
vide financial data detailing the companies' total assets, total stockholders'
equity and net income. This information should be readily available to a minori-
ty shareholder, and will provide an adequate basis for assessing the exposure to
the consolidated operations of the foreign banking organization by the investment.
A foreign banking organization is exempt from filing the Confidential
Report of Operations if its U.S. branches and agencies have neither total ag-
gregate liabilities to nonrelated parties that exceed $100 million nor total
aggregate nonbank deposits, credit balances and liabilities on acceptances that
exceed $10 million. Any foreign banking organization that owns or controls a
U.S. commercial bank or maintains a branch insured by the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation must file the Confidential Report of Operations.
Adoption of Uniform Accounting Principles
The proposal required a foreign banking organization to submit both con-
solidated and parent-only financial statements including balance sheets, income
statements, statements of changes in capital accounts, and statements of changes
in financial position. The comments received from the foreign banks focused on
the burden imposed by the requirements. While the proposal did not establish
uniform criteria for consolidating majority-owned investments, the comments in-
dicated that this reporting requirement implied that the Board was imposing U.S.
generally accepted accounting principles on foreign banking organizations in
requiring consolidated statements.
In revising these reporting requirements, the Board believes that the
establishment of uniform accounting criteria is unnecessary if supplemental data
is reported on earnings and reserves, and separate financial statements for un-
consolidated, material foreign subsidiaries are requested. This financial in-
formation is needed to assist in the analysis of financial statements that are
not prepared on a uniform basis.
Timing Requirements
The comments received on the proposal stated that the filing deadline
of 90 days after an organization's fiscal year-end did not allow sufficient time
to collect financial and other information on worldwide operations and/or trans-
late the information into English. Some foreign banks indicated that financial
statements are not available until after the annual shareholder meeting which is
usually held from four to six months after the fiscal year-end. The comments
generally recommended a filing date of six months after fiscal year-end.
The Board modified the instructions to require submission within four
months of the end of the organization's fiscal year. The instructions provide
for extensions of time to be granted only on an item-by-item basis. The length
of the extension would be based on an assessment of the earliest date when the
information can be provided without undue burden or hardship. Experience with
current filings by both domestic and foreign organizations indicates that reports
are not received until the filing deadline, irrespective of whether the informa-
tion is available at an earlier date. As adopted, the procedures for granting
extensions of time should promote the receipt of some data within a reasonably
short period of time.
Tiered Foreign Organizations
In the proposal, a separate report was required of each member of a
tiered banking organization. The reports as revised treat a tiered banking or-
ganization as a single entity for reporting purposes. The instructions in the
reports describe the specific procedures to be followed by tiered foreign banking
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organizations in filing the Annual Report and the Confidential Report of
Operations.
Attached are copies of the reports.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February 9, 1981.
(signed) James McAfee
James McAfee
Assistant Secretary of the Board
[SEAL]
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REPORT OF INTERCOMPANY TRANSACTIONS FOR
FOREIGN BANKING ORGANIZATIONS AND
THEIR U.S. BANK SUBSIDIARIES
[Docket No. R-0257]
AGENCY: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
ACTION: Final Report Form.
SUMMARY: The Board of Governors has adopted a Report of Intercompany Transac-
tions for Foreign Banking Organizations and Their U.S. Bank Subsidiaries (F.R.
Y-8f) for implementation in the second quarter of 1981. The report is intended
to provide information on transactions between a United States subsidiary bank
and its foreign parent company and certain affiliates of the foreign parent. The
F.R. Y-8f is to be filed on a quarterly basis by foreign banking organizations
that have consolidated assets of $300 million or more and that own or control
commercial banks in the United States.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Susannah N. Lawrence, Financial Analyst,
Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation (202/452-2741) or Kathleen It.
O'Day, Attorney, Legal Division (202/452-3786), Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The F.R. Y-8f requests information on transac-
tions between a United States bank and its subsidiaries in the United States
bank's foreign parent company and its majority-owned subsidiaries (termed "other
BHC members") [1]. The information will assist the Board in monitoring inter-
company transactions that may have adverse effects on the safety and soundness
of a U.S. bank subsidiary of a foreign banking organization and will aid in de-
termining whether a foreign banking organization serves as a source of strength
to its U.S. subsidiary bank.
The F.R. Y-8f may be filed on the basis of each U.S. bank subsidiary's
intercompany transactions with other BHC members or a consolidated report may be
filed on the basis of aggregate transactions between a foreign banking organiza-
tion's U.S. subsidiary banks and other BHC members. The report should be filed
by or on behalf of only the top tier foreign parent company in order to avoid
duplicate reporting by intermediate holding companies.
Asset transfers. Section I of the F.R. Y-8f requests information on asset
transfers of more than $100,000 between the U.S. subsidiary bank and other BHC
members effected during the reporting period. Asset transfers involving loans
that were delinquent, nonperforming, or renegotiated at the time of transfer are
to be reported separately. In addition, descriptive detail is required on any
[1) "Other BHC members" is defined to include (1) the foreign banking organiza-
tion parent company (or companies) and (2) all of that company's majority-
owned subsidiaried that are neither U.S. banks nor direct or indirect sub-
sidiaries of U.S. banks.
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U.S. transfer that is equal to one percent of the total equity of the bank par-
ticipating in the transfer or $2 million, whichever is less. This section of
the report did not receive extensive comment and remains essentially unchanged.
However, comments received indicated that a foreign banking organization would
be unable to gather requested information on transactions effected by foreign
companies in which the foreign banking organization owned less than 50 percent
of the shares or that the organization did not otherwise control. The proposed
form defined "other BHC members" to include all companies, through tile first three
tiers, in which the foreign banking organization owned or controlled 25 percent
or more of the shares. In response to the comments, the definition of "other
BHC members" has been modified to include all majority-ouned companies of the
foreign banking organization.
Specific comment was requested on whether the other major organizational
grouping, "U.S. bank subsidiaries and their subsidiaries," should be expanded to
include U.S. branches and agencies of a foreign bank. Comments on this issue
were mixed. Some commenters stated that because the purpose of the report is to
monitor transactions between U.S. banking operations and all other operations,
in order to assure the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking operation, all
U.S. banking business conducted by a U.S. bank, branch or agency should be in-
cluded within one grouping. Other commenters indicated that a U.S. branch or
agency is an integral part of a foreign bank and to include its operations with
those of a U.S. subsidiary bank would impair the Board's ability to monitor the
transactions of the U.S. bank. After consideration of the comments, the Board
concluded that it would be appropriate to continue to include the U.S. bank and
its subsidiaries as one major grouping since the primary purpose of the F.R. Y-8f
is to isolate transactions between U.S. banks and all other members of the foreign
banking organization
Other Intercompany Transactions and Balances. Section II of the proposed
F.R. Y-8f requested information on five types of intercompany transactions and
balances: (1) U.S. bank subsidiary expenses recognized during the period associ-
ated with amounts paid or owed to other BHC members; (2) intercompany liabilities
and claims; (3) U.S. bank subsidiary participation in loans originated or syndi-
cated by other BHC members; (4) U.S. bank subsidiary loans or commitments made in
connection with credit extended by third parties to other BHC members; and (5)
compensating balances. After review of the burden imposed and the purposes of
the report, the Board has eliminated the requirement for submission of information
on loan participations. The proposal also required that average balances be cal-
culated using weekly balances as of the close of business on each Wednesday
falling in the reporting period. As revised, the report requires that average
balances be calculated using the last 30 calendar days of the reporting period.
Foreign Exchange Transactions. Intercompany foreign exchange information
is to be reported in Section III of the F.R. Y-8f. Under this section, the res-
pondent is asked to report (1) whether any U.S. bank subsidiary (or any of its
subsidiaries) has experienced a net realized loss or a net unrealized loss on
foreign exchange transactions during the period; and (2) whether during the period
any U.S. bank subsidiary (or any of its subsidiaries) was a party to foreign ex-
change transactions with other BHC members at nonmarket rates.
In the original proposal, the Board requested comment on whether, in order
to reduce reporting burden, there should be established an amount below which
realized or unrealized loss need not be reported. Most comments addressed this
issue by suggesting various cutoff points. After considering all comments re-
ceived, the Board has revised the report to require reporting of a foreign ex-
change loss only if the loss is greater than one percent of the total equity of
the U.S. bank subsidiary, or one million dollars, whichever is less.
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A copy of Form F.R. Y-8f and instructions is attached.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February 9, 1981.
(signed) James McAfee
James McAfee
Assistant Secretary of the Board
[SEAL]
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Supervising Multinational Banking Organizations:
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE hOME COUNTRY
Alain Hirsch
MR. MUNDHEIM: Let us follow through with our hypothetical.
Assume that the foreign bank with the U.S. branch or subsidiary is a
Swiss bank. Alain Hirsch, a member of the Swiss Banking Commission,
will tell us the view of the home country as to its regulatory and
supervisory responsibility. After you have done that, Alain, perhaps
you will want to raise some questions as to whether or not the de-
mands of the host country for information strike you as reasonable
and practical.
MR. HIRSCH: Well, if you will allow me, Bob, I think it
would be better for the discussion if I begin with the second part
of what you have just described and discuss the problem exposed by
Neal Petersen a minute ago. Then, in the second part of my remarks
I will consider the responsibilities of the home country, that is,
of the parent bank.
1. RESPONDING TO THE DEMANDS OF THE HOST COUNTRY
I think, Neal, that everybody agrees, or could agree in prin-
ciple, that a parent bank has to be a source of strength to the
whole of the banking organization. The problem is, who has to super-
vise it and how much? I suppose that you would also agree that the
branches and subsidiaries of a bank should not be a source of weak-
ness for the parent and accordingly that the parent supervisory
authorities have some responsibility over them.
A. U.S. Requirements
Now, let us begin very concretely--with your new regulations.
One can start with your form P.R. Y-8f covering transactions between
a subsidiary or branch in the U.S. and the foreign parent bank. I
think that nobody could object to this form and I understand that
nobody has, although it requests a great deal of information from
the bank. Of course, it requires the foreign bank to give its whole
organizational chart to the U.S. authorities; but that is necessary
to see what relationship the U.S. branch or subsidiary has to the
whole banking group. So, the whole of Y-Sf is, I think, fully per-
tinent to your supervisory task. It has not been challenged, nor
should it be. Perhaps it is a good example, if I may begin with a
compliment, for other countries to consider.
The second form you have put out is P.R. Y-7 in its new in-
carnation. In the workshop we could discuss in some detail, perhaps,
whether the entire form is necessary and reasonable; but on the
whole, I think that this is not a very hot topic.
The hot topic is quite evidently the third form, this pink
colored form P.R. 2068, in which you definitely want to know details
of the financial situation of the whole international group. You
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want to determine for yourself whether it is really sound and whether
it is really a source of strength for the U.S. branch or subsidiary.
B. Criticisms of the New U.S. Requirements
As I have had the occasion to tell you already, I must can-
didly say that I think this is going just too far. I emphasize the
fact that I am not speaking from the foreign bank's point of view;
but rather, it is too far from the point of view of foreign sover-
eignty. The main concern is that this path, which the American
authorities have followed in a modest way, challenges the basic
principle that it is primarily the responsibility of the home coun-
try to supervise an international banking group. I suggest to you
that if this approach were taken by a number of other countries in
the world, the supervision of international banks would become im-
possible.
My main thesis is that what the American authorities have
done, they could have done only on the assumption that no other
country in the world would be bold enough to do the same. I think
it is not rude--I hope it is not--to say that it is a form of legal
imperialism to do something which you suppose no other country will
do, because if four or five others should do it, it would be unac-
ceptable. This is really the problem, and it is a pity that appar-
ently the American banks do not fully understand it. If you really
have not received many objections from the members of your American
banking community, it is probably because they do not understand
the implications of the form. This could be a bad example for for-
eign authorities; and foreign states could possibly go further,
showing less respect for confidentiality than the U.S. has. This is
my first point.
The second point is that this form, and this way of supervi-
sion, is probably not a very efficient method for the U.S. because,
as you said a minute ago, you have very few means of verifying the
accuracy of these figures. Let us not discuss the possibility of
taking action toward the international group, if you feel it is going
in an unsound direction. Of course, at the end of the day you may
close the subsidiary or the branch in the U.S., but this is only if
the situation is very serious. If something is wrong, the best an-
swer is to ask the authority of the home country for a discussion.
In my opinion, this could have been done without the pink form.
Last, but not least, you have said yourself that the confi-
dentiality of this report is intended, but is not certain. This
may be quite disturbing, especially when you said that you would not
automatically give information to other agencies. Nobody reading
the report would understand it that way. I am sure you will try
your best not to give out information, but as you said, nobody knows.
2. HOME COUNTRY SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES
We come now to the point of asking, what would and what could
the home country or the home supervisory authority do? If I suggest
that you should rely on that home authority, or go to it when some-
thing is wrong, it must be on the assumption that the home authority
takes its responsibility seriously. Admittedly, this responsibility
of the home country is not assumed in the same way in all countries
today.
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A few years ago it was quite normal to think that the authori-
ty which supervised a parent bank was entirely responsible for super-
vising all its direct activities abroad--lending directly abroad,
and so on. To a certain extent, it also supervised foreign branches,
although there were some exceptions, because branches were already
being supervised in the host countries. It was admitted, however,
that subsidiaries were the concern of the local authorities only,
and not the concern of the parent.
It is only a relatively recent development to admit--and
quite rightly, of course--that economically a subsidiary is very
similar to a branch. It does not make sense for the parent's author-
ity to supervise a branch and to forget about the subsidiary. I do
not speak now about some special kinds of subsidiaries which, of
course, raise special problems. For instance, there are subsidia-
ries in which the bank has only a minority holding but wherein
fact, it controls the bank; or there are joint ventures where two or
three banks together own one bank. Problems arise especially when
such joint ventures become important.
But, for a minute, let us forget about these exceptions and
think about the normal subsidiary: the wholly-owned or majority-
owned foreign subsidiary. Surely, the principle of supervision of
these entities by the parent's authority is not universally acknowl-
edged today. In some countries there is still a lack of legal basis
for consolidated worldwide supervision by the parent. I understand
that this is still the case in France, where they lack any authority
to supervise subsidiaries. To a certain extent this is also true
of Germany. But in more and more countries, the legal basis exists
and the will of the supervisory body is also present.
There are, of course, technical difficulties in supervising
foreign operations. The host country also provides supervision--
local supervision--for the branch or subsidiary. Certainly, the
aim is not just to have additional, competitive, and excessive su-
pervision of the same banking operation. Rather, the idea is to
develop rational cooperation between two institutions to verify the
condition of these subsidiaries. I think that submission to the
supervisory authority of the parent country is necessary in order to
have an overall view of the whole banking group. Being able to see
it in a comprehensive form, the parent country can apply at least
some control to the whole of the banking group.
Again, the rules may be very different in different countries.
I understand, for instance, that the American authorities receive
rather good consolidated statements from their American banks with
foreign subsidiaries; but the authorities do not impose the capital
requirement of the American law to all the entities covered by this
consolidated balance sheet. In Switzerland we content ourselves
with a relatively simple method of consolidation. We think that the
capital requirements of the Swiss law should not be weakened by the
fact that a bank has subsidiaries in some places where the capital
requirements are lower. Indeed, in the case of Switzerland, almost
all countries of the world have lower capital requirements. For
several years in practice--and formally since January 1, 1981--we
have applied to subsidiaries the capital requirements of the Swiss
law, which are fairly high (between seven and eight percent of the
assets of all the worldwide operations of a bank). This kind of
rule has not led, if I am correct, but could lead, to some duplica-
tion of regulation. I strongly suggest that the only way to recon-
cile both governments' legitimate concerns is through cooperation
between the home authority and the local authority.
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3. NEED FOR MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION
Let me make one more point about the problem of supervision,
worldwide supervision. If the home country is to undertake its
responsibilities effectively, it has to have the means, not only to
get information, but also to verify this information on a worldwide
basis. Here, of course, the problem is how to verify information
in a foreign country, and here the difference between supervisory
procedures in the U.S. and in Switzerland is interesting.
The U.S. has a system of direct supervision with American
officials examining the banks directly, while we in Switzerland, as
in other European countries, use private auditors appointed by the
banks. These are not completely private auditors. They are chosen
from a list established by the federal banking commission, and they
are very closely supervised by the authority. These auditors really
act in many ways as if they had some public authority: they function
through the delegation of public authority to a private company.
We are very happy, I must say, with this system. I suggest that this
method is the most practicable for controlling banks on a worldwide
basis. For an official body to go into a foreign country and inspect
on site is generally considered unacceptable by the host state; but
private auditing companies may have either subsidiaries or corres-
pondent companies in many other countries. They may even send their
own people to examine the subsidiaries of the bank. This would not
normally be considered as an act of state and would usually be ac-
cepted by the bank and the host government. Worldwide verifying--the
examining process in your terminology--is more easily accomplished
this way.
Now, two words about cooperation, although I do not want to
overlap what Peter Cooke will say. To begin with, if cooperation
has to take place, the big problem starts with the initial establish-
ment of branches or subsidiaries. This involves questions of com-
petition and of public benefits. A very important condition for
allowing the entry of a foreign bank should be the international
standard under which it operates and the fact that it has proper
worldwide supervision in its home country. If not, I suggest that
it is not possible to replace that lack of home-country control by
any form of confidential pink report.
If a bank wants to enter the U.S. or any country, it should
be customary to make sure that its supervisory authority controls
and supervises it in an accepted international way. This need not
mean exactly following the American standard or the Swiss standard
or the English standard; but supervision must be provided at an
acceptable level and on an international basis. That would solve
a great many problems. If we consider offshore subsidiaries, off-
shore banks, and parent banks in offshore countries, the host super-
visory authorities readily admit that they normally do not control
the whole group on an international basis. So, without any detri-
ment, I think this requirement would solve a great part of our
problem.
I believe the second condition for entry should be that the
supervisory authority of the parent country must be ready to coop-
erate fully with the host authority. Especially, it must be willing
to alert the supervisory authority of the subsidiary or branch if
the whole of the banking group gets into some kind of trouble or if
there is an improper transaction between the subsidiary and the
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parent bank. If we could approach this goal, I think it'would
create an effective and efficient system of supervision for inter-
national banking. Benefits would be realized both from the point
of view of the supervisory bodies and also from the point of view
of the banks, because duplication and excessive regulations would
be avoided. I will end with a question: Do you think that the
kind of regulation you have recently adopted in the U.S. is helping
or is hindering efforts in this direction?
MR. MUNDHEIM: Before I give Neal Petersen a chance to answer
that, I want to be sure I understand the point. You are saying,
Alain, that before allowing entry of a branch or subsidiary into
Switzerland, you would look at the adequacy of the supervisory re-
gime in the home country of that bank?
MR. HIRSCH: This approach is now developing. We have just
begun to discuss it in the Banking Commission in some specific
instances. Our law does not provide that foreign worldwide super-
vision of the international group is a condition for entry; but
what is required in our law is that a bank should have proper or-
ganization. Now, it seems clear to me that having proper organiza-
tion for a subsidiary means being properly controlled by the parent
and by the supervisory authority of the parent. I am confident that
if we make this point we would be supported by the court. Indeed,
we have considered this factor in many cases where we were convinced
that the supervisory authority of the parent bank was quite adequate.
True, we have not yet come to a decision to forbid an entry for this
reason alone, but I strongly believe that we are moving towards that
possibility.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Neal, is that a possible standard for approv-
ing or disapproving branches or subsidiaries in the U.S.? If it is
not, is that part of the reason for our governmental attitude that we
cannot rely on home country supervision? Is there some middle path?
MR. PETERSEN: I do not know if I disagree in principle with
what Alain Hirsch is saying--that considerable reliance should be
given to the home country supervisor. I think it is something that
perhaps over time we might strive for. I have some immediate prob-
lems with it in terms of entry into the U.S. at this time and under
existing international arrangements; and I am sure Peter Cooke will
expand on that theme. First, I think it would be very difficult
for the Federal Reserve or the other bank regulatory agencies to be
making public judgments on the adequacy of supervision in other
countries.
Second, if you go back to the principle of national treatment
in the foreign banking area, you should bear in mind that we are not
asking the foreign banks for any more information than we require,
for example, of a domestic bank holding company filing Form Y-6--
even though the form number is a little bit lower. That leads me to
the third point which I will give to you in all candor. This is my
personal view and not necessarily the view of the Board of Governors
or anybody else. Political considerations in this country would not
allow us to adopt the system that Alain Hirsch suggests.
We have a very open country in terms of foreign banks coming
in at the moment. They had been somewhat restricted by the IBA, but
I think the system is still one of great openness and probably as
open as any country in the world. Now, that policy has been under
some political attack--often in regard to the adequacy of our super-
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vision of the entities coming in. To illustrate that point, I can
refer you to Congressional hearings where the Board testified about
its approval of certain acquisitions by foreign bank holding com-
panies. At those hearings many members of Congress raised serious
questions about the adequacy of our supervision of foreign banks in
this country. Now, this is not a legal problem. It is a political
concern--a major one in terms of adopting any approach such as that
Alain Hirsch suggests.
The next point I would make is that foreign banks in the U.S.
--foreign subsidiaries and foreign branches--now have the same
access as any other domestic institution to the lender-of-last-resort
and the adjustment-credit facilities of the Federal Reserve. In some
instances insured foreign branches have a potential claim, or their
depositors have a potential claim, on the FDIC insurance fund. I
think it would be difficult to fulfill these roles without satisfy-
ing ourselves as much as we can of the overall strength of the for-
eign organizations.
Finally, I would disagree with Alain that what we are asking
for is all that onerous and difficult for a foreign banking organi-
zation to come up with--particularly the modified Y-7 and F.R. 2068.
It seems to me that it is not a difficult job to file that report
once a year and to file quarterly the form Y-8f. So, I would con-
clude my remarks by saying: (1) I don't think we are being unrea-
sonable. (2) I think it is a proper concern of the host country to
require this kind of information for ongoing supervisory purposes.
(3) I think it would be very difficult at this time for us to change
our approach in any significant way--given the present climate--even
if it would be desirable to do so. (4) I think the lender-of-last-
resort function, the claim on the Federal Reserve that these insti-
tutions may have from time to time, argues for our treating them the
same as we treat domestic institutions.
MR. HAWES: Neal, could you react to Alain's specific sugges-
tion about independent verification by auditors? As a general prin-
ciple, I think it has some interest.
MR. PETERSEN: I imagine it does. Our banking system, as far
as supervision is concerned, has been traditionally grounded not
upon independent auditors, but upon actual examination and reportinq
to the bank supervisory agencies. I do not think that we would be
comfortable with an independent audit verification at this time.
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Supervising Multinational Banking Organizations:
EVOLVING TECHNIQUES FOR COOPERATION AMONG
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES*
W. Peter Cooke
MR. MUNDHEIM: We have heard that some of the problems be-
tween the host and the home country could be smoothed out by interna-
tional cooperation. Peter Cooke has been one of the leaders in the
effort to develop international cooperation among supervisory agen-
cies. Peter, would you talk a little bit about that approach to the
problem?
MR. COOKE: Thank you,Bob. Those of you who just heard Neal
Petersen and Alain Hirsch's remarks will realize how difficult it
is to foster this international cooperation.
I would like to spend a few minutes talking about the inter-
national framework of supervisory cooperation within which the de-
bate about Y-7, and its relation to the operation and supervision of
foreign bank branches and affiliates in the U.S. and U.S. branches
and affiliates abroad, is being conducted.
1. RECONCILING DIFFERENT LEGAL SYSTEMS
First of all, an obvious remark. You cannot regulate inter-
nationally unless you have a governing international law. You can
only supervise. International supervisory techniques and agreements
on common approaches only become legally based when they are incor-
porated within different national systems on a consistent basis.
This problem of reconciling different legal systems, different
regulatory approaches, will pervade my remarks.
A. Domestic Supervision
I want to begin by reminding you of the environment in which
international supervision developed. Supervisors are domestic
animals, or they certainly were until the 1970s. Then, all of a
sudden, spurred on by events like the failures of Herstatt Bank and
the Franklin National, supervisors came to a rather salutory percep-
tion of the degree to which banking had become internationalized and
the degree, therefore, to which supervisory techniques and proce-
dures should also be internationalized.
They realized that there was a supervisory vacuum in the
global marketplace and that it needed to be filled. Filling this
* Mr. Cooke's remarks were based on a more detailed paper, Develop-
ments in Cooperation Among Bank Supervisory Authorities. That
paper is reproduced in the Appendix to this chapter.
0378-721418110000-00001502.75 0 1981 North-HolHand [2441
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol3/iss3/1
W.P. Cooke / Techimques for cooperation among supervisory authorities
vacuum involved two steps: first, the adaptation of essentially
domestic supervisory systems to the international marketplace, and
second, the need for cooperation among the domestic authorities.
There are two ways in which this cooperative effort can be pursued
and they can be characterized very clearly, I think, in the work of
two groups which are the most active in this field.
B. Steps Toward Global Supervision
The first, and the first in time, was a group which was set
up among the supervisory bodies of the European Community. It was
called the Groupe de Contact, and it set out to meet on an informal
basis to discuss supervisory problems within the European Community.
It later developed a parallel role, undertaking technical studies
for formally constituted bodies within the European Community. The
ultimate objectives of the Community are directed towards the har-
monization of banking legislation in the affected countries. That
particular route is one which seeks to produce, by way of European-
based legislation, a convergence of national laws and practices to
produce a common system within which banks can operate across na-
tional boundaries within the European Community.
The second approach--perforce a more informal approach--is
that which is followed by the supervisors of the main industrialized
countries meeting in Basle. It is essentially one of informal co-
operation. It provides a forum for the formulation of guidelines
for international supervision, for personal contacts between super-
visors, and for mutual education about each other's systems. Most
important, it ensures that at least among the major countries, and
I hope more widely as the message is spread, there will be no sig-
nificant gaps in international supervisory arrangements. This
group does not seek to promote harmonization of law or regulation,
although it may be--and I would certainly hope that this would
happen--that some element of convergence of practice in different
countries will come about through a developing perception of each
country's best practice.
2. THE BASLE CO1MITTEE OF SUPERVISORS
I want to focus my remarks this afternoon on the work of the
Basle Committee of Supervisors. What is that committee trying to
do? We are trying to exercise an appropriate measure of control
over the international banking system. That system needs to be
allowed to work so that it can fulfill its function of financing
international trade. Although the system must be given scope to
develop, it must develop in an orderly manner. A delicate balance
must be struck between maintenance of national interests and the
freedom of the international marketplace. The real problem with
supervising the international business of banks is that if they are
supervised too rigidly the banks can just walk away and do their
business somewhere else where the supervision will be much less
stringent. Hence, the growth of the offshore center, as it is some-
times known, which permits the banking system to escape the fiscal
and monetary control regulations of national authorities. Indeed,
the growth of the Euro-currency markets in the first instance de-
rived from measures taken by the U.S. authorities for domestic
reasons. So, there is a delicate balance here to be maintained.
There are two main strands of the work which is being pursued
and the understandings which are being sought internationally. The
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first is what has come to be known as the Concordat. This name is
somewhat obscure. It relates, if my history does not desert me, to
certain activities of the medieval papacy--which is perhaps not an
unreasonable antecedent for modern day banking supervisors.
A. The Concordat
The principle of the Concordat was developed in the very early
days of international supervisory cooperation, in the mid-1970s, be-
cause there were no established practices relating to the overlapping
responsibilities of different national supervisors where banks were
conducting business across national boundaries. It sets out guide-
lines covering the responsibilities of different supervisory authori-
ties for the ongoing supervision of banks where those banks operate
in more than one national jurisdiction. It is not, and it was never
intended to be, an agreement for the provision of lender-of-last-
resort facilities to the international banking system. There should
not be any automatic link between acceptance of responsibility for
ongoing supervision and the assumption of a lender-of-last-resort
role.
The aim of the Concordat, then, is to sustain, as far as
possible, the health and safety of the existing structure. It does
not set out to rule on the way in which the pieces of that struc-
ture should be picked up if it is broken. The Concordat encompasses
the following principal guidelines and recommendations:
(1) The supervision of foreign banking establishments should be
the joint responsibility of host and parent authorities.
(2) No foreign banking establishment should escape supervision,
each country should ensure that foreign banking establishments
are supervised, and supervision should be adequate as judged by
both host and parent authorities.
(3) The supervision of liquidity should be the primary responsi-
bility of host authorities since foreign establishments generally
have to conform to local practices for their liquidity management
and must comply with local regulations.
(4) The supervision of solvency of foreign branches should be
essentially a matter for the parent authority. In the case of
subsidiaries, while primary responsibility lies with the host
authority, parent authorities should take account of the exposure
of their domestic banks' moral commitment in this regard.
(5) Practical cooperation would be facilitated by transfers of
information between host and parent authorities and by the granting
of permission for inspections by or on behalf of parent authorities
on the territory of the host authority. Every effort should be
made to remove any legal restraints (particularly in the field of
professional secrecy or national sovereignty) which might hinder
these forms of cooperation.
I have gone into some detail on this agreement because it is
the cornerstone of all international supervisory cooperation which
has been developed since that time. Indeed, it has recently been
reexamined and found to be still an adequate statement of the basic
approach towards international supervisory cooperation.
Just in passing, I might say that the Concordat has an impli-
cation for the operation of the Y-7 Report and associated forms. I
have a great deal of sympathy with what Alain Hirsch has said. At
the same time, because I try to sit in a position which enables me
to see the best sides of everybody's arguments, I also understand
the U.S. domestic problems. What is really crucial is that there be
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no infringement by the U.S. authorities of the principles of the
Concordat. Thus, the U.S. authorities must recognize--and I think
they do--that parental responsibility operates across national fron-
tiers.
On one point, I very much agree with Alain. I too am not
sure what the U.S. authorities will do with the information they are
seeking from their reports. It certainly would be highly undesir-
able, in terms of developing and sustaining international coopera-
tion, if every country were to adopt the same procedures as the U.S.
I might comment that the objections to the Americans' original pro-
posals which have been expressed by most other major countries might
be thought to ensure that those countries would not have the pre-
sumption to impose similar procedures, as doing so would only fly in
the face of the case they are presently putting to the U.S. authori-
ties. However, before dwelling too long on an abstract debate, I
personally feel that the important thing is to see how the matter
resolves itself in practice. Often things work out better than one
might imagine and I think we should wait and see how it does work out.
B. The Principle of Consolidation
The second major element in the development of supervisory
cooperation relates to what I have described as the principle of
consolidation, touched on earlier by Alain. That is, the principle
that there should be a capacity for the parent's supervisor to un-
derstand the totality of a bank's international business, in order
to get a proper picture of that institution's overall exposure to
risk and its capital adequacy. The consolidation principle is cur-
rently being implemented to varying degrees in different countries.
The principle has been accepted by all the major countries and has
obvious implications for the way in which supervisory responsibili-
ties are carried out in practice.
3. SHARING INFOIATION
In my paper I discuss a number of other aspects of interna-
tional supervisory cooperation [1]. For the moment, I want to un-
derscore just two aspects; they both relate to information flows.
There are two basic problems. One concerns consistency of data.
This is a real headache and will continue to be so, but is an
area where everybody is going to have to work very hard to improve
consistency. Data gathered by national banking systems for their
own national purposes do not generate an adequate basis for produc-
ing data on the worldwide activities of most of the major three
hundred banks of the world. Harmonizing data procedures and data
gathering arrangements is extremely difficult. This is also very
costly to the banks and they do not like it very much. I keep tell-
ing commercial bankers that I think they should regard harmonization
of this sort as very much in their own interests. They should be
prepared to produce additional data when it is required, in order to
serve their own wider interests by having global information avail-
able. Such information will be useful in their own businesses.
The second aspect relates to bank secrecy. A great deal has
been said about this subject. Personally, I do not believe that
banking secrecy provisions in different countries are an overwhelm-
ing obstacle to cooperation among supervisory authorities. It is
mostly on the deposit side, the liability side of the balance sheet,
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that the real sensitivity lies. Certainly Alain would agree that
this is the case in Switzerland, which is perhaps the arch priest
of banking secrecy.
It is important, of course, to know about concentration of
deposits, but it is really very much more important to know about
the spread of the risks on the assets side of the balance sheet.
The major industrialized countries, which include most of the major
banks of the world, have looked at this subject in a detailed way
over the last year or two. They have concluded that while it cannot
be denied that there are problems, these problems are manageable in
terms of the broad objectives of international supervisory coopera-
tion. You can get the data that you need in order to consolidate
and to understand the extent of the exposure of different banks
around the world. Insofar as verification procedures are concerned,
if direct examination of overseas branches or subsidiaries by the
parent is not feasible or permitted, it can be handled by agreements
authorizing the host country supervisor to act as the agent of the
parent country supervisor, or through the external audit route.
I understand Neal Petersen's reservations about these routes, but
in the real world, in international terms, you must accept the tech-
niques available. I would think that most of us would feel that the
external audit route for verification of data is generally a pretty
acceptable one.
Now, all this cooperation I have been talking about has been
in the context of the committee which meets at the BIS in Basle.
We are working to develop wider cooperation across the whole world.
You cannot, of course, operate a committee with a hundred or so
countries, so we have just twelve. We do have gatherings where
these agreements and understandings can be disseminated more widely.
The federal agencies in the U.S. are organizing a conference in
September 1981, in which supervisors from all around the world will
meet to discuss all these problems. This conference follows one
which we had in London in 1979. In the interim between these con-
ferences, we disseminate within the supervisory fraternity the mater-
ial we produce in Basle.
4. FUTURE TRENDS
To conclude very briefly, I think that the important thing to
realize about international supervisory cooperation is that the in-
ternational banking system is here to stay. International banking
is not going to go away. There is an enormous mass of international
business and no matter what changes are made in national bank regu-
lations, the international banking system is not going to disappear,
and certainly could not without a great deal of effort on the part of
national authorities over a very long period of time. The growth of
international banking has been accompanied by evolution of interna-
tional banking supervision. I think that the basis of good coopera-
tive work has been well established and should have significant im-
pact on the capacity of the supervisory authority in host and parent
countries to reconcile the kinds of problems which surfaced a little
bit, peeked out from under the carpet, shall we say, in Neal Peter-
sen's and Alain Hirsch's comments.
The number of countries to which this international coopera-
tion is going to be significant is increasing all the time, because
more and more banks in more and more countries are coming to have an
international dimension to their business. I think the system has
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enormous resilience to withstand shocks and difficulties which may
occur. Good supervision all around the world is absolutely essen-
tial to maintaining that resilience.
I would like to close by echoing a remark which Bob Mundheim
made at the beginning. As the system changes, supervisors have to
change with it. Structurally we will see, at least in the interna-
tional sphere, the closer integration of banking, investment banking,
and other aspects of the international securities business. Conse-
quently, the regulation of the banking and securities businesses may
also have to be more closely integrated in order to respond not only
to the internationalization of the two lines of business, but also
to the increasing intertwining of the two.
I would not wish to leave you with the impression that I am
over-confident about the capacity of the system to meet all the
strains to which it may be subject, but I think it is very much
better able to do so than it was a decade ago. I have a little
notice on my desk which is a quotation from Benjamin Disraeli, an
old nineteenth century prime minister in my country. It reads,
"Confidence is suspicion asleep." And so I always wish to be on the
guard against being over-confident about the capacity of the system
to sustain strain. As my Governor put it in a recent speech, "The
trouble with good health is that it is such a precarious state. It
can only get worse."
5. REMAINING PROBLEMS
MR. MUNDHEIM: Fritz, did you have a comment?
MR. KUBLER: well, there is not much I can add. Before coming
here I asked our supervisory authorities in Berlin about their feel-
ings about the present situation. I must say, everything they said
confirms what Peter Cooke has told us right now. The system works
very well inside Europe, and existing gaps are going to be filled.
Germany is aiming at legislation for consolidation. Even at the
present moment, German banks, under a sort of gentlemen's agreement
with the authorities, come forward on a voluntary basis with infor-
mation concerning their Luxembourg subsidiaries. So, I would like to
raise only two questions.
After having listened to the dispute between Neal and Alain,
my impression is that there remains a problem in Europe. The system
works well when the countries involved have about the same level of
supervision. But what are we going to do with the countries that
are not yet at this level--and perhaps will not be for the next dec-
ade or decades? I am sure that we are in almost the same situation
as the U.S. We just cannot completely prevent them from doing bank-
ing in Western Europe.
The second question to which I would like to return is the
problem of secrecy. Looking at some of the more recent American
legislation--for instance, at the financial privacy act you have
adopted [2]--the question arises, shouldn't Europe go a little bit
the same way? Of course, it cannot be overlooked that the German
supervisory authority is part of the Department of Treasury. This
certainly does not mean that all information they receive will go to
the Internal Revenue Service. But still, wouldn't it benefit inter-
national cooperation in banking supervision if a clearly defined
line could be drawn? Legislation could be enacted to specify where
information may go and where it has to be withheld. I would be very
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happy to get reactions to this question from the supervisors on the
panel.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Neal or Alain, do you want to respond to that?
MR. HIRSCH: The second question is the easy one, I think.
We are moving toward legislation establishing the limits on the dis-
tribution of information given to a banking supervisory body, es-
pecially in the Common Market. The new Common Market text restricts
the use of information given by one authority to another authority.
Basically, information may be used only for supervision of banking
and for nothing else. The only small problem is how to deal with a
criminal offense. In some countries the notion of criminal offense
is very much broader today than it was in the past. It can mean even
a very, very minor offense. So, there are still some problems, but
I think on the whole, we are in the clear.
Your first question is the more difficult one. What if a
bank coming from a country where the supervisory organization is
still weak wants to do business in Europe? I think we should then
say, "If you are not internationally supervised in the proper way,
then we will look with a very, very close eye to see if you may have,
for instance, an independent subsidiary in Switzerland or in Germany."
An economically independent subsidiary should not be part of an in-
ternational group or community which is not properly supervised.
In practice, that would mean applying some version of your Form Y-8f
but probably even tougher. It seems to me that there is no alterna-
tive to this, even if it is difficult to implement it.
MR. COOKE: May I add a comment on those two points? On the
question of the countries with less supervision, this is, of course,
a vexatious problem. It raises the problem which Neal referred to
of discrimination between one kind of national supervisory system
and another. This may be, on occasion, very difficult to do.
In our Banking Act of 1979, which is the basis for our present
supervisory arrangements, there is a specific provision which re-
quires us to have regard for and be in contact with the supervisory
authority of the parent entity of any foreign banking institution
which wishes to set up a branch or a subsidiary in the United King-
dom. It is within our powers either to accept or not to accept the
adequacy of that supervision as fulfilling a number of the require-
ments that we otherwise would have to address ourselves. If we do
not accept it, then we have the difficult problem which Neal referred
to of having to appear to be discriminating against that country by
saying that we do not think much of its supervision and, therefore,
have to do the job ourselves. That is a difficulty, but at least
the problem is recognized in our legislation and we have a handle to
grasp in that regard.
On the general subject of the development of international
banks around the world from less supervised or unsupervised centers,
I think I should say that the major countries are all very clearly
agreed on what is the desirable principle here, that you should not
allow an entity from an unsupervised center to develop an interna-
tional business. That is easier said than done. There are countries
that have in the last year or two passed legislation authorizing the
creation of fiew banks within territories that are specifically ex-
cluded from that country's supervisory regime. Banks that take ad-
vantage of this legislation may be consortium banks with entirely
respectable parentage, interested in pursuing international business
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from a tax and supervisory haven within a country. But in principle,
we are very unhappy about the proliferation of such entities around
the world and do our best to stop them from operating worldwide from
an unsupervised base. I am sympathetic on the whole to the view
that banks should not be allowed to enter a country if the host
country bank supervisory authority has forbidden it and where it
believes there is no supervision or the quality of supervision of
the parent is unsatisfactory.
On secrecy, the second point, I think the particular sensiti-
vities relate to deposits. The other sensitivities of most European
countries relate to hidden reserves. This is a subject that is going
to be debated fairly hotly in Europe over the next year or two be-
cause, as Alain indicated, there is a bank-accounts directive now
before the European Community which seeks to settle the basis on
which hidden reserves can be maintained. This problem will likely be
with us for a long time.
The important point about secrecy is that it should not pre-
clude supervisory authorities from communicating information which
is in their possession to other supervisory authorities when this is
in the interest of international banking supervision, that is, when
it is in the interest of banks generally operating in the countries
of the different supervisory authorities among whom this information
is being exchanged. I would very much hope that that principle of
free exchange of information for this purpose can be enshrined in
national laws as it is enshrined in the new United Kingdom legisla-
tion [3].
MR. MUNDHEIM: I promised to let Fred Heldring ask a question.
MR. HELDRING: Peter, I was one of those who read your text
in hushed silence up in my room this morning. One of the sentences
in your report raises a question in my mind. The aim of the Concor-
dat is to sustain, as far as possible, by effective supervision the
health and safety of the existing structure; and I am very impressed
with all the progress that has been made in that respect. Then you
go on to say that the Concordat does not set out to rule on the way
in which the pieces of the structure should be picked up if it is
broken.
May I ask your opinion about whatever infrastructure is being
built upon a similar basis of international cooperation to take care
of a breakdown in the structure at one place or another? Do you
think there is as much progress in that area as in supervision?
MR. COOKE: You are opening up a very big question which per-
haps goes a little bit beyond the scope of today's discussion, al-
though it is obviously very closely related to the ongoing super-
visory process. I think that the lender-of-last-resort function in
terms of international business is an immensely complex one. I, for
one, believe it is important that it should not be made too specific.
There is a principle of moral hazard which we should observe in the
international banking system. The Governors of the major central
banks of the world issued a communique on September 10, 1974, at the
most troubled time in international markets, in which they said
rather delphically that means were available to deal with any prob-
lems that might arise, and I think we should leave it at that.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Alec, you wished to make a brief comment?
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MR. VAGLIANO: Very brief. As an American bank we are, of
course, accustomed to a large amount of disclosure; and when it does
not affect customers' confidentiality, we are quite inured to that.
However, one point that came up today is the possibility that the
regulatory authorities in the many jurisdictions in which we do
business may move to global supervision, that is supervision of our
overall global activities. I would be very concerned that this
could eventually lead to inconsistencies and even conflicts where
we would be right in the middle. So I would, in that context, sup-
port cooperation between the supervisory authorities.
NOTES
[1] See 58 to 63 infra.
[21 12 U.S.C. §§3401-3422 (Supp. I1 1979).
[3) See Banking Act, 1979, C.37, §§19, 20.
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APPENDIX IV




International co-operation among banking supervisory authorities is a
relatively new phenomenon. It emerged in the 1970's alongside the burgeoning
international banking activity which had developed significantly in the 1960's
and has continued to grow apace thereafter. I will review the growth in co-
operation which has taken place during recent years from the particular perspec-
tive of the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices which
has provided a focal point for that co-operation.
THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY CO-OPERATION
The internationalization of banking brought about considerable changes
in banking systems and in the conduct of banking business. New international
markets grew up with their own techniques and conventions and new kinds of risks.
The number of international financial institutions grew considerably as banks
expanded across national frontiers through the establishment of subsidiaries and
branches in many countries to service the needs of their customers--large and
small--on an increasingly international basis and to take advantage of the newly
created markets. New types of bank were formed, particularly the so-called con-
sortium banks with shareholders from many different countries. New financial
centres developed--notably those which are broadly categorized as "offshore"
centres--where banks were attracted by favourable fiscal and regulatory environ-
ments to conduct a significant part of their international operations. The
proliferation of new banks operating across national borders sometimes led to a
situation in which foreign branches and subsidiaries of banks in one country
operating in the markets of another country fell outside the perceived responsi-
bilities of the supervisory authorities in either country. More generally, the
high degree of cross border interbank borrowing and lending through the ever-
growing activity ofthe Euro-markets meant that banks became increasingly depend-
ent for much of their liquidity on banks in other countries and on currencies
other than those of their country of origin.
Looking back, it is now clear that at the beginning of the 1970's the
perceptions and techniques of banking supervisory authorities around the world
had not kept pace with these developments. There was in effect a supervisory
vacuum in this new global market which needed to be filled. Neither the super-
visors, nor indeed the banks themselves, had fully appreciated the degree to
which the banking environment was changing in character and the new increased
risks involved in international business. Supervisors were still very much
domestically oriented within the framework of different national banking systems.
Indeed it is difficult now to realize how little contact there was at that time
between those responsible for banking supervision in major countries.
MOVES TO DEVELOP INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY CO-OPERATION
The banking environment to which supervisors needed to respond was thus
changing radically--particularly in those countries where the world's major banks
were situated. The events of 1973 and 1974, when a number of banks in different
countries failed (notably the Herstatt Bank in 1974) and others experienced serious
losses, highlighted this changed environment and precipitated more urgent action.
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In response to these events, the Governors of the world's major central
banks took action to allay the concerns about the viability of the international
financial system. They issued a statement in September 1974 to the effect that,
while it was not practical to lay down in advance detailed rules and procedures
for the provision of temporary support to banks experiencing liquidity difficul-
ties, the means were available for that purpose and would be used if and when
necessary. At the same time the Governors concluded that a better co-ordination
of the surveillance exercised by national authorities over the international bank-
ing system was necessary and to that end they created a new standing committee--
the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices with members drawn
from the Group-10 major industrialized countries and Switzerland.*
The first formative steps to bring together supervisors in major banking
countries had in fact been taken two years earlier in 1972 when, at the time of
the impending UK membership of the European Community, an informal and autonomous
group of those with operational responsibilities for banking supervision in EEC
countries was set up. Known as the Groupe de Contact its principal aim was, and
is, to achieve closer understanding and practical co-operation between the banking
supervisory authorities of the Member States. In recent years the Group has also
taken on a technical role for the Advisory Committee for Banking Co-ordination
(set up under the First Banking Directive of the European Community to advise the
European Commission on moves to harmonize the banking systems of the Community
and their regulation).
The Basle Committee of Supervisors met for the first time in February 1975.
Its first Chairman was Mr. George Blunden of the Bank of England; and I succeeded
him in 1977. The Committee has met regularly over the past six years--normally
three times a year.
There were two major tasks confronting banking supervisors which became
apparent to the Committee. The first was the need to adapt the national super-
visory system within each country in order to cope with the wider dimensions of
their major banks' businesses. The second and complementary task was the promo-
tion of close co-operation between national authorities in monitoring the activi-
ties of the overseas branches, subsidiaries and affiliates of their own banks and
the offshoots of foreign banks in their own territories. The Committee has pro-
vided a forum over the years in which supervisors can learn of each other's tech-
niques and experience and hear of problems that may be emerging in different
national systems and could be of wider concern. It has been particularly valuable
in establishing close personal contacts between supervisors in different countries
--relationships which in a number of cases have facilitated rapid and effective
co-operation between the authorities concerned when banks operating within their
respective jurisdictions have experienced problems. More generally, the Committee
has worked to develop broad principles with which different national supervisory
authorities can be encouraged to conform in settling their own detailed arrange-
ments. It is not, however, a forum which specifically sets out to harmonize bank-
ing supervisory arrangements. National systems have grown up with different
traditions: some with detailed statutory arrangements, others with more informal
and flexible supervisory frameworks; some have comprehensive examination proce-
dures, others do not. In practice, however, members of the Committee have found
much to learn from each other and this mutual learning process may well over time
produce some convergence between national systems which can only be beneficial.
In all member countries the past few years have been a period of considerable
activity in the field of banking law and regulation. Most have enacted or are
* Committee members come from Belgium (and Luxembourg), Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and
the United States.
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preparing major legislation and in every case this legislation reflects, albeit
to varying degrees, accords which have been reached in Basle or the incorporation
in the national laws of one country desirable features of the arrangements pre-
vailing in others.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BASLE COMMITTEE'S WORK
In the first period of the Basle Committee's work it concentrated on carv-
ing out first principles for international supervisory co-operation. They had to
be built up from virtually nothing. The first priority was to reach an under-
standing of the appropriate division of responsibility between national authorities
for the supervision of banks' foreign establishments with the object of ensuring
that no foreign banking establishment escaped supervision. The general statement
of the Committee's views on this subject which was subsequently endorsed by the
Governors in December 1975, has become known as the Concordat. I will discuss
this in more detail later. The importance of this early agreement cannot be em-
phasized too much. It represented the first, and a most significant, co-operative
step forward, and even if it may have been a step made easier by the pressure of
events at the time, it was nonetheless a considerable achievement which laid the
foundation for later co-operative efforts. Another matter to which the Committee
turned its attention at the outset was how an early warning system of potential
problems in national banking systems might be organized. It was concluded that
such problems could not in practice be handled through a separate monitoring sys-
tem operated by an international body. Because of differences in national sys-
tems and legislation co-ordination would be difficult and would anyway tend to
duplicate national arrangements. Action to counter potentially dangerous situa-
tions should thus be taken by the national supervisory authority most concerned
in consultation with other countries as appropriate.
As the disturbances to the system lessened and immediate concerns were
allayed the Committee settled down to examine the supervisory tools and arrange-
ments that would be necessary to facilitate implementation of the basic guide-
lines enshrined in the Concordat and to develop co-operation further. A major
recommendation was the use of supervision on a consolidated basis whereby the
capital adequacy and risk exposure of international banks would be monitored on
the basis of their worldwide business. The Committee also began to look beyond
the specific type of risk which had underlain the Herstatt crisis (foreign ex-
change risk) to a detailed examination of other types of risk facing international
banks--especially the degree of maturity transformation effected by individual
banks and the system as a whole--and the problems of measuring and monitoring
country risk.
As the Committee's work progressed substantial efforts were made to in-
volve in the discussion process supervisors from a wider group of countries than
those represented on the Committee since it was realized that to be effective,
the supervision of international banking activity should be as comprehensive as
possible. From the outset a number of the Committee's papers had been circulated
widely within the supervisory community for information and for comment, and in
1979 it was decided to provide a forum for this wider group of supervisors to
meet and discuss the Committee's work and its conclusions to date. Accordingly,
an International Conference of Banking Supervisors was organized by the Bank of
England in London in July 1979. It was attended by bank supervisors from about
80 countries, representing Europe (Eastern and Western), North, Central and South
America, Africa, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and the Pacific basin.
A variety of topics was discussed covering many of the principal areas of the
Committee's work up to that time, including the division of supervisory responsi-
bility; co-operation between bank supervisors; capital and liquidity adequacy;
foreign exchange controls; consolidation; and the role of the offshore centres.
This was the first occasion ever on which supervisors worldwide had had an oppor-
tunity to meet together, to establish personal contacts, and to exchange views on
international aspects of banking supervision.
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The supervisory agencies in the U.S. have already announced that they will
be organizing a similar conference to be held in Washington in September 1981 and
we hope meetings of this kind may become a regular feature of the international
banking scene so that the work of the Committee of Supervisors meeting in Basle
may continue to be disseminated to the widest possible audience and the Committee
itself may profit from the ideas of those who do not take part in its regular
deliberations. Mention has already been made of the work of the Groupe de Contact
(some of whose members also sit on the Basle Committee). The studies of this
Group have frequently made a valuable contribution to the development of subjects
considered in the wider forum of the Basle Committee; for example, the concept of
consolidating banks' international business to make international supervision more
effective was first discussed in the Group. Other regional and more specialist
groupings of supervisors have also met from time to time and are being encouraged.
One example of these was a joint meeting of supervisors from the Group-10 countries
and the principal offshore centres which was held in Basle in October 1980. Dur-
ing this meeting a number of subjects were discussed, including exchanges of in-
formation, consolidation and supervisory standards, and procedures for consolida-
tion and supervision--on all of which a community of approach and considerable
measure of agreement was achieved.
AREAS OF CO-OPERATIVE ACTION
I want to turn now to a somewhat more detailed description of the principal
areas of work to date in the Basle Committee.
A. The Division of Supervisory Responsibility: The Concordat
It is appropriate to begin with an outline of what has come to be known as
the Concordat on International Supervisory Co-operation. It sets out guidelines
covering the responsibilities of different supervisory authorities for the ongoing
dupervision of banks where those banks operate in more than one national jurisdic-
tion. It is not, and was never intended to be, an agreement about responsibilities
for the provision of lender-of-last-resort facilities to the international banking
system; and there should not necessarily be considered to be any automatic link
between acceptance of responsibility for ongoing supervision and the assumption
of a lender-of-last-resort role. The aim of the Concordat is to sustain as far
as possible by effective supervision the health and safety of the existing struc-
ture. It does not set out to rule on the way in which the pieces of that struc-
ture should be picked up if it is broken. The Concordat encompasses the following
guidelines and recommendations:
(1) The supervision of foreign banking establishments should be the joint res-
ponsibility of host and parent authorities.
(2) No foreign banking establishment should escape supervision, each country
should ensure that foreign banking establishments are supervised, and supervision
should be adequate as judged by both host and parent authorities.
(3) The supervision of liquidity should be the primary responsibility of host
authorities since foreign establishments generally have to conform to local
practices for their liquidity management and must comply with local regulations.
(4) The supervision of solvency of foreign branches should be essentially a
matter for the parent authority. In the case of subsidiaries, while primary
responsibility lies with the host authority, parent authorities should take
account of the exposure of their domestic banks' foreign subsidiaries and joint
ventures because of the parent banks' moral commitment in this regard.
(5) Practical co-operation would be facilitated by transfers of information
between host and parent authorities and by the granting of permission for in-
spections by or on behalf of parent authorities on the territory of the host
authority. Every effort should be made to remove any legal restraints (par-
ticularly in the field of professional secrecy or national sovereignty) which
might hinder these forms of co-operation.
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To make the Conqordat fully effective internationally its principles will
have to be endorsed by supervisors worldwide. The London Conference in 1979
examined the terms of the Concordat and, although no formal decisions were taken,
there was general acceptance of its principles by those participating. The super-
visors from the major offshore centres meeting in Basle in October 1980 also felt
able to endorse its principles. It should be stressed, though, that the Concor-
dat's guidelines are not fully implemented in practice and certainly not in law,
and there remain areas where the division of responsibility is not entirely clear
cut and where banking secrecy provisions are to a degree an impediment to its
effectiveness.
Despite elements of imprecision--inevitable in agreements on principles
when responsibilities are shared--the Concordat nevertheless has become establish-
ed as a most important cornerstone of international supervisory co-operation.
Its operation has recently been reviewed by the Committee who have concluded that
it is still soundly based and a valuable aid to international supervision.
B. Consolidation
The second major plank, developed over the past three years, of the Basle
Committee's approach to international banking supervision is the principle that
banks' international business should be monitored on a consolidated basis.
The Committee made its first recommendation to the Governors on the merits
of supervision on a consolidated basis in 1978. The practice of consolidating
the totality of a bank's international business permits its capital adequacy and
risk exposure to be assessed on the basis of its worldwide business, including
that of its foreign branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates. This prevents banks
from "gearing up" imprudently on their capital or increasing their risk taking
beyond acceptable bounds through the establishment of operational presences in
foreign countries where the solvency and other prudential requirements might be
less tight than in the parent country. Consolidation in effect provides a clearer
picture of a bank's overall exposure to risk and enables parent supervisors to
apply their own standards to the monitoring of their banks' business irrespective
of where that business is conducted. Consequently it is an invaluable aid to
parent supervisors in enabling them to fulfill in practice their responsibilities
under the Concordat for the supervision of the solvency of their banks' foreign
affiliates.
The Governors have strongly endorsed the consolidation principle and re-
commended its early implementation. Since 1978, good progress has been made in
a number of countries to push ahead with the introduction or extention of super-
vision on a consolidated basis for their banks' international business, and others
have plans to do so. Banks in Canada, the Netherlands, and the U.S., for example,
have for several years been required to consolidate their foreign branches as well
as significant wholly-owned subsidiaries for supervisory purposes. Japanese banks
have been required to consolidate the accounts of their foreign branches for
several years and those of significant wholly-owned and majority-owned subsidia-
ries since 1978. In the United Kingdom new reporting arrangements were introduced
during the course of 1979 to cover the international risk exposure of all UK in-
corporated banks on a fully consolidated basis which should be fully effective
by the end of 1981. In December 1980 the Swiss authorities adopted the necessary
provisions to formalize the use of consolidated accounts for the purpose of assess-
ing capital adequacy. In Germany the Gessler Commission's study of the German
banking system published in May 1979 recommended the consolidated approach to
supervision as a means of dealing with the problem of German banks abroad creating
so-called "credit pyramids", and legislation is currently in preparation. Further
impetus to the adoption of the principle of consolidation in other EEC countries
may come in the relatively near future from proposals for a Community directive,
recommended by the Advisory Committee at the end of last year, which would make
worldwide consolidation for supervisory purposes obligatory for EEC countries.
A recent review conducted by the Committee concluded that good progress was being
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made in applying the principle of consolidation but that much still remained to
be done especially in improving the availability and consistency of statistics.
C. Solvency and Liquidity
Effective monitoring of banks' solvency and liquidity adequacy lies at the
heart of the national supervisory systems. Over recent years supervisors have
been concerned at the weakening of capital, or solvency, ratios that has occurred
in a number of countries, due in varying degrees to the rapid expansion of inter-
national business, a high degree of competition, the erosion of margins, and in-
flation constraining real profitability. This tendency has been accompanied and
reinforced by many banks' reluctance or inability to attract new equity capital
and their increasing use of subordinated debt as a substitute-a development
accepted rather reluctantly by supervisors.
In an international setting, the need to sustain an adequate solvency
profile for banks can be met through the application of the principle of consoli-
dation to a bank's worldwide business without fundamental changes in approach
from that pursued at the national level. Up to now the Basle Committee in con-
sidering solvency questions has concentrated particularly on attacking the prob-
lem through improved consolidation arrangements.
Handling liquidity adequacy questions is more complicated because many
currencies are involved and there is no formalized lender-of-last-resort respon-
sibility vested in any one body in international markets as there tends to be for
the domestic currency in a national market. The Committee has shared the concern
which has been voiced by some that the rapid increase in international lending
in the 1970's has been accompanied by a lengthening of maturities and an in-
creased mismatch between banks' assets and liabilities. This gives rise to an
interest rate risk and a funding risk, and while in theory the rollover technique
should alleviate the first of those risks, banks may not match exactly to rollover
dates. In practice also some banks may not be able to re-fund their lending at
acceptable rates, particularly when interest rates are rising steeply.
Although there are differences of emphasis among its members, the Committee
considers that the degree of maturity transformation effected by banks in their
international business is a matter of especial importance to supervisors because
funding problems are not infrequently the origin of a problem bank situation.
More important, there is the risk that the increased interdependence of banks for
their liquidity managment could lead to domino effects throughout the international
banking system in the event of problems emerging in one corner of it.
Faced with an inadequacy of statistics in trying to assess the extent of
and variations in the mismatching being effected by banks in the conduct of their
international business, and in order to be able to make valid international com-
parisons, the Committee, at the request of the Group-lO Governors, began in 1978
to examine the construction of a uniform reporting system for the collection of
data on banks' maturity transformation in their international business. Following
extensive discussions, and with the Governors' support, it was agreed in September
1980 that a twice-yearly reporting system should be put in train under the aegis
of the BIS with the object of producing aggregated consolidated data on a consis-
tent basis, with fairly detailed maturity breakdowns from sight to 7 years, cover-
ing all the international assets and liabilities of reporting banks. This opera-
tion began in March 1981. As with other international efforts of this kind, it
may take some time for the new system to become fully operational since some
countries may have substantially to amend or extend the basis on xwhich maturity
transformation data is currently reported; in others it will require a completely
new system. But despite such additional reporting burdens for the banks, which
for many countries, including the U.S., come on top of recent major revisions to
reporting requirements, it seemed to the Committee that it was a matter of consi-
derable priority that better data on this very important aspect of international
banking activity should be made available and that these requests for information
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being made to the world's major banks were fully justified. In view of the
relatively untried and untested nature of market conventions with respect to
liquidity management and further recycling pressures which could well arise in
the future, supervisors need to be in a position to improve their capacity to
assess the maturity patterns and potential liquidity problems of their banks in
the international banking system as a whole.
D. Country Risk
Much has been written about international banks' exposure to country risk.
A difficult concept to define with precision, country risk refers to the possi-
bility that borrowers of a particular country may be unable or unwilling to ful-
fill their foreign obligations because of actions taken by that country's govern-
ment to conserve foreign exchange reserves or for some other reason. This cate-
gory of risk, which embraces both sovereign risk lending and lending to commercial
entities in foreign countries, has become of increasing concern to banks and
supervisory authorities because of the rapid expansion of international lending,
particularly to developing countries as part of the recycling process, to a
degree which at a time of adverse economic conditions worldwide could call into
question the ability of some borrowers to repay their loans as they fall due.
The Basle Committee has kept this subject under review over recent years. The
basic attitude of supervisors generally can be simply expressed: country risk,
as one form of credit risk, is a matter for the commercial judgment and decision
of each bank on a case-by-case basis. But as with all kinds of risk exposure in
banks' business the essential characteristic is that it should not be excessive
in relation to a bank's capacity to meet losses. The supervisors' particular
concerns should be: (1) to assist banks to assess the risks they are running by
ensuring that the best possible data bearing on the lending decisions is avail-
able; (2) to ensure that the banks have adequate internal assessment and control
procedures; and (3) to improve prudential reporting and monitoring systems.
A number of steps have been taken over the last few years in line with this
approach. Following the Herstatt affair it became clear that an improved statis-
tical breakdown of banks' exposure by country was needed. In 1977 the BIS began
to produce twice-yearly data on the maturity structure of the claims of banks in
the Group-10 area and certain other centres and in 1979 issued a comprehensive
manual on country indebtedness designed to direct the banks to statistical source
material for assessing country risk. Many countries' measurement and control
systems of this kind of exposure have been improved. For example, in 1978 the
main supervisory agencies in the U.S., which have done much pioneering work on
methods of country risk analysis, agreed on a common approach to the isolation of
country risk, including a checklist of factors to evaluate the banks' ability to
monitor and control their country risk. More recently the German and Belgian
authorities have asked auditors to include in their annual reports on banks an
evaluation of the banks' methods of country risk measurement and control. The
U.S. and the United Kingdom are now collecting country exposure information on a
consolidated basis. Other countries too are considering similar moves.
E . Other Work
In addition to the work in these major subject areas the Committee has
examined a wide range of other issues of concern to supervisors of international
banking business. Each meeting gives members an opportunity to keep up-to-date
with recent developments in each other's rules and practices and to hear of prob-
lem situations and how they have been handled. Subjects that have been studied,
or on which recommendations have been made to the Governors, include broad com-
parisons of the supervisory systems in operation in each country and of various
aspects of the banks' own internal procedures to control foreign exchange opera-
tions, relations with brokers, official regulations, and the role of supervisors.
The Committee has also reviewed the various attitudes adopted by member countries
with regard to the role of loan capital in a bank's balance sheet, requirements
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for endowment capital for foreign branches, arrangements for bank audits, and
affiliation relationships between banks and non-banks. Other areas of study have
included the role of profit and loss analysis in bank supervision; techniques
of rescue and support; deposit protection arrangements in different countries;
the supervision of banks' trust business; and the prudential implications of cer-
tain aspects of loan syndication agreements. In addition, the Committee has been
involved with the accounting profession internationally and the International
Chamber of Commerce on technical work relevant to international banking business.
F. Information Flows
The free flow of information across national borders between banks and
supervisors is a crucial feature of effective international co-operation between
supervisory authorities.
Bank secrecy laws or regulations in some countries can enjoin banks not
to reveal information about their customers and can preclude supervisors from
divulging to other supervisory authorities information that they have acquired
in the course of their duties. Obstacles to free cross-border flows of informa-
tion between foreign offshoots and their parents and between host and parent
authorities, while their significance should not be overemphasized, raise a num-
ber of practical barriers to fully effective co-operation. First, foreign estab-
lishments may not be able to reveal information to their parent banks or the
parent bank may invoke the secrecy rules of the host country not to divulge in-
formation to its parent authority. Second, host authorities may be precluded by
local laws or practice on professional secrecy from revealing information about
the banks under their supervision to parent authorities. Third, differences in
the laws of professional secrecy applied to different supervisory authorities
could potentially make information less well protected in one country than in
another. Finally, parent authorities may be prevented from conducting on-the-spot
inspections to verify the information they receive.
Since such impediments can clearly impair parental supervision under the
Concordat, consolidated supervision, and co-operation in general, the Basle Com-
mittee is working to reduce these obstacles but believes that, at least amongst
its members, secrecy provisions do not in practice operate substantially to im-
pair supervisory co-operation. In particular, use of banks
t 
external auditors
may help alleviate some of these impediments. An important step forward in re-
moving the legal barriers to exchanges of information between supervisors was
made in the First EEC Banking Directive, adopted at the end of 1979, which re-
quires Member States to permit the exchange of information between supervisory
authorities about the management and ownership of credit institutions and data
necessary for monitoring their liquidity and solvency. More recently, there have
been signs of a greater willingness on the part of other countries to relax secre-
cy rules for purposes of international supervisory co-operation. These are en-
couraging developments in what must be recognized to be a gradual process, since
bank secrecy constraints are deeply rooted legal or customary attitudes in many
countries around the world and will not be quickly or easily removed.
Another area of concern in ensuring that effective exchanges of information
can take place is the consistency of the data. Differences of style and techniques
and of intensity of supervision lead to considerable variations in the amount and
form of the information required by national supervisory authorities. Much of the
information supplied by the banks is designed to meet not only prudential but also
monetary and statistical purposes for which information needs differ widely be-
tween countries. Phat is more, during the last few years, as a result of the
rapid change in banking and supervisory arrangements in the 1970s, many countries
gave considerably amended and generally enhanced their national reporting systems.
This has placed burdens on banks and the authorities have to strike a sensible
balance between securing important informational objectives and making excessive
demands on their banks.
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A start has been made on "international" reporting with the collection of
reasonably consistent data on country exposure and maturity transformation. As
these reporting systems are improved and consolidation reveals what further co-
ordination is necessary on a broader front, it may be hoped that models will
evolve on which future changes in national systems can be based. In the meantime,
at this experimental stage in the collection of "international" data, the banks--
and supervisors-will have to recognize that some duplication of existing systems
and allocation of extra resources are inevitable but that these should be borne
with for the general good. Over time the Committee will be working to achieve a
greater degree of agreement about the purposes which data should serve so that
all countries will have a better basis for considering sympathetically the de-
sirability of standardizing systems for the production of such data.
CONCLUSION
The initial moves toward international co-operation in banking supervision
in the mid-1970s arose out of problems associated with the rapid growth of the
Euro-markets and the strains of international recycling following the first major
oil price rise. As the 1980s began, in the light of the continued growth in in-
ternational business and pressures from further oil price rises, the Central Bank
Governors of the Group-lO countries and Switzerland took a further close look at
international financial markets and banking activity. They concluded that high
priority should be given to the maintenance of the soundness and stability of the
international banking system.
To enhance the authorities' surveillance capacity the Standing Committee
on Euro-markets was charged with the regular review of international banking
statistics and other relevant information. Thus developments in the macro-econo-
mic field, which profoundly affect the environment within which supervisors oper-
ate in working to sustain the soundness of individual banks, are now being regu-
larly monitored. At the same time, in their communique of April 1980, the
Governors referring to the risks run by individual banks re-affirmed "the cardinal
importance which they attach to the maintenance of sound banking standards-par-
ticularly with regard to capital adequacy, liquidity and concentration of risks.
To this end they place high priority on bringing into full effect the initiatives
already begun by the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices
with regard to the supervision of banks' international business on a consolidated
basis, improved assessment of country risk exposure, and the development of more
comprehensive and consistent data for monitoring the extent of banks' maturity
transformation." Thus, some at least of the tasks of the international supervi-
sory community in the early 1980s have been signposted.
The last few years have seen the emergence of a strong sense of community
of interest among those responsible for supervising the international business of
banks in full awareness that the health and safety of individual banks now depend
on the soundness of the whole international banking system. The knowledge that
this co-operation exists provides reassurance to the markets that the international
banking system is being effectively supervised and that, should problems emerge,
contacts and understandings exist and experience can be shared to ensure that
speedy solutions can be found to minimize the extent of any disturbance to the
system.
The Basle Committee, and the Contact Group, have played a pivotal role in
this process. They have provided a forum for mutual education about each other's
systems; for the exchange of confidential information within the bounds of each
country's secrecy rules; for the study of individual problems to learn the lessons
they contain for supervisors; for the elaboration of guidelines that should govern
the supervision of banks' international business; and perhaps most important of
all, for the establishment of personal contacts which has led to practical contin-
uing collaboration outside the confines of the committees in an atmosphere of
mutual confidence and trust both in routine matters and in individual problem cases.
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The result of these contacts and exchanges has been to create a new inter-
national approach to banking supervision. The foundations of international co-
operation in supervisory responsibilities have been laid, notably in the Concor-
dat and the recommendations on consolidation. In addition, new international
guidelines, frequently incorporating the best of individual countries' experience
and developed through international discussion, often in a spirit of real compro-
mise, are coming to be widely accepted by authorities worldwide and are increas-
ingly being reflected in the legislative and administrative measures undertaken
by individual countries.
Moreover, in framing new policies many countries increasingly seek possible
models in the methods of other countries, and this is creating a slow but percep-
tible trend towards convergence of supervisory techniques based on best practice.
More-remains to be done in the 1980s but a basic international framework for
future co-ordination and co-operation, both amons the major industrialized coun-
tries and more widely, has already been established.
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INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING
ON BANK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Robert Carswell
MR. MUNDHEIM: These questions on supervision could be pursued
at length, but it is time to turn to the question of the influence
of international banking on bank regulation in the U.S. and ask Bob
Carswell, a former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury and presently
Visiting Distinguished Practitioner at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School, to address those questions.
MR. CARSWELL: Previous speakers have described in some detail
the extraordinary net of laws and regulations that the Congress and
our small army of federal and state bank regulators have woven in
the last few years as a response to the equally extraordinary growth
in the international financial and banking markets. Most of the sub-
stance of this regulation derives from a decision to retard the inter-
nationalization of theose markets by requiring new entrants to play
in the U.S. by our domestic rules rather than addressing possible
changes in those rules to give domestic banks more freedom to compete
against foreign entrants. Since our domestic rules are complex, the
technically competent response produced is, not surprisingly, even
more complex.
I would like to discuss briefly the context in which this
latest round of regulation has proceeded, some of the forces that
are operating, and how these forces are affecting several areas of
regulation.
1. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Fifty years ago we had a banking crisis in this country that
had profound effects on hundreds of thousands of people and business-
es and on our whole economy. Several broad statutes were passed,
abuses were corrected and a comprehensive framework of regulations
was instituted that had the long-term effect of reducing the areas
in which banks could compete and of curtailing initiative in the
banking business.
The crisis passed, but in the decades after World War II it
became clear that a price being paid for sound banks was that a large
share of the growth in our domestic financial markets was going to
less regulated financial institutions. A generation ago, there were
no significant non-bank commercial lenders, banks had most of a much
smaller personal finance and consumer credit market, through their
trust departments they dominated a much smaller market for investment
advice, the Small Business Investment Corporation and other govern-
ment credit programs were a small fraction of their present size, and
there were no money market funds or brokerage houses offering the
equivalent of checking accounts. On the other hand, our larger banks
expanded dramatically in unregulated overseas markets, and a large
volume of international banking business simply moved out of the U.S.
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A series of panels and commissions appointed by administra-
tions over a twenty-year period all recommended substantial legis-
lative changes to simplify the systemincrease competition, and
dispense with unnecessary regulation. The Congress failed to act,
apparently viewing the area as a dispute among business rivals with
little public interest involved in the outcome. It was not until
last year when a large number of small consumers complained that the
banks only paid them five and one-half percent interest while every-
body else was getting fifteen percent or more that the Congress
finally responded to some of the neglected agenda. That response,
in the form of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980, has begun to redress the balance and restore
competition in some areas. But the pace of change will also depend
on more general economic developments and, in no small measure, on
likely continued internationalization of the financial markets.
2. DEVELOPING POLICY AREAS
This interaction between events and the trend toward dereg-
ulation is evident in a number of areas of bank regulation, of
which I will touch on three: (1) monetary policy and interest rate
control, (2) standards by which to judge foreign acquisitions or con-
trol, and (3) equality of competition between domestic and foreign
banks.
A. Monetary Policy
Whatever one's views of monetary policy, it seems abundantly
clear that control of the money supply will be a crucial element in
the domestic policy of most, perhaps all, developed countries. It
is equally clear that authorities in virtually all those countries
are experiencing a variety of technical and operational problems.
In the U.K. critics argue whether the cause of the government's
problems is the Bank of England's inability or its unwillingness to
restrain monetary growth. The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System has faced similar criticism as a consequence of er-
ratic short-term swings in interest rates and the money supply. The
necessity of taking action with respect to interest rates to accom-
modate balance of payments or exchange rate problems, presents simi-
lar difficulties. It may be useful to illustrate with a few recent
policy dilemmas.
(i) Reserve requirements
In October 1978, the dollar was dropping in a disorderly
fashion on the exchange markets and raising concerns that panic con-
ditions might be precipitated in the markets. A joint Treasury-
Federal Reserve response was hastily fashioned, relying principally
on a large increase in the war chest for intervention, a one percent
increase in the discount rate and a two percent supplementary reserve
requirement on time deposits of $100,000 or more. The Federal Re-
serve commented at the time:
The reserve requirement action will help to moderate the recent relatively rapid
expansion of bank credit. It will also increase the incentive for member banks
to borrow funds from abroad and thereby strengthen the dollar by improving the
demand in Euro-markets for dollar denominated assets.
Whether the action on reserves taken would have the advertised
impact was debated by some; others complained that it would have
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inequitable competitive effects. Whatever the precise results, it
was evident that the use of reserve requirements in this type of
situation was less than a panacea because of the very large size and
volatility of the Eurodollar market. Partially in response to sug-
gestions from the Congress, the Federal Reserve (with Treasury par-
ticipation in the effort) initiated discussions with Governors of the
central banks of the Group-10 countries and Switzerland concerning
the possible imposition of reserve requirements on Euro-currency
deposits. The U.S. tabled a discussion paper; two committees were
appointed; but there was little enthusiasm for the idea in Europe in
1978 and 1979, and nothing tangible has come of it as yet.
(ii) Eurodollar market
No one argues that the Eurodollar market does not complicate
the Federal Reserve's ability to conduct monetary policy in the U.S.
--whether with the objective of controlling the money supply or in-
fluencing exchange rates. Large U.S. borrowers have learned to use
the Eurodollar market, and their access to foreign banks is clear
enough. Thus, efforts by the Federal Reserve to restrict credit
domestically will be effective only to the extent the Eurodollar
market rates and movements parallel those of our domestic markets.
Governor Wallich has pointed out that frequently they do. But he
concluded in testimony in July 1979, that the thrust of his discus-
sion was to recognize that "the existence [of the Euro-currency mar-
ket] makes the execution of monetary policy more difficult."
(iii) Inflation curbs
In March 1980, the U.S. announced a series of monetary and
credit actions as part of a general government program to help curb
inflationary pressures. They included a Special Credit Restraint
Program that specifically included credit extended to U.S. residents
by the U.S. agencies and branches of foreign banks. The Federal
Reserve also stated: "The parents and affiliates of those foreign
banks are urged to cooperate in similarly restricting their lending
to U.S. companies." Foreign banks generally were asked to respect
the substance and spirit of the Credit Restraint guidelines in their
loans to U.S. borrowers or loans designed to support U.S. activity.
A panel of large U.S. corporations was asked to report monthly on
their borrowings abroad. There is no public assessment of the re-
sults of this effort to control the extension of credit by foreign-
ers to U.S. persons.
It is also worth noting that the Federal Reserve currently
imposes a three percent reserve requirement on certain Euro-currency
activity pursuant to authority granted in March by the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. They
are
- net borrowings from related foreign offices;
- gross borrowings from unrelated foreign depository institu-
tions;
- loans to U.S. residents made by overseas branches of domestic
depository institutions; and
- sales of assets by depository institutions in the U.S. to
their overseas offices.
It is clear enough that these requirements alone will not control
the potential influence of the Euro-currency market on our domestic
money supply.
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(iv) Future trends
These illustrations represent, in gross, a groping by the
Federal Reserve to cope with the real or potential influence of the
Euro-currency market on its ability to carry out domestic regula-
tory responsibilities. These efforts will almost certainly continue.
The dollar will have problems again, and it would take unbridled op-
timism to believe that the course of monetary policy will run smooth.
More likely, the influence of the international markets will in-
creasingly impinge on domestic policy and lead to responses both in
the U.S. and in other countries. These responses could come through
international agreements or cooperation or they could come through
exchange or other types of controls or reserve requirements with
varying degrees of effectiveness.
B. Standards for Judging Foreign Bank Acquisitions
A second area where regulatory policy will be significantly
influenced, perhaps shaped, by market and economic developments is
the standard by which regulators will judge acquisitions, or control,
of U.S. financial institutions by foreigners. With the Euro-curren-
cy market continuing to expand at a rate at least twice that of the
U.S. market and with foreign banks increasing their share of that
market, foreign banks should have no particular problem about re-
sources with which to expand.
(i) 1980 moratorium on acquisitions
The moratorium imposed by the Depository Institutions Deregu-
lation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, followed by the call for
an additional moratorium by the General Accounting office in August,
indicates sensitivity in various quarters about the standards now
being applied. The result--whatever it may be--of Midland Bank's
proposal to acquire Crocker National may well trigger either a Con-
gressional reaction or early preemptive foreign acquisitions. Per-
haps the most critical but unpredictable influence on foreign acqui-
sitions will be the general health of our banking system.
Most of the completed foreign acquisitions have involved
banks that were on the verge of failure, or at least in need of in-
fusion of capital. As previous speakers have pointed out, under
present law the only available saviors of larger troubled banks may
well be foreign institutions. If general economic conditions lead
to an increase in the number of sizable banks in trouble, there will
be pressures for a continuing permissive .attitude toward foreign
acquisitions. On the other hand, there will also be pressures from
some domestic banks for modifications in the McFadden Act or the
Douglas amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act to permit domestic
banks to make the same acquisitions as foreign institutions.
(ii) Extraordinary Assistance Bill
In March of 1980, the bank regulators agreed on the text of
an Extraordinary Assistance Bill of 1980, which was introduced as
H.R. 7080 and S. 2575 in the last session of Congress. That bill
included a provision that would have permitted across-state-line
acquisitions by domestic banks in troubled bank situations if the
appropriate regulator could make necessary findings. The effect of
that bill would be significantly to reduce the foreign bank advan-
tages in these situations. If the economic storm clouds thicken,
that bill (or some derivative of it that liberalizes the McFadden
Act or modifies the Douglas amendment) will doubtless be introduced.
The severity of the problems encountered will have as much to do
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with the outcome as the conflicting public policies involved.
The overall public policy issue remains the question of what
standard is the appropriate one for judging foreign acquisitions.
Because of the limited presence here of many foreign banks and the
present state of the law, the applicable standards can properly be
characterized as permissive. But it would be hard to find a Con-
gressman who would feel comfortable about permitting the takeover of
one or two of the five largest banks in the U.S.
(iii) Possible tests
What kind of test would articulate that unease but not amount
to mere market protection? Neal Petersen has mentioned two candi-
dates that have been under discussion: first, an objective test--
probably prohibiting acquisitions involving more than some relative-
ly high percentage of assets in some relevant market. That test
would have the virtue of being predictable of result, but the impact
in various sections of the country, depending on the percentages and
markets chosen, would be widely disparate. Second would be a subjec-
tive test, such as prohibiting the acquisition value unless the regu-
lator can find that public benefit could be formulated. Predicting
what that kind of test really means would be hazardous. Depending
on how it was applied, it would no doubt lead to charges of discrim-
inatory action and perhaps lead to retaliation abroad.
I doubt that it is particularly profitable to try to answer
this question in the abstract. A few more clear fact situations
would clarify a lot of minds. Since it will likely take a year for
the regulators to act on any major proposed acquisition, the Congress
will have ample time to react before its consummation. That fairly
obvious procedural framework will, I hope, lead foreign banks to
proceed circumspectly.
C. Equality of Competition Between U.S. and Foreign Banks
The third area where pending events will continue to impact
bank regulation is that of the so-called level playing field or
equality of competition between U.S. and foreign banks.
My personal conclusion about this area (with the exception of
the advantages foreign institutions have as to acquisitions) is that
the substantive inequalities do not now bulk very large. They
achieve prominence largely because various aspects of inequality are
thought to be excellent reasons to present to Congress or the regu-
lators to justify expanded (and usually highly desirable) powers for
domestic banks.
(i) Geographical limitations
Revisions of the McFadden Act and the Douglas amendment have
been overdue for a decade or more. The tardily released Report to
the President, Geographic Restrictions on Commercial Banking in the
United States, contains moderate recommendations for change in this
area. It notes that, as previous speakers have pointed out, foreign
banks have limited advantages in operating across state lines, but
it does not rely heavily on this anomaly. As Steven J. Weiss has
pointed out in his paper The Competitive Balance Between Domestic
and Foreign Banks in the U.S., the substantive impact of this privi-
lege does not appear to be important.
The geographic advantages are of two varieties. First, grand-
fathering of the branches and other non-home state operations a
foreign bank had prior to July 27, 1978; and, second, the right to
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establish non-home state branches or agencies with limited deposit-
taking power if the establishment is not prohibited by state law.
Forty of the fifty largest non-U.S. banking organizations have
grandfathered deposit-taking facilities in at least one state and
twenty-seven in two states or more. Those not grandfathered can
establish new facilities with only marginal additional restrictions.
The open question is whether domestic banks through Edge Act or loan
production offices and the like can achieve approximate competitive
status. Clearly they cannot with respect to receipt of retail de-
posits, but the foreign banks have not developed, and as a practical
matter probably cannot develop, extensive retail deposits through
their non-home state facilities. The other advertised advantages
also appear very limited, with the result that although the techni-
cal inequality unquestionably exists, the likelihood of it command-
ing Congressional attention does not seem high.
(ii) Nton-banking activities
Similarly, in the Glass-Steagall area foreign banks command
competitive advantages. Under the IBA grandfather provisions, vari-
ous foreign banks are authorized to continue to retain their in-
terests in thirty-two U.S. firms that engage in various aspects of
the securities business in the U.S. The regulators are still en-
gaged in compiling data on the extent of the business conducted by
these firms, but the list of U.S. securities affiliations of foreign
banks in the Appendix to the Weiss paper is a very long way from a
roster of Who's Who in the securities business.
The best guess seems to be that the present situation does
not grant significant competitive advantages and is a long way from
a challenge to the principles underlying Glass-Steagall--whatever
they may be. The same general conclusion, namely that significant
competitive advantages do not appear to be present, seems to flow
from the fact that the IBA permits foreign banks to hold interests
in types of non-banking entities that are off limits to U.S. banks.
However, there is a potential in both these areas for unfair competi-
tion and undue concentration, and no doubt the area merits and will
get regulatory surveillance so long as the inequalities are conti-
nued.
(iii) Funding costs
The area of funding costs is more difficult to assess and
bankers occasionally point to possible inequalities there. Weiss
finds little evidence to support the assertions, but it may well be
that the effect of reserve requirements can be discriminatory, par-
ticularly when foreign banks have great potential flexibility as to
where they book business. The ebb and flow of regulations would seem
likely to change this area from time to time, particularly if the
Federal Reserve response to its problems with the money supply is to
increase the ambit of its regulations.
(iv) Export trading
There is one final area worth noting. And it is one where the
Congress may be moving toward a liberalization of the powers of U.S.
banks, not so much for the purpose of permitting them to compete on
a more equal basis with foreign banks--although it would have that
effect--but to enhance the export potential of the U.S. The Export
Trading Company bill, which passed the Senate 77-0 last year under
the guidance of Senator Stevenson, has been reintroduced by Senator
Heinz as S. 144 and reported out unanimously last week by the Senate
Banking Committee. The heart of the bill would permit U.S. banks to
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invest up to five percent of capital and surplus in export trading
companies without federal regulatory approval but would require
approval of investments where control was acquired. The trading
companies would have broader powers than are now available to banks
to facilitate exports--powers modeled on, although more restricted
than, highly successful export companies that exist in many foreign
countries--particularly Japan.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System last year
opposed the acquisition of control by a U.S. bank on the ground pri-
marily that the activities are not sufficiently close to U.S. bank
powers, and the bill did not emerge from committee in the House of
Representatives. The new administration has announced its strong
support of the bill, including antitrust exemptions contained there-
in. Chairman St. Germain of the House Banking Committee has not
taken a public position, but there have been reports of discussions
designed to work out a compromise.
Although it affects a somewhat peripheral area, this bill
represents a current illustration of the difficulties our system has
in adjusting its domestic regulatory paternalism even to the reali-
ties of the largely uncontrolled area of financing and facilitating
exports and trading abroad. It will be instructive to watch whether
the breezes of deregulation reach this area.
(W) Future trends
How these issues will be decided depends, in part, on the
health of our banking industry. If we have a significant number of
bank failures the administrators have already agreed on the form of
a bill (introduced last year as H.R. 7080 and S. 2575) that has provi-
sions to permit crossline acquisitions--that is, cross state line
and cross other boundary line acquisitions by domestic banks in a
way that would perhaps parallel what the foreign banks can do today.
If this approach is followed, the pressure may let up here, because
there will be competition from larger and stronger domestic banks
to make acquisitions that presently cannot be made in troubled situ-
ations except by foreigners. This development would be healthy for
everyone, but apparently it is not going to take place until we have
real trouble in our system. Unfortunately this is not the right way
to pass considered financial legislation.
The level playing field concept has largely developed into a
debate between the various people on the playing field. Depending
on what premise you start from, there is, or is not, substantive
equality of competition; in most areas the point is arguable. I
imagine that Alec may disagree with me, but I think there is more of
an effort to influence the Congress to change the division of mar-
kets, rather than any desire to right competitive balances.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Alec, I will give you a chance to respond if
you like, and then Peter has a comment.
MR. VAGLIANO: Not so much a response, but an observation.
I think the question is really so much broader because the industry
itself is in the process of a pretty dramatic change that will ex-
tend over the next fifteen years. This is brought about by a number
of factors that are perceivable today: the narrowing of margins;
the competition, as was mentioned earlier, from non-banking sources
such as commercial paper and nationwide brokerage; the dramatic in-
crease around the world of non-interest costs, both in terms of em-
ployee fringes and even the availability of employees in many places;
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the entirely new technology, which has not yet been able to resolve
other cost problems and has in fact added costs and put a great deal
of stress on banks; and finally, the tremendous volatility of markets
in an inflationary context where even the most prudent and conserva-
tive types of institutions like savings banks find themselves in
great difficulty because of this dramatic change. I think overall,
you have so many factors working for rapid change that the risks are
much greater, and these risks may end with some unfortunate develop-
ments. Then you are going to have to push more and more towards
regulation, maybe--as Bob was just saying--in the unfortunate con-
text where people do not have the chance to think through the prob-
lem and develop coherent long term policy. So I think there is going
to be a lot of hit-and-missing going on.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Peter. . .
MR. COOKE: Just a brief comment. Bob Carswell asked what
had happened to the debate on the reserve requirements in the Euro-
markets. He said it seemed to have disappeared. Well, it has dis-
appeared, but with a flourish in the form of a communique that the
central bank Governors issued in April 1980. it did not refer to
reserve requirements as such, from which one can perhaps make certain
deductions about the way the debate came out. But it did say that
it recognized the need to have regard for the macro-economic environ-
ment in which the international banking system was doing its busi-
ness and to enhance the existing capacity to monitor and keep an eye
on that macro-economic environment, re-emphasizing the role of the
Euro-currency Standing Committee which, like the Committee of Super-
visors, meets in Basle on a fairly regular basis.
These are separate meetings: one group looks at the macro-
economic environment in which international banks conduct their
business, while the other, the supervisors' group, looks more at
what I would call the micro-prudential elements of each individual
bank's business and their inter-relationship. In between these two
aspects is what I would describe as the macro-prudential dimension
that is somewhere between macro-economic and micro-prudential. This
calls for a certain amount of co-ordination between the work of the
two groups.
As I see it, the macro-prudential encompasses all issues,
like inflatioh or other macro forces that actually have a direct im-
pact on the way in which an individual bank conducts its business.
So the central bank Governors have not actually lost sight of the
overall issues that were being addressed in the context of reserve
requirements on the Euro-markets. That work is being continued on
a regular basis.
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Lessons from the Iranian Experience:
NATIONAL CURRENCIES AS INTERNATIONAL MONEY
John E. Hoffman, Jr. and Ian H. Giddy
MR. MUNDHEIM: We are ready now to look at the U.S. govern-
ment freeze of Iranian government assets and some of the implica-
tions that action has for banking znd lending policies and practices.
John Hoffman, who, as counsel for a major bank, played a leading
role in the negotiations which resulted in the release of the hos-
tages held in Iran and in the unfreezing of a substantial portion of
the Iranian assets held by U.S. banks, will begin our discussion.
1. THE IRANIAN EXPERIENCE
MR. HOFFMAN: It is fair to say that from the very imposition
of the Iranian asset freeze, attention focused on the question of
the consequences of the freeze and the lessons to be learned from
the experience, wholly apart from the question of the effectiveness
of the freeze as a means to compel the Iranians to perform in a way
satisfactory to the U.S. government.
There was a great deal of consideration given to the poten-
tial effect of the freeze on the foreign exchange markets and the
money markets. The announcement of a threat by Iran to withdraw its
deposits from the U.S. banking system had been one of the factors
that triggered the freeze. Ironically, the question arose, would
imposition of a freeze have the consequence of influencing withdraw-
al of other foreign deposits from U.S. banks? Would Eurodollar de-
posits, particularly in branches of U.S. banks overseas, become a
sort of endangered species as a result of this exercise?
As a result of the experience with Iran, we now know more
about the nature and liquidity of the Eurodollar market, as well as
the risks of placing and receiving Eurodollar deposits within that
market. These and other issues that made up the financial backdrop
of the Iranian experience will be the subject of our discussion.
A. Imposition of the Freeze
To set the stage, let us turn back to November 1979. You
will recall that on November 14, 1979, President Carter imposed a
freeze on certain Iranian government and government-related assets.
I think it is worth taking a moment to read the presidential an-
nouncement. It states: "I, Jimmy Carter, President of the United
States, find that the situation in Iran constitutes an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and
economy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency
to deal with that threat. I hereby order blocked all property and
interests in property of the government of Iran, its instrumentali-
ties and controlled entities in the Central Bank of Iran which are
or become subject to jurisdiction of the United States, or which
are in or come within the possession or control of persons subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States." [1]
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At the same time as the Presidential Executive Order was
issued, the White House put out a press release further describing
the action this way: "The President has today acted to block all
official Iranian assets in the United States, including deposits in
United States banks and their foreign branches and subsidiaries.
This order is in response to reports that the government of Iran is
about to withdraw its funds. The purpose of this order is to ensure
that claims on Iran by the United States and its citizens are pro-
vided for in an orderly manner. The order does not affect accounts
of persons other than the government of Iran, the Central Bank of
Iran, and other controlled entities. The precise amounts involved
cannot be ascertained at this time but there is no reason for dis-
turbance in the foreign exchange or other markets." [2]
The imposition of a freeze of this nature was not a novel
exercise on the part of the U.S. government. There were precedents
for the regulations that were issued that day to govern the nuts-
and-bolts operation of the Iranian freeze. These precedential situ-
ations involved Cuba and China as well as other countries. [3]
What did the freeze purport to affect? What was its desired
effect, financially and economically? Prior to this time, Iran had
been receiving approximately fifty million dollars a day in oil
revenue. These funds found their way into deposits that were main-
tained by Iran with U.S., European, and Japanese banks. Many of
these deposits were denominated in dollars at branches of U.S. banks
overseas, predominantly in London. These accounts were a prime tar-
get for the freeze.
B. Attack on the Freeze Outside the United States
The question of the President's authority to freeze the ac-
counts very quickly became the subject of litigation in London and
in Paris. Within two weeks of the imposition of the freeze, the
Central Bank of Iran sued five American banks in London (with which
it maintained very large dollar deposits) claiming its right to im-
mediate payment of the funds, asserted to be more than three billion
dollars in Iranian external reserves. The Iranian complaint was
very simple. It stated that Iran had maintained the deposits, that
they were now due, that they had been demanded, and that they had
not been paid. In effect, Iran came in with a summary judgment
application, which said that somebody owed them some money and would
not pay it.
C. Defense of the Freeze
The defenses asserted by the banks in these actions were pre-
mised on three main theories. One of them, which will be the primary
focus of our attention this afternoon, derives from the operation of
the presidential freeze. The freeze defense was based on the propo-
sition that the President could freeze dollar deposits maintained on
the books of an American bank branch overseas by the imposition of
an executive order, without necessarily intruding into the sovereign-
ty of the foreign country where the branches were located or creating
a conflict with the laws of that country. More of this in just a
moment.
The second line of defense, which was founded on a public
policy argument, held that the courts of England should not honor the
Iranian claims because they had behaved in a barbaric fashion and had
violated the law of nations. A third defense, based on the Breton-
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Woods agreement, would deny Iran the right to recover on the accounts.
I do not propose to spend any time discussing the second and third
lines of defense, as most of our attention was focused on the first
line of defense: namely, the way in which the freeze affected the
Eurodollar accounts.
I should mention that the banks all had substantial setoff
claims against the deposits, based on their claims against Iran for
various loans. Another issue that played a major role in the liti-
gation in Paris involved the proposition, under French law, that if
an American bank were precluded, by virtue of some legal problem in
the U.S., from paying out dollars from a dollar deposit in France
but was not precluded from paying in francs, it had an obligation to
convert the dollar claim of Iran into francs. That issue has not
yet been resolved and it is doubtful, at this point, that it will be.
I would like to focus our attention on the defense of the
American banks based on the operation of the freeze. From a legal
and a tactical point of view, it appeared preferable to structure
this defense on the premise that the manner of operation of the
accounts was well known to the depositor, who understood that no
transfers could be made out of a dollar deposit account in London
unless the transfers were made through the New York clearing system.
Recognition of that fact was, indeed, a term of the contract of de-
posit. President Carter had therefore acted within the territorial
jurisdiction of the U.S. by freezing the ability to transfer the
dollar accounts. According to this theory, the freeze would not
create any conflict with the laws of England or English national
rights.
This was a defense that was to be established by proving the
long term method of operation of such accounts. The defense, how-
ever, was not tried in the English court, nor will it be, due to the
settlement reached in the Algerian accords. This experience provided
a crash course for many people in the nature and operations of Euro-
dollar accounts. I would like to turn to my colleague, Ian Giddy,
who will describe in greater detail how the English courts would have
come out on this issue had they had the chance.
2. EURODOLLARS AND THE INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM
MR. GIDDY: This is a story about the Eurodollar market, how
transfers are made between banks in the Eurodollar market, how in 1979
Bank Markazi, Iran's Central Bank, expected to receive return of its
funds in London despite the deposit freeze, and why it did not. This
is also a story about the Eurodollar transfer system and the impli-
cations of the freeze for the future of the international payments
and the Eurodollar market.
A. Nature of Eurodollars
First, a little lesson in money. One of the initial questions
that was asked of me as a consultant to Shearman & Sterling and an-
other law firm in the Iranian deposit freeze case was, are Eurodol-
lars money? And if so, what kind of money? Fortunately, I never had
to give the answer in court. But in the professional writing on this
subject, most economists agree that Eurodollars are not money, strict-
ly defined. They are more akin to what economists define as quasi-
money.
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The difference is simply that you cannot make a payment with
quasi-money; you first have to convert it into something else. Let
us get back to the question of what a Eurodollar is, if it is not
money.
Eurodollars are bank deposits denominated in dollars outside
the borders of the U.S., and Euro-currencies are bank deposits in
currencies other than that of the country in which the bank or bank
branch is located. There is nothing special about the deposits.
They are mostly time deposits. They are simply deposited outside
the country of the currency in which they are denominated.
The important feature of Eurodollars is that they are subject
to different jurisdictions and, therefore, different regulations.
The sine qua non of a Eurodollar is that the regulations to which
Eurodollar deposits are subject are less onerous, creating lower
costs for the banks issuing those deposits. Those lower costs enable
the bank to offer a higher interest rate on the deposit, which is
what attracts funds out of national markets and into the Eurodollar
market.
B. Risks of Holding Eurodollar Deposits
The higher interest rate, though, does not come free. In the
Eurodollar market it is accompanied by a different set of risks faced
by depositors who place their funds there. Those risks are fairly
well understood by depositors, central banks, domestic corporations,
and multinational firms. Those risks were fairly well understood,
that it, until the Iranian deposit freeze took place; then a new kind
of risk was highlighted.
" CONDITION OF BANK
" CENTRAL BANK BACKING
" HOST COUNTRY POLITICAL RISK
" TRANSFER RISK
Exhibit I: EURODOLLARS DEPOSIT RISK
Exhibit 1 lists four sets of Eurodollar risks. These risks
include, first, the condition of the bank itself. The second risk
arises from the nationality of the bank, or more accurately, the re-
liance that one can place on the central bank backing it up. One
would normally prefer to have a deposit in a bank that has access to
the same currency as the one in which the deposit is denominated,
which is why American banks have had such an advantage in issuing
dollar deposits abroad. The third risk is the host country's politi-
cal risk or the sovereign risk--in other words, the risk that the
Bahamian authorities might freeze up all Eurodollar deposits in
Nassau and that the dollars might not be repaid. One could answer
that the dollars are not really in Nassau so they can always be re-
paid; but this is not as clear cut as it seems because, after all,
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there have been instances of countries seizing foreign banks. This
occurred, for example, in Saigon and Peru. In some cases, depositors
lost their funds entirely, and even those who have recovered their
money have suffered extended delays.
The new element of risk is the transfer risk, which arose out
of the deposit freeze. The transfer risk stems from the fact that
Eurodollars themselves are not narrowly-defined money. They are
quasi-money. People do not make payments with Eurodollars. PeoPle
make payments with U.S. dollars, which means that they make payments
through the U.S. banking system. Thus, despite the fact that the
Carter deposit freeze applied only within the jurisdiction of the
U.S., it effectively applied not only to the assets held within the
U.S., but also to the offshore deposits denominated in dollars in
U.S. banks in London, in Paris, and elsewhere.
GOLD AND SECURITIES HELD
BY NEW YORK FED
S 2.s8
EURODOLLAR DEPOSITS LOANS AND DEPOSITS




Exhibit 2: OFFICIAL IRANIAN ASSETS FROZEN ON NOV. 14, 1979
Let me refer you to Exhibit 2. Assets of approximately $12
billion were effectively frozen on November 14, 1979. This sum in-
cludes gold and securities held in the Fed and the U.S. Treasury
(which, of course, were immediately seized), loans and deposits in
U.S. firms, and about $2 billion of deposits in U.S. banks. However,
about half of the total--for us the more interesting part--was the
$5.5 billion in banks abroad, mainly in London, mainly in five U.S.
banks.
C. International Dollar Payments System
How was that effectively frozen? Bank Markazi claimed that it
was not frozen at all and wanted its money back immediately. Exhibit
3 indicates how the U.S. and international dollar payments system
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works and how Bank Markazi would have received its money. The dollar
payments system works quite simply as follows.
LONDON NEW YORK
BANK JARKAZI CHEMICAL BANK
INSTRUCTION CHIP' 'S
INSTRUCTION
CITIBANK, LONDON - - - - CITIBANK,NEW YORK
SWIFT
Exhibit 3: THE INTERNATIONAL DOLLAR PAYMENT SYSTEM
Bank Markazi is in London and the dotted line is the demand
it put to Citibank and to other banks in London that it wanted its
money back--the dollar deposits held in London. It said, "Give it
back here in London. It is not in the United States."
A payment between two banks in London, however, is made in
New York. This situation puzzles a lot of people including econo-
mists, but that is the way it works. To make a payment, Bank Mar-
kazi sends an instruction to Citibank in London specifying the amount
and exactly which account the money is to be paid into. That speci-
fied account is an account in New York, for example, in Chemical Bank
if Markazi had an account there.
Citibank, London, of course, has an account in its New York
head office. Through the international payments communication sys-
tem, SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Transfers), a
message is sent to Citibank,New York to remove money from Citibank,
London's account and transfer it to Chemical Bank. This transfer is
effected through the domestic payments system used for international
dollar payments or CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payments System),
the clearing house system in New York. The payment would be executed
on the same day as the instruction is sent from London and the pay-
ment issued through the CHIPS system would be paid in so-called
clearinghouse funds. The CHIPS system is simply an offsetting mech-
anism where dozens, indeed hundreds, of banks abroad with accounts
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in New York make payments to one another through other accounts in
New York. Every day these totals paid into and out of various banks
(and even within banks) are totalled up. At the end of the day the
CHIPS people figure out who owes whom what, and the net amount that
is owed. The net amount owed between the fourteen settlement banks
is then transferred in real money the following day, and the real
money is no longer so-called clearinghouse funds but dollar bills
or their equivalent, deposits in accounts at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York. Exhibit 4 shows an example of a CHIPS settlement,
with Chemical Bank and Citibank making various payments to one an-
other. At the end of day one, the net amount is totalled up and the
following day that net amount is paid. If Citibank turns out to owe
Chemical Bank a certain amount, it is paid through the "Fed wire",
i.e., through transfers between accounts at the New York Federal
Reserve or at other Federal Reserve banks.
CHEMICAL BANK CHEMICAL BANK
CHIPS
CITIBANK,NEW YORK CITIBANK,NEW YORK
Exhibit 4: TWO U.S. PAYMENT SYSTEMS
That is how it works. It all goes through the U.S. clearing
system, CHIPS, and ultimately gets paid in what everybody terms
"good money", money that can earn interest because it constitutes
scarce reserves at the Fed. Because all this has to go through New
York, any payment made between two banks in London, including be-
tween Markazi and Citibank, was subject to the freeze the moment it
started to pass through the New York clearing system since the freeze
applied to transfers not only made by, but also on behalf of, Bank
Markazi or any other entity of the national government in Iran. The
freeze was not necessarily confined to U.S. banks but the U.S. govern-
ment chose not to try to impose it on foreign banks as well.
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To conclude, one of the questions that arose out of this case
and one of the first thoughts that occurred to Bank Markazi and its
lawyers at Stephenson Harwood was, why don't you try to make the
payment in some other way? There are several ways in which you can
make this payment in London. If Bank Markazi wants to be paid by
Citibank, one way is the wheelbarrow method: the dollar bills are
wheeled down the Strand in London from Citibank's branch to Markazi's.
Unfortunately, the sums involved would have meant such a huge wheel-
barrow, such a huge shipment, that the banks were simply going to
argue that this was not a normal, accepted means of payment and so
they were not obliged to do it.
There are other methods, asserted Markazi. They could have
paid in gold or securities, or they could have made the payment in
the equivalent amount in some other foreign currency. Citibank and
other banks argued, with some merit, that none of these was the nor-
mal and expected means of payment. However, of course, the case was
never decided in court. So we do not know yet whether the courts
would have decided that Citibank was obliged to make that payment.
D. CHIPS
The Iranian freeze called into question the whole system of
international financial transfers denominated in dollars. It is a
system that has worked extraordinarily well. This system is part of
the reason for the fact that fifty-two percent of world trade and
seventy-two percent of the Euro-currency market is denominated in
U.S. dollars. About ninety-five percent of all foreign exchange
transactions in the world goes through the U.S. dollar payments sys-
tem, even between, for example, the German mark and the Swiss franc.
In other words, the CHIPS system has to handle the great bulk of in-
ternational transactions in the world. On an average day CHIPS
handles $160 billion worth of payments, which is confined to inter-
national transactions and does not include U.S. transactions. A
$160 billion may not sound like very much, but the total world trade
that occurred in 1980 was about $1.8 trillion. Therefore, CHIPS
could handle in twelve trading days the whole of 1980's world trade
--all the oil and goods and so forth that passed among all the coun-
tries in the world.
Why does it have to go through CHIPS? First, it is rather
efficient if everybody everywhere in the world knows that there is
only one payment system, only one location to which they have to
make payments when doing transactions with one another. It is like
having only one currency for doing different sorts of transactions
instead of having to go through many payment systems. But the fun-
damental reason why everything goes through CHIPS instead of, for
example, an alternative clearing system in London such as is being
proposed, is that any payment system that involves settlements be-
tween banks over time rather than instantaneously, involves out-pay-
ments sometimes preceding in-payments. The CHIPS system is settled
on a two day basis. The amount that is transferred between banks
in any one day is settled in Fed funds the following day. In the
future, same-day settlement will be instituted but the principle
remains.
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Exhibit 5: CHIPS INTRADAY SETTLEMENT RISK
Exhibit 5 indicates what happens on a typical trading day
during which international payments go through the CHIPS system.
They are not paid in real money yet. They are only paid in clearing-
house funds, which is an understanding that real money will be paid
the following day, or (when CHIPS moves to a same-day clearing sys-
tem) later on the same day. This, however, takes time and Bank A,
for example, may have various payments coming in and out during the
day. At any one point, Bank A may make an out-payment in expecta-
tion that they will receive an offsetting in-payment later on be-
cause these two transactions already have been concluded. They are
just waiting for the clearing system to take effect.
What would happen if, at any point before these transactions
offset one another, somebody interrupts the payment system? Some-
body closes down the system, or the computer breaks down, or they
were expecting a payment from Bank C which is located in Iran and
all of a sudden Bank C does not make the payment, or the central
bank of that country closes down the bank, or something else goes
wrong. In other words, the offsetting payment does not come in be-
fore the end of the clearing day. Then all these payments and set-
tlements would have to be unwound. There would be a great deal of
uncertainty as to who owed what to whom aet that particular point.
There would be concern about who was suspect, and to whom you could
make out-payments prior to receiving offsetting in-payments. The
whole system would slow down and a liquidity crisis could result.
The reason CHIPS works so well is that people have confidence in it.
If anything of this nature were to go wrong, there are twelve major
U.S. banks that are members and therefore backers, essentially in-
surers of the CHIPS system; the Federal Reserve is assumed to be
standing behind these banks. All these banks have access to the U.S.
central bank.
[2791
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
J.E. Hoffinan, Jr., LH. Giddy / National currencies as international moneyr
A similar system could be set up in London for dollar pay-
ments between banks but so far there has been an unwillingness on
the part of any institution or set of institutions to make the
investment and take the risks that would be involved in backing a
system to assure all payees that they ultimately would get paid any
transfer that was due them. Part of the reason for the reluctance
is that it would be a dollar payment system in a sterling country.
It would have to be backed up by sterling-based banks and ultimate-
ly by the Bank of England. This is largely why the international
payment system goes through the U.S. and will continue to do so.
3. EFFECTS OF THE FREEZE
A. Deposits with-U.S. Banks Abroad
Despite all the concern that was voiced in 1979 when the
Iranian deposit freeze was first imposed, concern about the dis-
ruption that would result in the international dollar deposit and
payment system, very little in fact occurred. The system has proved
extraordinarily resilient. Even the fear that U.S. banks would lose
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Exhibit 6: EURODOLLAR DEPOSITS I' U.S. BANKS
Source: rEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN
Based on Federal Reserve data, this diagram indicates the
total amount of deposits in U.S. banks abroad denominated in dollars;
that total climbed through 1978 and 1979 at a quick pace and con-
tinued to climb in 1980. Of that total, the bulk was from non-
residents of the U.S. Those deposits dropped slightly after the
freeze (indicated by the dotted line) but rebounded shortly there-
after. There has been no mass outflow of deposits from U.S. banks
I
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or from the U.S. dollar or Eurodollar market as a whole. The reason
is simply that even if you have U.S. dollars in a bank abroad and
you are subject to this transfer risk, you can protect yourself in
various ways--for example, by having a clause in any deposit con-
tract or an understanding even in unwritten contracts that the de-
positor has the option of receiving payment in another currency,
should the original currency of denomination be frozen. However,
this agreement will not be costless because if that were to happen,
the banks themselves might be subject to the risk of having to pay
out in another currency while the currency in which the deposit was
made was frozen. Although one can obtain such protection, as with
any other form of risk reduction, it is not going to come free. Banks
will surely either protect themselves against the risk by stating
their exemption from such obligations or, if they provide the option
to pay in another currency, they will pay a lower interest rate or
charge for that insurance in some fashion.
B. Application of the Freeze to Cover and Foreign Currency Accounts
MR. MUNDHEIM: Let me ask Bob Carswell to answer one question
that flows from that very good explanation of Ian's. Ian's explana-
tion certainly indicates that cover accounts in dollars would also be
included in a U.S. government freeze. That is, a Eurodollar deposit
in Barclay's Bank would also be caught. Why were those cover accounts
specifically excepted by the regulations? Ian's other point was that
if the deposit agreement had an alternative payments clause, that
clause would likely free the deposit from the risk of being effective-
ly frozen. Again, there was a general license for Iranian deposits
in U.S. banks abroad denominated in currency other than dollars.
Could you explain why those two situations were not ultimately sub-
jected to the freeze?
MR. CARSWELL: There is some history that may not be publicly
recorded, but during World War II the Treasury came up with a cover
account theory. The theory was that any dollar transfer, wherever
located, ultimately had to be done through what was known then as a
cover account in the U.S. It was not really a cover account, but the
way the transactions worked was known as the cover account theory.
I believe a reference to this may have appeared in one lower court
decision.
In subsequent blockings (the Chinese, North Korean, Vietnam-
ese, and the Cuban blockings) the issue came up only peripherally, be-
cause there were no significant overseas dollar deposits by any of
those countries, at least that anybody knew about, and hence, nobody
ever really focused on this problem. From time to time an event did
occur where an overseas dollar transaction popped up, and the Office
of Foreign Assets Control of the Treasury did occasionally invoke the
cover account theory to deal with it. For example, in one instance
when the Vietnamese tried to make a dollar transfer, and the dollars
had to come back to the U.S., Foreign Assets Control took some action.
In any event, the cover account theory was discussed in the
Treasury during all those years but I am not aware of its having
been really used. When the Iranian blocking came along, everybody
recognized that all of a sudden we had something that was unique.
U.S. banks had these huge deposits abroad, and if the freeze was go-
ing to mean anything, you had to block them. The question was how
far you went with a theory that had very sparse legal background,
that is, no court decisions that meant anything--and where there
were practical limitations to its enforceability. We just had to
make a very quick policy judgment on how far one could press the
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theory. The judgment was not to go for the full cover account
theory and block overseas dollar accounts in foreign banks, thereby
taking on foreign banks and their regulators in all the jurisdic-
tions where dollar accounts were situated. At least, as far as U.S.
banks were involved, we had them here anyway, and it was going to
be less likely that they could protest. It was simply a practical
judgment.
We decided not to include foreign currency accounts in the
overseas branches of U.S. banks for the same practical reason.
Again, the U.S. government can get to the U.S. banks because the
U.S. banks are sitting here with their head offices. In theory we
could have said to Chemical Bank in Paris, "Don't pay out the franc
account that you have for the Bank Markazi." They would then have
been subject to the excruciating problem of which regulator they
should listen to--the French or the U.S. It seemed very clear that
we were going to have nationalism problems of a high order if we
tried to block the franc deposits. Hence, we decided not to do that
either.
MR. NICHOLS: But you did.
MR. CARSWELL: I am sorry. We did include them at first, but
then within a week or so we reversed that decision because it was
perfectly clear it was going to get us in a lot more trouble than
the pressure it might put on the Iranians.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Well, in light of your explanation that there
are practical difficulties in applying the freeze theory to what I
will loosely characterize as cover accounts and to foreign currency
accounts, one is then driven, John, to the question of why foreign
depositors would not make all their dollar deposits through the
branches of non-U.S. banks, since as a practical matter they would
recognize that in the event of a freeze it is unlikely that the
government would move to a cover account theory to catch those as-
sets.
MR. HOFFMAN: I would suppose that the foreign depositors
would be best qualified to answer that question. The evidence that
Ian Giddy has pointed to has demonstrated that this was not the con-
sequence that flowed from the Iranian freeze, although there was
some speculation that there might be a movement in that direction.
People did not, in fact, take the deposits out of the U.S. foreign
branches and take them all across the street to National Westminster
or Barclay's. The question is, why didn't they in light of the fact
that there was at least some demonstrable incremental risk attand-
ant on keeping the deposits in a U.S. bank branch, rather than in a
foreign bank.
Perhaps I should let Ian Giddy give you the real answers.
But I want to begin by speculating a little bit. There is probably
a combination of reasons. Certainly an American bank holds most of
its earnings in dollars. Its assets are not primarily denominated
in yen, for example. When you put money into a bank, you are anx-
ious to get it back and to see your deposit backed up by assets
that are predominantly in the currency of your deposit. I think
that has to be the prime reason.
Ian Giddy pointed out in his remarks earlier that a U.S. bank
has a direct means of access to the Fed that is not available to a
foreign bank, and that presumably has some bearing on a decision to
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place deposits in U.S. Banks. By the same token, someone who want-
ed to maintain franc accounts would prefer a French bank over a
German bank.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Alec, as a banker what are your thoughts on
the question?
MR. VAGLIANO: As Professor Giddy said, there are four dif-
ferent risks here: the condition of the bank, the central bank
backing, the host country's political risk, and the transfer risk.
Most people, looking at the present situation from their own point
of view, see the Iranian situation as a very special one in which
there was an outrageous act by the Iranian government. They do not
expect their own government (I am speaking now of the foreign depos-
itors) to put them in that kind of a situation; so it is clearly
a risk that is very much discounted at the present time.
Still, it is fair to say that there could be circumstances
under which this is seen as a precedent. A political situation
could arise where people might remember the Iranian occasion, and
the risk would then become more relevant and more immediate, and
it could result in a different decision.
MR. CARSWELL: I think I should say that from where we sat in
the government, we would agree with that, and we were at great pains
to say that all the way through. The Iran blocking was a response
to a particularly outrageous event. It was not, at least as far as
we were concerned, to be regarded as a precedent. Indeed, in the
final settlement we did everything we could (and it worked out suc-
cessfully) to unwind the extraterritorial effect of the whole thing
simultaneously with the release of the hostages. So, there is not
even a vestige of the extraterritorial blocking left and, again,
that was not an accidental policy course.
C. Alternative Payments Systems
MR. MUNDHEIM: Is this alternative payment procedure that you
have mentioned, Ian, a practice which is beginning to gain currency?
MR. GIDDY: There are other reasons besides the transfer risk
for establishing an alternative payments mechanism. Indeed, I have
heard a number of London bankers complain that they have to go
through New York and pay the transatlantic communications cost, and
that they would like to have a payment system in London. It seems
to me that the fact that there are good economic reasons for people
to want the payment system in London or elsewhere and the fact that
this has not emerged, despite several proposals and studies looking
into this, is evidence that the transfer risk has not provided any
great incentive to establish a new system.
There has been absolutely no move towards realistic setting
up of such a system, although it is true that some payments are made
between banks in London for securities purposes, for retail trans-
actions, and for claims among insurance companies.
Bob, could I take the opportunity to reply to one of the ques-
tions sent up from the audience?
MR. MUNDHEIM: Certainly.
MR. GIDDY: There is a question that has been asked of me
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that bears directly on this. The question is, if Bank Markazi asked
Citibank, London to transfer its credit balance on Citibank, London's
books to the account of Barclay's Bank, might this transfer of cred-
it from one account to another in Citibank, London be accomplished
without a transfer through New York? In other words, if two entities
both have an account in Citibank, London, could London just offset
one against the other and not require any transfer through accounts
in banks in New York? That is correct: in principle, offsetting
payments could be made in London within the same bank. From the
evidence that I have seen in relation to the deposit freeze case,
that sort of thing is done very rarely but it is done. So, in prin-
ciple it seems to me that a transfer within a branch to another ac-
count within the branch could be made by Citibank, London on behalf
of Markazi.
MR. NICHOLS: I would like to follow up with one additional
comment. I think it is right, as Ian points out, that as a practi-
cal matter, this is something that can be done. There is a legal
issue involved, however, that I think becomes quite significant
when you consider the amounts that you are talking about in con-
nection with these central bank accounts.
If you have an American bank branch that has a very large
deposit from Customer A and it is very happy to do business with
Customer A in that magnitude, it may not be so happy to do business
with Customer B in the same kind of magnitude, for all sorts of rea-
sons: one being the future relations with Customer B and whether
it is going to be a stable account and all those sorts of things.
So I think there is a very serious legal question whether Customer A
can direct the bank to establish a similar account for Customer B.
I do not think there is anything in the implied contract of deposit
between the bank and Customer A requiring the bank to do business
with Customer B on a similar basis. Such a requirement would be the
consequence of that kind of transfer directed by Customer A, unless,
of course, Customer B has an account.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Our discussion here will not decide the issue
that the British court would have had to decide. We have heard ex-
planations of what the defense would have been; but since we do not
know what the answer of the British court would be, we are left with
a question rather than an answer. However, it is an issue that de-
positors and others who deal with the dollar system have to bear in
mind, and I think all we want to do is to recognize that it is an
open issue and to understand the basis of the U.S. position and the
bank defense.
D. Foreign Currency Accounts
MR. HOFFMAN: I would like to add one other comment that bears
on a couple of things that some of the others on the panel have said
with regard to foreign currency accounts in U.S. banks. It has been
pointed out that almost immediately after the freeze a license was is-
sued which permitted transfers of foreign currency accounts. These
were no longer blocked, for reasons Bob Carswell pointed out. One of
the consequences of that license was the establishment of a fact that
bears on the validity of the legal theory of the freeze defense in
London.
The freeze defense, remember, was predicated on the fact that
dollars always remain in the U.S. All dollar transfers must be done
in the U.S. By the same token, guilders are currency in the Nether-
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lands, not in England or in Japan. If you do a transfer of a guilder
account, another Euro-currency, it has to go through the Netherlands.
Soon after the freeze had been imposed and the license for these
foreign currency transactions had been issued, such a transfer was
made by Bank Markazi, which had a guilder account with a European
branch of an American bank. Markazi directed the transfer to be
made in the bank in the Netherlands, recognizing the fact that such
a transfer must go through the Netherlands because that was the
local currency of deposit.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Robert, you had a comment.
MR. CARSWELL: Let me just close, or try to close, a circle.
I think you ought to remember, in assessing the transfer risk issue,
that when the U.N. imposed sanctions on Rhodesia some years ago, in
the early 1970s, it included the freezing of accounts in its resolu-
tions. The U.K. at that point adopted its own freeze measures in
the U.K. and, in fact, froze Rhodesian pound accounts in the U.K. on
a basis parallel to what the U.S. and other countries did. So, your
transfer risk is not solely an Iranian experience. It does come up,
has come up from time to time, in other jurisdictions. If you start
thinking of what other bank you could go to, to be assured of no
problems, you may have to recognize that there is no sure escape.
I do not suppose anybody can predict where the next tensions will
come, and in what currency and with what relationships they will be
confronted.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Let me ask one additional question in light of
that particular observation. If someone has a dollar deposit with
a London branch of a U.S. bank and the British freeze payments, can
that depositor come to New York and say, "I deposited some dollars
with your bank and now I would like them back."
MR. NICHOLS: No.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Because.
MR. HOFFMAN: No--unless it is specifically spelled out,
which it may be. I believe in many instances if the deposit is
reflected by a certificate of deposit, a CD, the terms may be typed
or written right on the document. If not, it is an implied term of
the deposit contract that is subject to the laws of the country in
which the branch is located. Without taking up a lot of time, I am
convinced that such a position is not inconsistent with the elabo-
ration of the argument we made. Although some people may be will-
ing to debate it on another occasion, I think that it is widely
recognized that if you maintain a deposit on the books of a branch
in London, you are subjecting yourself to regulation and control by
the U.K. Mr. Nichols, would you disagree?
MR. NICHOLS: No, I do not think I would disagree. The Fed
thinks there is a difference between Eurodollars and domestic dol-
lars, and it treats them differently for a number of regulatory
purposes. Obviously the theory is that the Eurodollar market is
less attractive to American depositors because there is a different
level of risk. In other words, everybody has always assumed, or
should have assumed (although I must say I do not think bank deposit
contracts are written as clearly on this point as they might be)
that if you have U.S. dollars on deposit in Nassau, and the Bahamian
government chooses to impose a system that says, "You can get paid
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the dollars in Nassau but you cannot get them out" you will be un-
able to recover against the head office in the U.S. I have always
assumed that everybody understood that this kind of a freeze was a
possibility. Now, the Bahamians are presumably cutting their own
throats in the process, so nobody thinks it is very likely. But
there have been times, I believe, when dollar deposits in the
Bahamas have commanded rates different from those on dollar deposits
in London, because it is assumed that there is a different risk as
between the Bahamas and the U.K.
MR. VAGLIANO: That is right. I think that in the early
period of the Eurodollar market, for example, there were some of the
more conservative Swiss depositors that hesitated about putting
their Euro-deposits in London because of the British risk.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Fred, you had a comment?
MR. HELDRING: I have no comment on the legality, but one on
the matter of practice. lie have a branch in Nassau and were one of
the first to have one. We have always thought that if something
happened, we would just transfer our books back to the U.S. and pay.
It is a branch and we pay.
MR. NICHOLS: One New York bank is defending pretty vigorous-
ly a suit for dollar deposits made in its Saigon office, if I am
not mistaken. You also have the fact that if you tell your customer
that you are prepared to pay him in Philadelphia, you are going to
have to keep reserves against the deposit.
There is a very specific Fed interpretation of Regulation D,
which says that if an American bank guarantees repayment at its
head office of a foreign office deposit, then that becomes a U.S.
deposit for Regulation D reserve purposes--and I would assume pro-
bably also for Regulation Q purposes if there were a Q ceiling ap-
plicable.
NOTES
(1] Exec. Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65729 (1979).
[21 White House Press Release, 15 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 2117
(Nov. 14, 1979).
[3) See 31 C.F.R. pts. 500, 515 (1980).
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Lessons from the Iranian Experience:
IMPACT ON LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
Bruce W. Nichols
MR. MUNDHEIM: I think we have illuminated a number of issues
relating to deposits. It is time to turn to the lessons learned
from the experience of banks as lenders. Bruce, could you begin our
tour of that problem?
MR. NICHOLS: Let me first say that I think the deposit is-
sues are really the more interesting issues, and I am going to come
back to them. You donot want to listen to lawyers spout statistics,
but in view of all the comments that have been made to the effect
that the Eurodollar market is alive and well and living in your telex
machine, I thought perhaps you should have at least a few statistics
that may point in the other direction.
The Bank for International Settlements collects figures from
large banks in a number of jurisdictions. Those figures show that
between the end of 1979 and the end of the third quarter of 1980,
the liabilities of the U.S. bank segment of the reporting universe
to the oil exporting countries did not decline in absolute terms,
but in percentage terms they fell from thirty-seven percent to twen-
ty-nine percent. In other words, the liabilities of the non-U.S.
banks to the oil exporting countries grew absolutely and grew rela-
tive to the liabilities to those countries of banks in the U.S. The
figures for Eastern Europe are even more interesting. The U.S.
banks' proportion of those liabilities fell from 10.4 percent to
5.8 percent, and the absolute amount of liabilities of the U.S. re-
porting banks to the Eastern European countries also fell. So it
seems--and there are other statistics that point in the same direc-
tion--that the oil exporters, who are the big accumulators, are
diversifying their currencies. That process almost certainly began
before Iran, but I do not think one can totally ignore Iran as a
factor fueling the move to further diversification.
I noticed in Mr. Cooke's paper that there are a couple of
references to Herstatt and no mention of Iran. In many ways, per-
haps Herstatt was a more important influence on the Euro-markets
than Iran. On the other hand, I think it would be a mistake to say
that the markets have not been influenced by Iran, and I shall come
back to that point when we get to the deposit side. Rather, I think
that we have not seen the Iranian story play itself out completely.
1. IMPORTANCE OF LOAN DOCUmENTATION
Switching now to the loan side, one of the things we argue
about at conferences like this is whether the loan documentation
makes any great difference. There are Continental lawyers who say
that the twenty-five and thirty page loan agreements drafted by
English and American lawyers are so much verbiage and that in the
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end the foreign government is either going to pay you or it is not.
So what difference does it make what you say in your documentation?
I suppose at the height of the crisis when we were all reading the
agreements furiously and when we were having lawyers around the
world give opinions as to what they meant and were preparing to
carry questions of interpretation to the supreme courts of three or
four different countries, we all more or less said, "Well, this
proves that loan documentation is important."
One of the arguments given by those who say that documenta-
tion is not important is that when a foreign country reaches the
stage of not paying its debts, it probably has no foreign assets.
I suppose the great lesson of Iran was that a country with vast
foreign assets might nevertheless decline to pay its debts. Thus a
fair amount of asset-grabbing went on; that is to say, the American
banks set off, or thought they had set off, Iran's deposits against
Iran's debts. Certain Iranian assets in Germany, and in this coun-
try also, were attached by creditors of Iran. As you have already
heard, Iran has brought lawsuits in both the English and the French
courts to recover its deposits. Certainly we were all getting pre-
pared, if this thing had gone on for any great length of time, to
deal in minute detail with various kinds of loan documentation prob-
lems. I think I could show you a stack of legal opinions and pro-
fessorial advice--and I am sure John could show you an equally high
stack--interpreting any number of clauses in these documents.
In the end, we have to recognize that what happened was a
political settlement; and as far as the syndicated loans were con-
cerned, it was a global settlement. The fellow with the three page
loan agreement got his money back, just as the fellow with the
thirty-three page loan agreement got his money back. When one is
having an argument with Continental lawyers as to whether the exten-
sive documentation is or is not really important, I am not sure that
we can point to Iran as proof positive that it is--although I still
believe so.
2. AREAS OF REEXAMINATION
Now it is true that the Iranian experience has had some im-
pact on what is being put into these documents, or at least what
people are asking to have put into these documents. This is a high-
ly professional audience. Some of you spend more of your time in
this area than I do, and therefore I am going to hit some high spots
rather than try to go into extensive detail. I have appended at the
end of the chapter a few excerpts from specific documents for those
of you who appreciate detail.
A. Central Bank Guarantees
The fact that a borrower with external assets can refuse to
pay its debts is going to lead to some greater attention in sover-
eign lending as to whether the fellow you are lending to is the
fellow who has the external assets. If Bank Markazi had guaranteed
all of the Iranian public sector's external debt, I think we all
would have felt that our setoffs were a good deal more solid than
they were. In other words, the basic issue on the setoffs was that
the deposits were basically those of Bank Markazi, and the debts
were those of the government of Iran or the National Iranian Petro-
chemical Company or some other entity within the Iranian public sec-
tor. I suppose that if the lenders were in the driver's seat (which
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they are not and have not been for a very long time) you would see
renewed attention to the question of central bank guarantees, be-
cause external assets tend to be held in the central bank's name
and the foreign liabilities tend to be issued in the names of other
parts of the government. I take it that there is no banker in the
room who would say that he would not love to have a central bank
guarantee of all his governmental lending, but it is not easy to
obtain.
I could take one Latin American country, which has occasion-
ally given central bank guarantees, and draw a graph to show you
that such guarantees are given when the credit of the country is at
its lowest ebb and that they disappear the minute the country's
credit standing rises. As a practical matter, I doubt that there
will be a notable increase in the number of central bank guarantees
that bankers can obtain.
B. Jurisdictional Clauses
Another matter which was of particular importance to those of
us who got involved in Germany is the jurisdiction clause. The
jurisdiction clause in one of the important Iranian loan agreements
reads as follows:
Any legal action or proceedings with respect to this Agreement by the Borrower
against the Agent and/or the Banks may be brought at the option of the Borrower
In any court of competent jurisdiction in Iran or elsewhere and against the
Borrower may be brought at the option of any Bank or the Agent in courts of
competent jurisdiction in England or Iran or in New York....
If the German litigation had gone to a conclusion, one of the most
important issues--probably the most important issue--would have been
whether the jurisdiction clause saying that the banks could sue Iran
in the courts of England, New York or Iran was permissive--in the
sense that you could sue there and that you could sue any place else
you felt like, too--or whether it was exclusive and meant that you
could sue only in those jurisdictions, and hence not in Germany.
I continue to feel (wearing my lender hat) that it is very
important to make clear that your jurisdictional submissions are not
exclusive. If you hypothesize a situation in which a borrower has
e::ternal assets and still does not pay his debts, you cannot know
what jurisdiction those external assets are apt to be in. If you
lock yourself into suing in one court or two courts when the exter-
nal assets are in fact in the third country, your client may well
get annoyed at you if your case fails on that ground. Moreover,
this is something about which the average borrower, at least in my
experience, has not been too resistant--at least up until now.
C. Event of Default
Another interesting aspect of Iran was the argument that the
Iranians were getting all set to make the payments, and that it
could not have been an event of default because they were prevented
by law from paying. The Iranians have asserted that they had every
intention of paying. Indeed, for the Government loan, the payment
instructions were already here in New York when the freeze occurred.
The Iranians asserted that banks could not call a default and ac-
celerate a loan if the non-payment is not the borrower's fault but
rather the result of force majeure. I think English law and New
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York law probably would not accept that as a correct view of the
contracts as they have been written. It is possible to make it
very, very clear in your acceleration clause that you have tried to
preserve your acceleration right notwithstanding the fact that the
failure to pay or the other event of default results from force
majeure, and not from a voluntary act on the part of the borrower.
One such clause, not the most artfully drafted one I have ever seen,
reads as follows:
then, and in any such event (an "Event of Default"), whatever the reason for
such event and whether or not it shall be voluntary or involuntary or be
effected by operation of law or pursuant to any judgment, decree, order, law,
rule or regulation of any governmental agency, the Agent may, and shall upon
request of the Majority Banks . . .
I do not know whether the borrowers are going to resist such
a clause strenuously, and I am not even sure as a legal matter that
I want to put it in, because I think it may raise some questions.
Traditionally such a clause has tended to appear in insurance com-
pany private placement agreements and has not tended to appear in
domestic bank loan agreements. But it certainly is an issue worth
thinking about.
D. Remedy Clauses
All of us who write loan agreements with foreign sovereigns
have for a long time been trying to focus on what I would call the
remedy clauses, but the fact that the Iranian litigations all began
with pre-judgment attachments tends to show the importance of such
attachments. The people who write these clauses are going to focus
even harder than they have in the past on spelling out the kinds of
remedies against the foreign sovereign borrower they think they
ought to have.
Pre-judgment attachment is obviously terribly important in a
situation where you have a borrower who has external assets but who
has a political reason for not paying. Obviously, if you sue him
in Jurisdiction A where he has assets and you cannot get a pre-
judgment attachment or Mareva injunction, by the time you get judg-
ment in Jurisdiction A, those assets are going to be in Jurisdiction
B, C, D, E, or F. Thus pre-judgment attachment and a specific con-
sent to pre-judgment attachment is, I think, a matter of renewed
concern on the part of lenders.
E. Control of Acceleration Rights
Another aspect of Iran is that the non-American banks in the
syndicates got pretty annoyed with the American banks in the syn-
dicates. With respect to those Iranian loans that were in fact
accelerated, the acceleration was done over the strenuous objection
of the non-American banks in the syndicates. Thus one heard an-
nouncements by some foreign banks that they would never again join
a syndicate in which the American banks had the percentage necessary
to accelerate. There are not many foreign banks following that kind
of rule, but there is no doubt that those percentages--which tended
not to be thought about very seriously--are now being looked at very
much harder.
For some reason, Euro-agreements have tended to have the same
percentage for covenant waivers as they have had for acceleration.
I think the usual formula would be that the Majority Banks (defined
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usually as 66.66 percent by amount) can waive covenants, and the
same percentage can accelerate. Those two percentages do not
necessarily have to be the same, although they do have to overlap.
It would be utterly inconsistent to say that thirty percent could
accelerate and 66.66 percent could waive the covenant, because you
then have a Mexican standoff. There would be nothing inconsistent,
however, in saying that 66.66 percent could waive covenants but that
only forty percent was required to accelerate. I think acceleration
provisions are getting a much harder look, and they should. I have
no doubt that some foreign banks are a little nervous about joining
syndicates where it is clear that the American banks in the group,
acting alone, would be able to cause an acceleration.
F. Sharing Provisions
Another matter now receiving extensive attention is the so-
called sharing provisions, which are common in Euro-loan agreements.
These came into the Euro-market from American domestic lending prac-
tice, where groups of American banks were lenders and were fearful
of the fact that the borrowing company might have all its deposits
at one or two of the big banks. The smaller banks would argue that
if a setoff had to be made, surely there ought to be a sharing of
setoffs.
Thus the sharing clauses are often called setoff sharing
clauses, although that may not be strictly accurate. Some of them
are setoff sharing clauses; some share almost any conceivable method
of repayment. In other words, some clauses say that if you get re-
paid by any means disproportionately to the amounts the other banks
are paid, then you have to share. Some of them say that if you get
paid voluntarily by the borrower or through the exercise of setoff,
then you share, but that if you sue the borrower you do not have to
share. All those clauses are coming under intense review. Comments
come back from groups of lenders on those clauses to a much greater
extent than used to be the case.
G. Agents' Authority
Also relating to the rights of the bank group members among
themselves, the extent of the agent's discretionary rights and
authorities has been called into question by Iran. A lot of the
Iranian agreements that had named American banks as agents said that
the agent could, acting on its own, accelerate if it wished to do so
and that it must accelerate if requested to do so by a specified
percentage of the banks. As far as I know, no American agent exer-
cised the discretionary part of that authority.
I think a number of foreign banks were made nervous by the
existence of the discretionary power to accelerate. On the other
hand, suppose that one of the plaintiff banks in Germany had been
thrown out of court when it sued on a loan that had not in fact been
accelerated, and let us assume hypothetically that the same bank had
won and actually recovered on another loan that had been accelerated.
Would that bank have had a cause of action against the agent that
had failed to accelerate although it clearly had the right to do so?
You may find an even greater effort on the part of the syndicate
banks to curb any discretionary authority in the agent--perhaps par-
ticularly when it is an American agent.
Also, and as a result of Iran, you find a much greater ten-
dency to write clauses making it absolutely clear that the specified
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majority of the banks may instruct the agent how to proceed on any
matters where the agent is supposed to proceed. You also find much
greater attention to clauses saying that the banks in the group can
fire the agent if they want to fire him.
The latest wrinkle I have run into is requests from non-
American banks to put in clauses that specifically permit the pay-
ments to be routed around the agent if the agent has trouble han-
dling the payments. One such clause reads as follows:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement or in any
Note, if it shall become unlawful or, in the opinion of the Agent, impracticable
for any payment to be made as aforesaid and the Agent shall give notice to the
other parties hereto to that effect, then the Borrower shall pay to each Lender
for its own account in such funds as are required by Section 3.2 or in such
other manner as may be egreed between the Borrower and the relevant Lender and
to such account as may be specified by the relevant Lender to the Borrower the
amount of the relevant Lender's participation in the payment in question.
Each Lender shall keep the Agent fully informed as to all amounts received
by it and as to all agreements made between it and the Borrower as referred
to above.
3. DEPOSIT DOCUMENTATION
Obviously, a lot of things I have discussed are things that
lenders ought to be asking borrowers for. Conversely, borrowers,
having seen the fact that the American banks were pretty aggressive,
will be reacting opposite to the way the American bank law.yers have
been reacting. It is curious that what little fallout Iran has had,
has been in the area of loan documentation because, as John and Ian
have said, the right place for the fallout is the field of deposit
documentation. And yet, as far as I know, there has not been any
great pressure on deposit documentation.
In the 1950s, as far as I can tell, New York banks did take
foreign currency deposits here in New York. In a letter written by
a New York bank to an inland correspondent bank that had deposited
the magnificent sum of four hundred pounds with the New York bank,
I found a clause that says--in absolutely clear language--that the
New York bank was going to put the four hundred pounds on deposit
with its London office and that the inland bank was going to take
the risk that that money could not be gotten out of London. In
other words, the paragraph says that the inland bank is to be in
exactly the same position vis-a-vis English law and regulations as
it would have been in if it had taken the money to London and depo-
sited it there.
The German banks in their standard business terms and condi-
tions say roughly the same thing. The official English translation
of the standard business terms and conditions applied by the German
private banks says:
The holders of credit balances in foreign currency maintained at the bank shall
share in proportion to and up to the amount of their balances all financial or
legal disadvantages and damages which might affect the bank's balances in the
respective currency in consequence of force majeure, war, riots or similar
events or in consequence of acts of third parties abroad not caused by the
bank's fault or in connection with acts of domestic or foreign authorities.
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Thus, if you deposit a thousand dollars with the Deutsche Bank in
Frankfurt and Bob Mundheim deposits a thousand dollars with the
Deutsche Bank in Frankfurt, and something goes wrong, and the
Deutsche Bank is able to get only a thousand dollars back from the
U.S., then Bob will get five hundred dollars and you will get five
hundred dollars. I believe, although I am not certain, that a num-
ber of Swiss banks use a standard business condition similar to
that used by the German banks.
This shows that for a long time bankers have understood the
problem of the dual risk inherent in a deposit in one country in
the currency of another country. Yet in the Eurodollar time-deposit
market, where the contract is normally entered into by a pretty sim-
ple exchange of telexes, they have chosen to leave the matter fuzzy.
Now that Iran has happened and the international banking community
knows what the problems are, I wonder whether the risk of ambiguity
is shifting. I wonder whether the depositors ought to come, as Ian
Giddy suggests, and ask for a dual currency contract. As far as I
know they have not done so. I also wonder whether the banks that
leave the issue ambiguous may possibly be in for trouble. I think
we are going to hear more on that issue.
As far as I can tell, the Eurodollar bond market has not made
changes in its documentation as a result of Iran. The standard bond
language makes it perfectly clear that the bond is payable in New
York in dollars and that it is a matter of the issuer's grace and
favor as to whether it has any paying agencies outside the U.S. If
the issuer does pay outside the U.S., it does so only by a transfer
payable inside the U.S.
4. POLITICAL RISK
A look at the history of World War II may help explain why
the depositors have not been rushing to put their money with third
country banks. The fact of the matter is that both we and the
British at the beginning of the war--and indeed we even before we
got in the war--froze the assets of all the neutral countries of
Europe. Swiss deposits in the U.S. were frozen in just the same
way that German assets were, and an elaborate system was worked out
by which the Swiss could certify that the owners of those assets
were in fact Swiss.
There is no complete escape from the political risk in hold-
ing assets outside your own country. It all depends on how deter-
mined and fanatic Mr. Carswell and his henchmen in the Treasury
want to get. He explained to you that he probably could have frozen
the Iranians' dollar deposits at the Union Bank of Switzerland. He
was sensible not to try; but I suppose that if we had gotten into
some kind of a hot war with Iran, he might have tried. Thus, I
think that the reason for the apparent lack of pressure from deposi-
tor countries is a recognition that Iran was a unique event and is
not apt to repeat itself plus a realization that, in the end, if
the U.S. wants to tie up its dollars it can probably do so.
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APPENDIX VII
EXCERPTS FROM SPECIFIC DOCMENTS
ITEM 1: Portion of the jurisdiction clause from an actual Iranian
loan agreement:
(a) Any legal action or proceedings with respect to this Agreement
by the Borrower against the Agent and/or the Banks may be brought
at the option of the Borrower in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion in Iran or elsewhere and against the Borrower may be brought
at the option of any Bank or the Agent in courts of competent
jurisdiction in England or Iran or in New York....
ITEM 2: Portions of the jurisdiction clause in a recent interna-
tional loan agreement:
10.2. consent to Jurisdiction. The Borrower irrevocably submits
to the jurisdiction of any New York State or Federal court sitting
in the City of New York over any suit, action or proceeding aris-
ing out of or relating to this Agreement or any Note.
10.5. No Limitation on Service or Suit. Nothing in this Section
10 shall affect the right of the Agent or any Bank to serve process
in any manner permitted by law or limit the right of the Agent or
any Bank to bring proceedings against the Borrower in the courts
of any jurisdiction or jurisdictions.
ITEM 3: Portions of the default clause in a typical international
loan agreement:
If any one or more of the following events ("Events of Default")
shall occur and be continuing:
(a) failure by the Borrower to make any payment of the
principal of and interest on the Notes when due and
payable...
then the Agent may, and shall upon the written request of the
Majority Banks, by notice of default given to the Borrower, de-
clare all the Notes outstanding hereunder to be forthwith due
and payable...
ITEM 4: Portion of the default clause in a recent international
loan agreement:
then, and in any such event (an "Event of Default"), whatever the
reason for such event and whether or not it shall be voluntary
or involuntary or be effected by operation of law or pursuant
to any judgment, decree, order, law, rule or regulation of any
governmental agency, the Agent may, and shall upon request of the
Majority Banks...
ITEM 5: Remedies clause in an actual Iranian loan agreement:
(b) To the extent that the Borrower may be entitled to claim
for itself or its assets immunity from suit or other legal
process, the Borrower hereby irrevocably agrees not to claim
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and hereby irrevocably waives such immunity to the full extent
permitted by Iranian law.
ITEM 6: Remedies clause in a more detailed international loan
agreement:
6.1 Waiver of Sovereign Xmmunity. To the extent that the
Borrower or any central bank or monetary authority of the
Borrower may be entitled, in any jurisdiction in which judicial
proceedings may at any time be commenced with respect to this
Agreement or the Notes, to claim for itself or its revenues,
assets or properties sovereign immunity from suit, from the
jurisdiction of any court (including but not limited to any
court of the United States of America or the State of New York),
from attachment prior to judgment, from attachment in aid of
execution of a judgment or from execution of a judgment and to
the extent that in any such jurisdiction there may be attributed
such a sovereign immunity (whether or not claimed), the Borrower,
for itself and for its central bank or monetary authority, here-
by irrevocably agrees not to claim and hereby irrevocably waives
such sovereign immunity in respect of suit, jurisdiction of any
court, attachment prior to judgment, attachment in aid of
execution of a judgment and execution of a judgment.
ITEM 7: Sharing clause in an actual Iranian loan agreement:
If the Borrower pays any amount payable by it hereunder directly
to a Bank otherwise than in accordance with Clause 10(a) above
and as a result such Bank receives a greater payment than it
would have been entitled to have received under Clause 10(d)
above such Bank shall promptly remit such payment to the Agent
which shall promptly distribute the same in compliance with
Clause 10(d) above.
ITEM 8: A somewhat broader sharing clause in another international
loan agreement:
10.9 Sharing of Set-Offs and Other Payments. Each Bank agrees
that if it shall, whether through the exercise of a right of
banker's lien, set-off or counterclaim against the Borrower or
otherwise, obtain payment of the indebtedness (for principal or
interest) to it by the Borrower hereunder which is proportionately
greater than the payment of such indebtedness obtained by any other
Bank, (i) it shall be deemed to have simultaneously purchased from
such other Bank an interest in such indebtedness held by such
other Bank so that the aggregate unpaid amount of such indebtedness
and interest thereon held by each Bank shall be proportionate to
the aggregate indebtedness owing to it by the Borrower hereunder
immediately prior to such payment and (ii) such other adjustment
shall be made from time to time as shall be equitable to ensure
that each Bank shares in such payment pro rata; provided, however,
that if all or any portion of such proportionately greater payment
of the indebtedness is thereafter recovered from such purchasing
Bank, the purchase shall be rescinded and the purchase price
restored to the extent of such recovery, but without interest.
ITEM 9: Selected sections relating to the agent in a post-Iran
agreement:
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8.2 Majority Lenders. The Agent shall, to the extent practicable
under the circumstances, consult with all of the Lenders prior
to taking action on their behalf under this agreement, or under
any other agreements or instruments contemplated hereby. The
Agent shall not take any action contrary to the written direction
of the Majority Lenders and shall take any lawful action in
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement prescribed in a
written direction of the Majority Lenders.
The Agent may decline to take any action except upon the uritten
direction of the Majority Lenders and the Agent may obtain a
ratification by the Majority Lenders of any action taken by it
under this Agreement. In each case the Agent shall have no lia-
bility to the Borrower, the Managers or any of the Lenders for
any action taken by it upon the direction of the Majority Lenders
or that is ratified by the Majority Lenders, nor shall the Agent
have any liability for any failure to act (except as contemplated
by Section 8.7) unless the Agent has been instructed to act by
the Majority Lenders, the action of the Majority Lenders in each
case being binding on all the Lenders hereunder. Notwithstanding
anything herein to the contrary, the Agent need not take any
action on behalf of the Lenders unless and until it is indemnified
to its satisfaction for any and all consequences of such action.
8.8 Successor Agent. Subject to the appointment and acceptance
of a successor agent as provided below, the Agent may resign at
any time by giving prior written notice thereof to each Lender
and the Borrower, and the Agent may be removed at any time with
or without cause by the Majority Lenders. Upon any such resigna-
tion or removal, the Majority Lenders shall, with the approval of
the Borrower, have the right to appoint a successor agent. If no
successor agent shall have been so appointed by the Majority Lenders
and shall have accepted such appointment within 30 days after the
retiring Agent's giving of notice of resignation or the Majority
Lenders' removal of the retiring Agent, then the retiring Agent
may, on behalf of the Lenders, appoint a successor agent, which
shall be a commercial bank (or a financial institution with an
affiliate that is a commercial bank) with a banking office in New
York, New York. Upon the acceptance of any appointment as Agent
hereunder by a successor agent, such successor agent shall there-
upon succeed to and become vested with all the rights, powers,
privileges and duties of the retiring Agent, and the retiring
Agent shall be discharged from its duties and obligations hereunder.
After any retiring Agent's resignation or removal hereunder as
Agent, the provisions of this Section 8.8 shall continue in effect
for its benefit in respect of any actions taken or omitted to be
taken by it while it was acting as the Agent hereunder or under any
document contemplated hereby.
ITEM 10: A provision in a post-Iran agreement permitting payments
to be routed around the Agent:
(b) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this
Agreement or in any Note, if it shall become unlawful or, in the
opinion of the Agent, impracticable for any payment to be made as
aforesaid and the Agent shall give notice to the other parties
hereto to that effect, then the Borrower shall pay to each Lender
for its own account in such funds as are required by Section 3.2
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or in such other manner as may be agreed between the Borrower
and the relevant Lender and to such account as may be specified
by the relevant Lender to the Borrower the amount of the relevant
Lender's participation in the payment in question. Each Lender
shall keep the Agent fully informed as to all amounts received by
it and as to all agreements made between it and the Borrower as
referred to above.
ITEM 11: Excerpt from a letter sent by a New York bank in the 1950s
to a customer who had deposited sterling with such bank's
New York head office:
As a matter of record, we wish to advise you that this sum of L400,
together with other funds of customers, is carried in an account
in our name with our London Office, upon and subject to the con-
ditions, however, that such funds shall stand with our London
Office for your account and risk, in the same manner and with the
same effect as if they had been deposited by you directly with an
English bank, and shall be governed as to payment and in other
respects by the statutes, decrees, regulations, ordinances, etc.
of the authorities de facto or de jure controlling England. Please
note further that these funds are not payable here in actual cur-
rency but are available only by check or cable transfer in England
through us as your Agent to transmit instructions subject to the
conditions above stated.
ITEM 12: Official translation of Clause 3(2) of the General Business
Conditions applied by all privately owned German commercial
banks:
The holders of credit balances in foreign currency maintained at
the bank shall share in proportion to and up to the amount of,
their balances all financial or legal disadvantages and damages
which might affect the bank's balances in the respective currency
in consequence of force majeure, war, riots or similar events or
in consequence of acts of third parties abroad not caused by the
bank's fault or in connection with acts of domestic or foreign
authorities.
ITEM 13: The payment language contained in a U.S. dollar certificate
of deposit currently issued by the London office of an
American bank:
Negotiable Certificate of Deposit
CONSOLIDATED BANK OF NEW YORK, 5 OLD BROAD STREET
LONDON E.C.2
No. London ............
THIS CERTIFIES that there has been deposited with Consolidated
Bank of New York, London Office the sum of ....... U.S. $ ........
payable to bearer/order of ........... upon the ..... fixed ("the date
of maturity") with interest (for the actual number of days on a 360
day year basis from the date hereof to the date of maturity only)
at the rate of ..........
Payment will be made solely at the above mentioned London
Office upon surrender of this Certificate and will be made by draft
on or telegraphic transfer addressed to Consolidated Bank of New
York, 297 Park Avenue, New York, U.S.A.
This Certificate of Deposit must be presented for payment
through the medium of a banker. The rights and obligations herein
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shall be determined by English Law.
Authorized Signature
ITEM 14: The alternative payment language in a recent U.S. dollar
denominated note publicly offered outside the United
States by a finance subsidiary of a U.S. corporation,
which appears after a provision making the Note payable
at the head office of a New York bank:
At the holder's option and subject to applicable laws and
regulations payment of the principal of, premium (if any),
Interest and Additional Interest (if any) on this Note will also
be made at such paying agencies outside the United States as the
Company shall appoint from time to time and at which, at the
option of the holder, such payment will be made by check drawn
on, or by transfer to a United States dollar account maintained
by the holder with, a bank in New York City.
ITEM 15: Excerpts from Reeves, The Control of Foreign Funds by
the United States Treasury, 11 Law & Contemp. Prob. 17
(1945) (footnotes omitted):
In the face of growing world danger the United States took the
next step for its protection on June 14, 1941. On this date an
amendment to the Freezing Order was published which added to the
list of nations already frozen all the rest of continental Europe:
the aggressor, the conquered, and the neutral nations. The pre-
amble to this Order carried the additional phrase not used in the
previous Orders: "necessary in the interest of national defense
and security." A few weeks later, July 26, 1941, when Japan over-
ran Indo-China, Japan and China were added to this list. China
was included at the request of its own government for its assistance
and to prevent Japan from using the occupied areas in China as a
base for evading the freezing control.
The considerations of immobilization for preservation of property
obviously do not apply to the property of the blocked neutrals.
Here the problem is to prevent transactions which might be of
advantage to the aggressor nations and in this respect the work
of the Control is more in the nature of control of transactions
than a blocking of property. At least one problem, however,
arises in connection with neutral property not present in respect
to enemy property and of much less significance in connection with
the property of enemy occupied countries since they are treated
under the policy of immobilization. That is, the common practice
of European financial institutions to hold within the United States
in their own names, funds and securities deposited with them by
their clients--persons whose identity, nationality, whereabouts,
and very existence cannot be determined until the end of the war.
The beneficial ownership in such accounts may be neutral, enemy, or
national of friendly occupied countries. Unless the evidence of
beneficial ownership is clear beyond a doubt, trading in such
accounts might be in derogation of all of the basic policies of the
Control. Accordingly, the Treasury prohibited all transactions,
including the receipt of dividends or interest, with respect to
securities held in any account in the name of a financial institution
(2981
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located in a blocked country unless the custodian in the United
States was furnished with adequate information as to the ownership
of the securities, or they were placed in an account from which
they could be withdrawn only under special licence.
The neutral European countries, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain and
Portugal, were also granted general licenses for the transactions
of their governments and their nationals. Subject to the condi-
tions of the licenses, a transaction could be consummated under
official certification or through the central bank for the benefit
of a national of the country to which the license was granted.
These licenses were granted after the governments of the countries
involved gave adequate guarantees and assurances to the United
States that the terms and conditions of the general licenses would
be strictly adhered to. The basic condition imposed was the obvious
one; that under the license no transactions by, on behalf of, or
pursuant to the direction of any blocked country or blocked national
(other than the country to which the general license was granted or
national thereof), could be consummated.
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FOREIGN COMPANIES RAISING CAPITAL IN
THE UNITED STATES
Michael H. Coles
1. INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS
MR. HAWES: We have been talking about banking. In the
fashion of Americans, we separate banking from securities; this is
unlike the fashion in Europe where there are universal banks. Wie
will first examine the raising of capital in the U.S. by companies
from abroad and then we will discuss the raising of capital abroad
by U.S. companies. Thus, we hope to get a clearer picture of the
internationalization of the securities markets, particularly the
primary markets. Turning next to an analysis of the law on invest-
ment by foreigners, we will use as illustrations the law of Japan,
the law of Europe (if one may call it that), and the law of the U.S.
We will be looking to see whether perhaps there is a need for great-
er coordination or harmonization of the law on foreign investments
in the major countries.
Harmonization is already taking place, to a greater or lesser
degree, in accounting and in disclosure rules. We will be examin-
ing those subjects as a possible precedent for harmonization and
cooperation in other areas. We then take a look at the extent to
which the natural forces in the market, especially the trading mar-
kets, have pressed beyond national borders without a concomitant
extension of regulatory supervision. We will be looking at the bar-
riers to international activity by brokers and, to some extent banks,
which have been raised by national interests. First Michael Coles
will speak on foreign companies raising capital in the U.S.
MR. COLES: I have been asked to talk about the use of the
U.S. capital markets by foreign issuers. Much of the market that
I will duscuss is often referred to as the Yankee bond market.
This is customarily defined as the U.S. domestic market for debt
obligations, either non-convertible or convertible into equity, of
non-U.S. issuers, which obligations have been registered with the
SEC under the Securities Act of 1933. The Yankee bond market does
not generally include debt issued here by Canadian issuers, and I
will adhere to this convention. However, in addressing myself to
the Yankee bond market, I do not wish in any way to neglect the
small but growing market here for pure foreign equity issues.
2. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Development of the Yankee Bond Market
The Yankee bond market is often erroneously considered to be
a recent phenomenon. However, if we go back into history we will
find that, contrary to its position prior to World War I when the
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U.S. was a substantial debtor country and its growth was financed
in large part by European capital, the U.S. found itself in the
1920s as the world's largest creditor nation, being owed significant
amounts of money by most of the combatants involved in World War I.
As a result, the U.S. became, and with some exceptions and in dif-
ferent degree has continued to be, an important supplier of capital
to the rest of the world.
Much of the debt offered in this market during the 1920s and
early 1930s lapsed into default during World War II; and much of it
still remains subject to settlement plans whereby investors will re-
ceive only a small proportion of their original outlay. Most hold-
ers, for example, would probably prefer to forget the 1922 Bolivia
Eight Percents, due 1947, or the Republic of Cuba four and one-half
percent bonds due 1977, issued in 1937. The First Bohemian Glass-
works located in Czechoslovakia must have been considered a good
investment in 1927 when it issued its seven percent bonds due 1957.
Purchasers of the City of Warsaw seven percent bonds issued in 1928
and due 30 years later could hardly have foreseen the destruction
of that city in the early days of World War II, and the subsequent
subjugation of Poland by the Soviets.
Most of the early Yankee bonds I have mentioned, and many
others, are traded at nominal prices on the various stock exchanges.
Probably they have greater value in the eyes of investors as the
bases of lampshades or colorful bathroom wallpaper. One of the major
points I wish to make today is to stress the significant differences
between the market for foreign bonds in the U.S. now, compared to
the market that existed prior to World War II. Later I will discuss
what I perceive to be the much greater safety offered investors in
today's Yankee bonds as opposed to their unfortunate predecessors.
Obviously, during most of the Depression and during World War
II there was very little activity for foreign bond issuers in the
New York market. However, the U.S. came out of World War II as a
major creditor nation again, and during the period from 1945 until
1963 the Yankee bond market was the most important non-bank source
of U.S. dollar borrowings for foreign issuers. Sales of foreign
bonds to U.S. residents reached close to $1 billion in 1962 and
during 1963 were running at a rate almost double that amount.
As a result of rising concern about the increasing outflow of
capital, the Kennedy Administration introduced in 1963 an interest
equalization tax, designed to make it unattractive for most issuers
to use the Yankee bond market. In addition, so-called voluntary
guidelines severely limited the portfolio investments of U.S. non-
bank financial institutions in the securities of foreign issuers.
In 1974 the controls on U.S. investments abroad were removed.
Since that time eighty-six straight debt issues aggregating $10.3
billion for twenty-nine non-U.S. borrowers, eight convertible bond
.ssues totalling $475 million for six non-U.S. corporations, and
fourteen equity issues totalling $565 million for eleven non-U.S.
issuers have been successfully offered in this market.
The theme of this conference is the internationalization of
the capital markets. The Yankee bond market now represents a quite
significant portion of a global capital market which, over the last
ten years, has demonstrated a considerable ability not only to fi-
nance the growing and continuing capital needs of the industrialized
world but also to take care of the tremendous burden of capital
flows resulting from OPEC surpluses and the corresponding deficits
on the part of oil importing countries.
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B. The Current Yankee Bond Market
Let us take a look at the Yankee bond market: first, the
market for straight or non-convertible bonds. In 1974, after the
interest equalization tax was removed, the market was opened by one
issue on the part of the European Investment Bank, which raised $100
million in this market. There followed seventeen issues in 1975,
and twenty-eight in 1976; the volume peaked at twenty-nine in 1977.
The volume since that time has tended to decline; only eight issues
were offered in 1980.
There are a number of reasons for this apparent decline but
the most logical explanation is the increasing depth and liquidity
in the Eurobond market, both primary and secondary, which has enabled
issuers to raise money there in large amounts and on terms which
compare favorably with those available in New York. A further rea-
son--which I will discuss more fully later on--is the fact that bond
markets worldwide have become increasingly volatile and speed is
essential if an issuer is to obtain the best possible conditions in
the market. Whereas a Eurobond issue can be completed by a sovereign
or supranational issuer in a matter of hours, the registration re-
quirements of the SEC, until recently in any event, made the process
of raising money in the U.S. market considerably slower. Dollar
amounts have reflected the number of issues. In 1977, the peak year,
there were $2.3 billion of issues made here by foreigners; the amount
in 1980 was less than half of that.
It is not altogether surprising that the Yankee bond market
has been dominated by sovereign and supranational borrowers. The
number of private sector corporations who have been prepared to un-
dergo the rigors of registration with the SEC is relatively small.
In the straight debt sector, European supranational organizations--
in other words, the European Economic Community itself, the European
Coal and Steel Community, the European Investment Bank, and Eurofima
--have accounted for thirty-three issues or just under one-third of
the total amount offered, with a total dollar amount of $3.4 billion.
European countries have accounted for forty-three issues, with
France being the single most frequent borrower with fourteen issues
and Norway having the largest volume with total offerings of $1.25
billion. Other issuers have been Austria, Finland, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom. Non-European governments have accounted for twenty-
seven issues, with Australia--having done eleven with just under $1
billion--being far and away the most important. Others include
Japan, Brazil, Mexico, New Zealand, and Venezuela.
Many of these governments have chosen to borrow indirectly
through a state agency guaranteed by the government; others have
borrowed in their own names. The credit distinction by investors
between these two routes appears to be minimal. Some municipalities
have come here, the City of Oslo and the City of Stockholm account-
ing for three issues between them.
In the straight debt private sector, on the other hand, only
three issuers have appeared to date: ICI for two issues, British
Petroleum and Ito Yokado, a Japanese retailer, one each.
Let us look now at the equity sector of the market which is,
of course, confined to corporate issuers. Since 1974 there have been
nine issues of convertible bonds made in this market by foreigners--
all of the issuers being located in Japan. The total amount issued
was $535 million, and all the issues were made for maturities of
fifteen years. There have also been eleven issues of pure equity
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securities, all in the form of American Depository Receipts. Nine of
these were for Japanese companies, two for British companies.
C. Changes and Improvements
Why should American investors, given the somewhat disastrous
record of foreign borrowers in this market between World War I and
World War II, be willing to buy foreign securities in substantial
amounts today? I think there are a number of reasons why investors
look upon the Yankee bond market today as being dramatically dif-
ferent from that which existed prior to World War II.
First we must remember that most of the issues prior to World
War II took place before 1933 and were therefore not subject to the
disclosure requirements of the 1933 Securities Act. We should not
underestimate the importance of the clean nature of our securities
markets. If you are going to invest in securities, you might as well
choose a game where the deck is not stacked and the players keep
their hands above the table.
Second, the world financial community has changed dramatical-
ly since World War II. There is a strong network of interrelating
financial connections. Countries that qualify for entry into the
U.S. market are among the world's leading industrial nations, and
they are normally substantial borrowers in a number of different mar-
kets. It is arguable that if one of the major borrowers here--such
as France, Norway or Japan--were by any remote possibility to run
into problems in servicing its foreign debt, it would undertake
emergency loans from the World Bank or the IMF, activate existing
inter-governmental swap agreements, run down reserves, tighten belts,
cut back imports, or even hold rescheduling discussions with its
commercial bank creditors. A whole host of measures would be tried
before acknowledging the severity of the crisis by incurring any
kind of default in externally funded debt. Continual access to in-
ternational credit is a country's life blood. To permit curtail-
ment of this access because of an impaired record of debt service
would be a national disaster. Corporate issuers are generally based
in countries that are themselves well-accepted borrowers in the New
York market. Many of these countries have substantial U.S. assets
which, although not pledged to secure dollar debt, provide the re-
serves to service it in an emergency.
This brings me to what I think is the most important distinc-
tion between the market today and the market as it existed prior to
World War II: that is the willingness of the independent rating
agencies in New York to give bond ratings to indebtedness of foreign
issuers. This is a relatively new development, but it has become
nearly impossible for a foreign issuer to raise money in the New York
market without having first obtained a rating--at least if its plan
is to issue non-convertible debt.
of the twenty-one issuers or guarantors that have come to the
U.S. market in the last seven years, fifteen have obtained an AAA
rating from both agencies; and their borrowings have accounted for
$9.6 billion or 87.5 percent of the total amount raised. Two have
obtained an AAA from one agency and an AA from the other, accounting
for 6.2 percent. One has an AA from both agencies, accounting for
$300 million or 2.7 percent, and one has an A from both agencies but
borrowed only $20 million. Therefore, borrowers with no rating at
all accounted for only 3.4 percent or $370 million of the $10.9 bil-
lion raised since 1974.
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The overwhelming majority of business done in this market by
foreign borrowers is AAA rated. It is this quality aspect of the
borrowings that most appeals to investors here--quality, that is,
coupled with an appreciable premium in rate. A foreign sovereign
borrower, today, will probably pay as much as one hundred basis
points over the Treasury bills of a corresponding maturity; whereas
an AAA domestic industrial borrower will pay only forty additional
basis points. This differential of sixty basis points represents
the so-called "foreign premium": the amount that a foreigner must
pay in order to attract the investment interest of U.S. institutions.
The investor is therefore able to have, on the one hand, an AAA name
on his books while obtaining, on the other hand, a yield signifi-
cantly higher than that available from comparable domestic credits.
Finally, as I mentioned earlier, bond markets today are vola-
tile. Investors are sophisticated; the days when a bond was bought
and held to maturity are now long gone. An advantage of the Yankee
bond market is its liquidity. There is a significant and liquid
secondary market for Yankee bonds maintained in New York by the
principal bond dealing houses; and also, since the vast majority of
Yankee bond issues are sovereign credits, these securities are com-
pletely fungible with their equivalent issues in the Eurobond market.
There is frequent swapping between the two markets, aided by the
fact that interest on Yankee bond issues--like interest on Eurobond
issues--is paid free of all withholding tax. U.S. corporate and
government issues, on the other hand, are subject to the U.S. with-
holding tax.
3. ADVANTAGES TO THE ISSUER OF THE YANKEE BOND MARKET
A. Characteristics of the Market
Why do foreign issuers use the Yankee bond market? Issuance
of a Yankee bond provides entry into the world's largest and most
sophisticated capital market. The process of registering with the
SEC can be a painful and time consuming one. Nevertheless, once this
bridge has been crossed, entities that are substantial users of
capital then have access to the broad range of U.S. capital markets,
which can frequently provide funds in greater size or on more favor-
able terms than alternative markets.
Although the use of the commercial paper and private-place-
ment markets does not require long-term debt ratings or registration
with the SEC, the completion of these demanding processes provides
significant advantages. Continued access is gained to both the debt
and equity markets; and access to the commercial paper and private-
placement markets is made easier. Finally, the existence of favor-
able debt ratings and acceptance by U.S. capital markets can serve
only to enhance the issuer's standing in other markets.
The two principal quantitative advantages of the Yankee bond
market are cost and maturities. The Yankee bond market can frequent-
ly provide funds at a lower cost than those available elsewhere.
Although the initial costs of market entry are higher than in the
case of a Eurobond issue, interest rates are often slightly lower.
This fact, combined with the much lower U.S. commission structure,
frequently results in a lower end-cost than is obtainable in other
dollar markets. Issuers are increasingly cost sensitive. Frequent
borrowers want to choose the most competitive market; and it is
quite normal for a last minute switch to be made between the Euro-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol3/iss3/1
Al. . Coles / Foreign compaides raising capital in the U.S.
market and the Yankee market to take advantage of marginally lower
rates.
The second attraction of the U.S. market to foreign borrowers
is the availability of long term maturities. Of the 114 issues made
since 1974, forty-eight have been for ten years or longer, accounting
for $4.4 billion or forty percent of the total. The remainder have
been for five, seven, or eight years. Under normal market circum-
stances the U.S. can provide longer maturities than have usually
been available in other markets. Issues with maturities of twenty
or even twenty-five years have been successfully offered in the U.S.
while fifteen-year issues are considered about the longest maturities
obtainable in the Eurobond market.
The main disadvantage of the Yankee bond market is the time,
effort, and cost of registering with the SEC. However--as I will
discuss in greater detail--these costs are far less for a sovereign
issuer. This explains why the great majority of Yankee bond issues
have been made by sovereign governments or supranational agencies.
B. Characteristics of the Issues
It is worthwhile pausing for a moment to look at the princi-
pal characteristics of Yankee bond issues. First, amounts. Amounts
have varied from $20 to $200 million per tranche and up to $350 mil-
lion per issue (an issue may sometimes consist of two or more
tranches of differing maturities). The size of straight Yankee bond
issues has been increasing over the past five years. Convertible
issues have also ranged in size from $20 million to $100 million.
Since issues of less than $75 million do not develop significant
secondary market activity, we do not generally recommend offerings of
less than that amount.
Yankee bond maturities, as I have already said, range from
five to twenty-five years, but it is interesting to note that the
two issues for twenty-five years have been for corporations. We
have observed that, all other things being equal, American investors
will usually prefer a corporate credit as opposed to a government
credit of similar rank, particularly when the corporation has sig-
nificant assets located within the U.S.
One of the reasons why the volume of Yankee bond issues has
been declining is that the prevalance of inflation in the U.S. domes-
tic markets has caused investors to seek to shorten the maturity of
their exposures. As the overall average life of our domestic bonds
goes down, so does the average life of Yankee bonds. The critical
comparison between the medium-term Eurobond market and the increas-
ingly medium-term Yankee bond market becomes, therefore, interest
costs.
Most Yankee bond issues with maturities of fifteen years or
more have typically had sinking funds which have reduced their aver-
age lives to around ten years (in the case of fifteen year bonds) or
thirteen years (in the case of twenty year bonds). Convertible
issues in the Yankee bond market have also had sinking funds, re-
ducing the weighted average life of a fifteen year bond to approxi-
mately eight years. Yankee bonds have typically had call protection
providing that the bonds will not be callable for a number of years,
with the non-call period being as much as twelve years in the case
of twenty year bonds. Convertible issues, on the other hand, are
typically callable at any time.
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Underwriting discounts and commissions (customarily known as
the gross spread) are substantially less for straight debt issues
in the Yankee bond market than they are in the Eurobond market.
Gross spreads for fifteen to twenty-five year bonds are generally
about one and one-quarter percent, and for five to ten year bonds
they range from just under seven-eighths to one percent. The gross
spread on convertible issues is typically two and one-half percent,
about the same as in Europe.
The initial costs of structuring a Yankee bond issue can be
quite high. This is particularly true for corporate issuers, since
one of the major expenses is the fees for auditors who have to pre-
pare the company's financial statements in a manner acceptable to
the SEC. A first time corporate issuer undertaking an equity related
offering could find its expenses running close to $1 million. Major
items in this expense list would include, for example, about $150,000
for document printing, another $50,000 for printing and engraving secu-
rities, anywhere from $200,000 to $300,000 in accountants' fees, pro-
bably around half that amount in legal fees, $100,000 in reimburse-
ment of the underwriters' expenses, and other miscellaneous fees in-
cluding the SEC registration fee, listing fees, blue sky fees, fees
of the trustee and paying agent, and fees of the rating agencies.
C. Characteristics of the Investors
W'ho are the investors in Yankee bonds? The major purchasers
of straight Yankee bonds are U.S. institutions. However, the insti-
tutional market for Yankee bonds is quite significantly reduced in
size by the fact that two key classes of investors are limited in
their ability to purchase foreign bonds. Many public pension funds
can buy no foreign securities at all. Insurance companies, which
could be very substantial purchasers of such securities, are also
limited in the amount of overseas investments they can make. This
means that performance-oriented bank trust departments and invest-
ment advisors are critical to the success of new Yankee bond issues.
This factor makes the job of the issuer and the manager in correctly
fixing the terms of the issue much more difficult.
if a foreign company has significant operations in the U.S.,
it may be possible to structure the issue in the form of a domestic
offering with a guarantee by the foreign parent. This technique
substantially enlarges the potential universe of investors.
For obvious reasons, investment bankers are quite reluctant
to reveal precisely where they sell each respective Yankee bond is-
sue or any other bond issue. However, looking at our own retail
sales over the last four years, we can see a distinct pattern of
distribution emerging. Our own sales account for approximately seven
percent of the total amount of Yankee bond issues made during the
period under discussion. They are therefore probably a quite accu-
rate reflection of the whole.
Close to eighty percent of our sales have been made domesti-
cally; the remaining twenty percent have gone to investors located
outside the U.S. The breakdown of our domestic sales is approximate-
ly as follows: twenty percent to commercial bank trust departments,
five percent to thrift institutions, ten percent to investment funds
and investment advisors, six percent to charitable institutions,
fourteen percent to insurance companies, twelve percent to pension
funds, and thirteen percent to others, including individuals. The
proportion of these issues placed within the U.S. will obviously
vary according to maturity. For a twenty-year issue the domestically
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placed proportion is considerably higher.
I have mentioned that one of the attractions of the Yankee
bond market to borrowers is the possibility of obtaining funds at a
somewhat lower cost than might be available in the Eurobond market.
If this is true, the converse is also true: investors should be able
to obtain a better yield on their money by putting it in Eurobonds.
One reason for not putting all one's assets in the higher yielding
securities is the desire to develop a reasonable spread of risk be-
tween the Yankee and Eurobond markets. In the event that there is a
run against the dollar in Europe, the sale of unregistered Eurobonds
to European investors may become extremely difficult. On the other
hand, it is recognized that there will always exist within the U.S.
a reasonably viable market at some price for dollar denominated
securities that have been registered with the SEC.
Investors in convertible Yankee bonds typically include a
larger number of individuals than would be the case for a non-con-
vertible issue. However, the major portion of the investor group
is still institutional, albeit that the previously mentioned restric-
tions on purchases of foreign securities by pension funds and insur-
ance companies are applicable.
4. REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS
As I have mentioned several times during the course of my
remarks, a major problem that foreign issuers face in the U.S. is
in meeting the registration requirements of the SEC. As most of you
know, the registration process in general has been considerably sim-
plified over the past several years. A company of stature that has
its securities broadly distributed in public hands will generally be
what is known as a reporting company, which is a company required to
file periodic reports with the SEC pursuant to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. Such a company, if it meets certain size and
other standards, will be able to issue debt securities by register-
ing those securities on Form S-16. This is a short-form registration
statement, and most of the information contained in it is incorporat-
ed by reference from other documents on file with the SEC. For for-
eign issuers, however, there is presently no alternative to the basic
Form S-1 registration statement, which is a considerably longer and
more burdensome document than the S-16.
A. Governmental Issuers
A governmental issuer is entitled to file an S-1 registration
statement under what is known as schedule B, which gives the govern-
mental issuer considerable leeway in the extent of its disclosure.
For governments, therefore, the SEC problem is not actually the
amount of required disclosure. Most of the statistical data that is
contained in a governmental S-1 is reasonably available within the
various economic and finance ministries. The task is really one of
collecting the data and presenting it in a format that satisfies the
SEC. Once prepared, however, subsequent registration statements for
a sovereign issuer can be prepared with relatively little trouble.
The principal problem that governmental issuers encounter with
respect to SEC registration requirements is the lack of flexibility
as to timing. A registration statement must be prepared, filed with
the SEC, and cleared before any sales of securities can take place.
This may take days or weeks in a market that can move significantly
in hours. In the Eurobond market, on the other hand, an issue can
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take place in an extremely short time, often on the basis of only a
simple offering telex.
Recently the SEC has moved to remedy this problem by means of
a so-called shelf registration. A governmental issuer may file this
at the beginning of a year and then make an offering by amending the
registration statement to reflect, in general, any material develop-
ments, underwriting arrangements, and offering terms [l].
B. Corporate Issuers
The real SEC problem concerns corporate issuers who, in add-
tion to filing the S-1 registration statement, will thereafter be
required to file reports annually on Form 20-F, which is the foreign
equivalent of a domestic issuer's Form 10-K. Despite the fact that
the SEC has adopted a quite reasonable and flexible attitude toward
the requirements of Forms S-1 and 20-F for foreign registrants,
these requirements still present the most severe hurdle: one that
keeps many prospective issuers out of our markets.
C. Problems
(i) Accounting
There are several key SEC reporting requirements that create
problems for foreign issuers. First is the sheer magnitude and cost
of the accounting requirements. This is especially true for compa-
nies located in countries whose accounting system differ quite radi-
cally from ours, particularly with regard to consolidation.
In those countries where both auditing standards and account-
ing practices are generally similar to our own--such as, for example,
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands--the SEC will normally per-
mit the inclusion of the company's existing financial statements
followed by a schedule which reconciles in reasonable detail the
financial statements presented with those which would have been re-
quired under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. In
practice, this relatively simple procedure can be extremely costly
and time consuming. For a company whose existing accounts come no-
where near our own practices, the cost of meeting U.S. auditing
standards can be enormous.
(ii) Segment accounting
Another area of dispute is segment accounting. Most U.S.
issuers now report on a segment basis with very little difficulty;
the outcome, so far as we can tell, has not caused anyone to suffer
unduly. However, for a foreign issuer, which may have five or six
domestic competitors that do not report on such a basis, the compe-
titive burden of segment reporting can be quite considerable. In
addition, we have found several cases of large foreign multinational
companies where the requirements of segment reporting have meant a
total reordering of their internal data processing systems in order
to generate the required information in a timely manner. This,
again, is something that represents a continuous burden which can be
quite costly and which makes issuers think twice before committing
themselves to meeting SEC requirements.
(iii) Executive compensation
One disclosure requirement that is totally accpeted domesti-
cally probably raises more questions in the minds of prospective
foreign issuers than almost any other. That is the disclosure of
executive compensation. As you know, a domestic registration state-
ment requires disclosure of the names of and all remuneration paid
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to the five most highly compensated directors or executive officers
whose remuneration exceeds $50,000, as well as the total number of
and remuneration to all officers as a group.
In most foreign countries, disclosure of this type is not re-
quired, and it is understandable that foreigners are extremely sen-
sitive about this matter. The chairman of a major German or French
company would find it both politically embarrassing and possibly--
given today's environment--even personally dangerous to have his
compensation disclosed in a public document. The SEC has recognized
this concern and has shown a very flexible and pragmatic attitude.
It has not objected to the disclosure of aggregate executive compen-
sation, without revealing what individuals are paid, unless more
detailed information is made public by the registrant in its own
country. Nevertheless, we find prospective issuers are still con-
cerned on this account. Once securities are outstanding in this
country, they are subject to continuing reporting requirements; and
there is concern that what is acceptable now may become more onerous
in the future. You may recall that when Form 20-F was first propos-
ed, its requirements were intended to be more consistent with those
of Form 10-K than they now are. One proposed requirement, which was
shelved after considerable opposition here and abroad, would have
resulted in more detailed compensation disclosure.
(iv) Disclosure of foreign payments
One final problem which foreign issuers have with SEC disclo-
sure requirements concerns foreign payments. Corrupt foreign pay-
ments which are material either in amount or as an indication of
management integrity must be disclosed. However, what is considered
to be a corrupt practice in the U.S. may be a normal method of doing
business in a foreign country. Indeed, there are many countries that
consider the payment of agents' fees or other similar transfers (which
we might consider to be improper and therefore disclosable in a regis-
tration statement or other SEC report form) to be a part of the normal
way of doing business and encourage them as a form of export promotion.
There have been cases where the disclosures required under our
securities laws have attracted a considerable degree of unfavorable
publicity in the company's domestic country--not because the company
did something and was caught at it, but because it was the only com-
pany operating out of that country required to make a disclosure of
that kind. The possibility of disclosure of agents' fees and other
similar payments is something that worries an issuer not only at the
time of registration but also in connection with its continuing re-
porting requirements.
(v) Proposals for change
The SEC, as part of its continuing monitoring of the reporting
requirements, has recently circulated a draft proposal requesting com-
ments on the concept of permitting foreign registrants who have secu-
rities outstanding in the U.S. market and are already using Form 20-F
to report on a regular basis to file for subsequent issues using a
much shorter form [2]. One possible system which could be adopted
would be very similar to S-16, incorporating by reference information
already filed on 20-F. We believe that this could represent a major
step forward for foreign issuers and, if adopted, would open up our
market. It would not produce an avalanche of new issues, but at
least it would make our market more acceptable to those who, while
prepared to accept the need to register once under S-1, are reluctant
to do so if they have to repeat the same process over and over again
for future issues. I urge those of you who have an interest in the
future internationalization of our securities markets to write to
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the SEC supporting the kind of liberalization contemplated in this
draft.
5. YANKEE EQUITIES
A. Characteristics of the M~arket
I would like to examine for a moment what we refer to as the
Yankee equity: the issuance here of ordinary shares by foreign com-
panies, as opposed to convertible debt or straight debt. Despite the
fact that the costs of entering this market are probably higher for
Japanese companies than for almost any other type of company--due
principally to the substantial expenditure on auditors' fees--Japan-
ese companies have accounted for by far the largest portion, in
terms of numbers, of foreign equity issuers here. Over the last
seven years there have been share issues by Kyoto Ceramics, Pioneer
Electronics, Honda Motors, Waco, Mekita Electric, Kubota and Trio
Kenwood.
The only other country that has provided equity issuers here
is the United Kingdom with British Petroleum and Tricentrol, both
companies engaged in the oil business. The largest issue was that
made by British Petroleum in June 1977, when the Bank of England
disposed of part of its holdings in that company. The issue amount-
ed to $215 million--substantially more than any other foreign equity
issue in this market, before or since. The size of other issues has
tended to be in the $20-30 million range, although Tricentrol, which
was the next largestand which I will discuss further in a minute,
amounted to $56 million.
Investors in equity issues, as demonstrated by our own retail
sales, are very largely the trust departments of commercial banks,
accounting for over one quarter of our sales. Investment funds and
investment advisors and insurance companies represent the next larg-
est group, followed closely by pension funds. Individuals account
for a relatively small proportion of the sales, and sales to over-
seas investors represent a somewhat larger proportion than is true
in the case of straight Yankee bonds.
We find that investors in foreign equity securities are knowl-
edgeable and are making these investments for a number of reasons:
(1) obviously, diversification of assets; (2) the opportunity to buy
into a market, particularly the Japanese market, which appears to be
growing somewhat faster than our own; (3) a diversification of cur-
rency risk; (4) at times, the opportunity to buy the growth segment
of a particular industry.
For example, Matsushita may today represent the best way of
penetrating the healthiest segment of the home entertainment busi-
ness. At the time of its offering here in 1977, British Petroleum
attracted considerable investment interest, since it was then the
major international oil company that had the least Arab exposure, its
reserves being heavily engaged in both the North Sea and the North
Slope.
Yankee equities are typically offered in the form of American
Depository Receipts, or ADRs. These receipts evidence ownership of
foreign securities, are designed to facilitate the transfer of owner-
ship, and are usually administered by major international banks
operating in New York under a depository agreement. They may rep-
resent stock on a share-for-share basis. However, where the value of
the underlying stock would make the value of one ADR lower than the
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol3/iss3/1
M.fI. Coles / Foreign companies raising capital in the U.S.
most commonly traded unit values (i.e., between $10 and $30), the
ADR may represent a multiple of underlying shares: for example,
around ten in the case of Japanese corporations.
The depository agreement is entered into by the issuer and
the depository. It empowers the latter to issue receipts and to
transfer ownership of the ADRs on its own books and records, while
it continues as the official holder of record of the underlying
stock on the issuer's books. The ADRs are exchangeable into the
respective underlying stock; ADR holders enjoy the same rights,
duties, and privileges as holders of stock of the issuer. The ADRs
must also be registered under the Securities Act, but if the under-
lying stock has been registered, registration of the ADR is relative-
ly uncomplicated.
B. Tricentrol: A Case History
I shall relate to you, briefly, a case history of the sale in
this market of shares of an important foreign company, tracing it
from the moment this company first thought of entering the U.S. mar-
ket until the time the marketing was successfully completed.
On July 2, 1980, Goldman Sachs was sole U.S. manager on a
three million ADR offering for Tricentrol Ltd. with a total value of
$55.5 million. Of those three million ADRs, 2.25 million were sold
in the U.S. and 750,000 in Canada. This was the first primary offer-
ing by a British company--or, indeed, any European company--in the
U.S. equity market and only the second equity offering by a European
company since the removal of the interest equalization tax. Subse-
quent to the offering, the ADRs were listed on the New York and
Toronto Stock Exchanges.
Goldman Sachs had been advising Tricentrol for a period of
two years prior to the offering. Initial discussions with the com-
pany had centered on their need--as they perceived it--as an oil and
gas company to increase their representation in the U.S., from both
a business point of view and a financial point of view, given that
the U.S. represented the world's largest capital market with partic-
ular sophistication in financing oil and gas companies.
Early discussions with the company had focused on ways to
help them develop their business base in the U.S., either through
acquisition of companies or through the financing of acquisitions of
U.S. reserves to be developed by Tricentrol. Tricentrol viewed the
energy business as a multinational one where it is important to have
a significant stake in the U.S.; for the U.S. operates as a relative-
ly free market economy in a business where governments increasingly
tend to dominate and control the development of natural energy re-
sources.
After looking at various alternatives, the decision was made
to forgo trying to achieve both a U.S. shareholder base and an ex-
panded business base in the U.S. in one step through an exchange of
stock. It seemed more prudent to achieve the shareholder base first.
Then this shareholder base could be used for further acquisitions.
For Tricentrol's stock to be acceptable as an acquisition
currency to a U.S. company, it seemed that a registration with the
SEC and, preferably, a listing on the New York Stock Exchange after
a public offering of stock in the U.S. would be by far the most ef-
fective means of achieving this objective. In addition, the funds
raised through the offering would be available for additional U.S.
acquisition purposes. Tricentrol also decided to take the opportu-
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nity to register the stock in Canada and to have a simultaneous of-
fering in the Canadian market. This offering represents a unique
situation in that stock was simultaneously offered in the U.S. and
in Canada as an initial public offering in both markets. The pros-
pectus and registration documents met the requirements of the secu-
rities laws not only of the U.S. and Canada, but also of the United
Kingdom, where the prospectus was also registered.
Once a strategic decision had been made to do a registered
offering in the U.S. the process of achieving that registration was
both lengthy and complex. The meeting to start work on this process
took place in early February and the offering was completed in July:
a period of five months. Requirements of the SEC are particularly
complex in the case of an oil and gas company, and extensive work
was performed by the company's accountants, both internal and exter-
nal. Added complications were caused by the need to have a firm of
independent geologists estimate the reserves of the company in both
North America and the North Sea. Furthermore, during the period
they were working on the transaction, Tricentrol made an acquisition
in the United Kingdom which was so significant that the target com-
pany's financial statements had to be included in the registration
statement.
As a result of these complications the prospectus contains
seventy pages of text and sixty-two pages of financial statements
for a total of 132 pages. In addition to the prospectus, almost
3,000 pages of additional material had to be filed with the SEC, some
of which involved confidential contracts between Tricentrol and the
British government about the development of their North Sea fields.
The British government required Tricentrol to negotiate with the SEC
to obtain confidential treatment for these documents. As mentioned
earlier, the offering was also to be registered in Canada. This
called for additional disclosure required by the Canadian Securities
Law. Finally, the whole prospectus had to be translated into French
in order to meet the requirements of the Quebec Securities Law and
thus to be eligible for offering in that province.
In addition to the difficulty of preparing documentation to
conform to both U.S. and Canadian requirements, the marketing effort
posed similar problems. There are significant differences in the
procedures used in the Canadian new-issue distribution process from
those that are normal in the U.S. Much time was spent by Goldman
Sachs (lead manager of this offering) coordinating with Wood Gundy
(the Canadian manager) to ensure that the two different distribution
processes were indeed coordinated, so that an offering could be com-
pleted on the same day and effectively at the same price.
The Canadian investors were offered shares in Canadian dollars
based on a translation of the U.S. dollar offering price. The com-
pany and the investors were protected against movements in the for-
eign exchange market between the time of pricing and the time of
payment. The underwriters took out, on behalf of the company, a
forward foreign-exchange contract. This covered the difference be-
tween the price in Canadian dollars that Canadian investors were to
pay for their shares and the price in U.S. dollars that the company
was to receive at the time of the closing. Additional discussions
took place, particularly with the New York Stock Exchange and the
blue sky authorities in the various states in the U.S., for it seems
it is common practice in the U.K. for companies to make loans to
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Clearly, this offering by Tricentrol represented a substan-
tial investment in money and in management time. Nevertheless, sub-
stantial benefit resulted from the offering, both in terms of the
offering itself and in terms of the company's positioning itself for
the future. This is particularly notable because Tricentrol is not
the sort of company you would expect to be using the U.S. capital
market. It is not in the top tier of international British compa-
nies. It is relatively small; and up to this point, it has relied
primarily on the U.K. market as a source of capital. At the time
of the offering, the company had a total market capitalization of
approximately $460 million; and the offering represented more than
eleven percent of the number of shares then outstanding. Neverthe-
less, as this offering indicates, it may turn out that it is the
second-tier foreign companies which can obtain the greatest benefit
from an equity offering in the U.S.
In Tricentrol's case, some of these benefits are as follows:
(1) An offering of $55.5 million represents a substantial new source
of equity capital and reduces the risk that the London market, which
had provided equity to the company as recently as 1979, might be
unable to meet the company's quite substantial needs.
(2) An offering in the U.S. represents the first step in a program
to obtain access to all aspects of the U.S. capital market. The
U.S. market is the largest in the world and can be expected to pro-
vide additional sources of funds at all times. Reliance on the
political and economic status of a single smaller economy is avoided,
and registration with the SEC acclimates Tricentrol to the U.S. dis-
closure requirements in a way that should allow it to meet subse-
quent obligations relatively easily.
(3) Tricentrol is now in a position to use its stock in connection
with the acquisition of a U.S. company. With a New York Stock Ex-
change listing and a successful U.S. offering behind it, Tricentrol
will have a market acceptance with shareholders of potential target
companies, which it would not have had without such an offering.
(4) Tricentrol's business strategy calls for increased exposure in
the U.S. The publicity associated with the offering and the pre-
sentation of Tricentrol in a format familiar to the U.S. business
community will facilitate that exposure. It will increase knowledge
of Tricentrol among U.S. companies in the oil industry.
(5) In addition to providing sources of funds, the U.S. capital mar-
ket will be a source of support to Tricentrol in the future. Up to
the time of the offering, the company was dependent upon the U.K.
equity market--a market that is relatively unsophisticated in evalu-
ating oil and gas companies, particularly those whose assets are
located outside the U.K. continental shelf. It is to be expected
that at various times in the future U.S. investors will value Tri-
centrol's assets and earnings more highly than will the U.K. market.
This will provide buying support for the stock and thereby facili-
tate additional equity financing or acquisition through the use of
common shares.
6. OTHER MARKETS
In conclusion, I shall touch briefly on two other major capi-
tal markets that are of importance to foreign issuers. The first is
our commercial paper market. This is a market that really does not
exist anywhere else in the world.
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A. Commercial Paper
Commercial paper is unsecured short-term promissory notes,
typically used by well-capitalized industrial, commercial, public
utility, finance, and bank holding companies. It is sold in the
open market, usually on a discounted basis.
Commercial paper has provided a means of short-term financing
for over a century and a half, but it has experienced its most rapid
growth in recent years. The total value of commercial paper out-
standing in the market place has risen from $260 million in the
period just after World War II to approximately $125 billion today.
At the present time, approximately one thousand major corporations
maintain commercial paper ratings from one or more of the three rat-
ing agencies. While not all the rated companies are active in the
market at the same time, a substantial majority have occasion to
come to the market at some time during any given year.
The market is divided into two segments. The first--compris-
ing just over half of the total amount outstanding--is made up of
issuers selling their paper directly to investors. These are mainly
finance companies, such as GMAC, Ford Motor Credit, and G.E. Credit.
The other segment represents issuers whose paper is marketed by a
dealer.
Foreign borrowers like the U.S. commercial paper market for
a number of reasons. First, it offers a source of funds that has
historically been cheaper than alternative borrowing sources such as
the London interbank market and the U.S. domestic commercial bank
market. Second, it provides a diversification in a company's or a
bank's source of dollar funds. Third, it is a flexible instrument
in terms of tailoring maturities to the borrower's needs, since
paper can be issued in maturities of anything from 5 to 270 days.
Last, the issuance of commercial paper is an attractive and relative-
ly easy-to-manage method of gaining access to the U.S. capital mar-
kets. Commercial paper is exempt from registration under the Secu-
rities Acts. On the other hand, commercial paper does require the
issuance of a rating. The highest commercial paper rating generally
indicates that the borrower would have a bond rating of at least an
AA or possibly a very strong A. Obtaining a commercial paper rating
paves the way for ultimately obtaining a long term bond rating. The
institutional buyers of commercial paper parallel in many respects
those who will ultimately buy a long-term debt issue.
As of the end of last year, approximately eighty-two foreign
corporations, government agencies, and banks were using the U.S.
commercial paper market. The average reported quarterly value of
outstanding commercial paper of these issuers totalled just under
$10 billion. The issuers included entities located in Australia,
the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, New Zealand, Japan, Belgium,
Finland, Sweden, Germany, Holland, and Denmark. There were major
programs by such issuers as British Petroleum, which had close to $1
billion outstanding; Electricite de France, with $1.7 billion; Caisse
Nationale de T616communication, the French telephone company with
$500 million; and the state-owned British Gas Corporation and Bri-
tish National Oil Co., each with just under $250 million.
A recent development in the commercial paper market has been
the growing interest of foreign banks in tapping this market. These
banks see commercial paper as a method of diversifying their dollar
funding, of tapping a broad segment of investors in the U.S., and
of obtaining funds at a lower cost than in the European interbank
market. Banks such as Barclay's, BNP, Swiss Bank Corp., Union Bank
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of Switzerland, Cr~dit Lyonnais, and Amsterdam-Roterdam Bank have
chosen to adopt this method of financing within the last year or so.
Our experience as the leading commercial paper dealer in the U.S.
leads us to believe that this method will continue to prove attrac-
tive to top-rated foreign borrowers. From the investors' point of
view, it represents a convenient and easy method of getting better
acquainted with these major companies located outside the U.S.
B. Private-Placement Market
The other market I want to touch on briefly is our domestic
private-placement market. This, again, is somewhat unique. Until
recently there was really no other place in the world where major
borrowers could negotiate directly with lenders and obtain large
sums of long-term money on a totally private basis without any after-
market listing or broad distribution. This private-placement market
has not proved to be a very significant source of funds for truly
foreign borrowers, since in many cases--as I described in greater
detail earlier--the lenders were precluded from lending more than
a small proportion of their assets to such borrowers. I strongly
believe there is a case to be made for liberalizing these con-
straints and I am pleased to note that this is already happening in
the case of investments in Mexico.
Where the foreign borrower has substantial assets in the U.S.,
however, his U.S. operations can be treated as a domestic entity for
the purpose of meeting the various state legality tests. Through
the medium of a guarantee or some other method of support, the par-
ent ensures that the U.S. affiliate has the best possible credit
rating and can obtain funds on the most attractive terms. The
private-placement market has therefore been popular with foreign
companies that are making acquisitions here or are expanding their
assets base within the U.S.
The U.S. private-placement market is also a major source of
funds for complex projects. Project financing typically relies for
credit support on contracts between the project, users of output,
suppliers of raw materials, and other sponsors. By fitting together
the various components, a viable credit can be created, but one
which is complex and therefore difficult to sell in public markets.
Accordingly, most project financing in the U.S. is undertaken on a
private-placement basis. In addition, where project equipment is
to be leased, the U.S. tax laws provide substantial advantages to
domestic owners of equipment that may be located in a foreign coun-
try. The lessor is still permitted to obtain accelerated deprecia-
tion and certain other fiscal advantages, but probably not invest-
ment-tax credit. Because of this, sponsors of major projects around
the world tend to look toward the U.S. private-placement market if
there is any possibility of obtaining funds here on a long-term basis.
Typically, the main constraint is sovereign risk when the
project is located in a developing country. However, projects in
Australia, New Zealand, the North Sea, Canada, and, more recently,
Mexico, have found advantageous financing by using our private-
placement market. Goldman Sachs has been responsible, for example,
for financing drilling rigs constructed for Pemex to use in offshore
oil exploration and development by the Mexican state oil company.
These rigs are owned by U.S. lessors. They are leased to Pemex un-
der long term leases, with the related financing being placed with
U.S. institutions. Pemex has obtained U.S. financing for substantial
capital expenditures by this route.
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In summary, I believe the U.S. capital market represents a
sophisticated and vital component of the world capital markets.
We hope that issuers will increasingly use the U.S. markets, par-
ticularly as regulatory constraints are gradually reduced.
MR. HAWES: Steve Friedman, would you like to make some com-
ments and raise some questions?
7. DISCLOSURE STANDARDS FOR FOREIGNERS
MR. FRIEDMAN: I think the SEC is clearly moving in the direc-
tion of integration in the use of shelf registrations and is in-
creasingly confronting the question of differential disclosure for
foreign issuers. But in evaluating those judgments, it is useful to
keep in mind why we are doing this. Accordingly, my first question
for Michael is, why do you think it is in the interest of the U.S.
to encourage the use of our capital markets by foreign issuers?
MR. COLES: I think that the flow of capital, like the flow
of goods and services, should be a two way street. If we create
barriers to the use of our markets by others, it is quite possible
that, when we need them most, others might create barriers to our
use of their markets.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Michael, excuse me, but disclosure requirements
are not barriers. They are inefficiencies in our market as compared
to the Eurobond markets. They impose additional costs on raising
capital in U.S. markets, but there are no discriminatory barriers
against foreigners.
For example, consider the accounting issues. Differential
accounting and auditing standards are a very serious problem, al-
though I think it is interesting that the companies for which the
accounting issue is probably the most difficult--the Japanese com-
panies--are the ones that have been willing to face up to it and pay
for access to our markets. in thinking about how far we ought to go
to accommodate other accounting systems, it is important to keep in
mind why we are doing so and why it is important to our national
interest. Why is it useful for the U.S. to have foreign companies
raising capital here?
MR. COLES: With respect to equity issues, if I may answer
that first, the question would be, are U.S. investors better served
by having an enormous amount of information about a very, very few
companies? Or, would they not be better served by having a vastly
expanded horizon of companies in which to invest, with a somewhat
reduced level of disclosure? It could be argued that it is like--if
I may use an analogy--pollution control. Getting the last five per-
cent of dirt out of the air is what costs you the most. I doubt
that general conformity to our requirements is the thing that worries
foreign issuers the most. The problem is with some of our more mar-
ginal requirements, for example, the U.S. existed happily for many,
many years without segment reporting being required to meet the dis-
closure obligations of the securities acts. Now, that is a major
problem. We have discussed the disclosure of foreign payments. A-
gain, I believe that the SEC did not necessarily feel this informa-
tion was essential for investors to know. This disclosure requirement
was used more, in our view, as an enforcement technique.
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I think we would not propose that the overall standards of
disclosure required for coming to the U.S. market should be lowered
in any significant way. U.S. investors are entitled to a level of
disclosure superior to that of the rest of the world; as I said
early in my remarks, this is the market where you play with a clean
deck. On the other hand, anything we can do to simplify disclosure,
to make it easier for companies to meet our requirements without re-
moving the basic premises on which the securities acts were built,
would be a positive step.
MR. FRIEDMAN: I find it curious that so few foreign companies
are using our market. As I listened to you talk, it became obvious
that the problem of regulatory requirements creating undue delays is
clearly a very serious one. On the other hand, the volatility of the
bond markets is a relatively recent phenomenon, and there was a peri-
od of relative interest rate stability after the IET was lifted
during which there was not much activity in our markets. You talked
about an interest rate differential and a commission differential and
I believe you concluded that the net cost of financing in this market
for an appropriate company ought to be lower, even granting the high-
er front-end costs because of regulation.
If we were able to deal with the timing problem through a
continuous disclosure system and if we dealt with some of what I
will call the irritants in the disclosure system, do you think it is
likely that there would be a substantially greater use of our markets
by foreign companies?
MR. COLES: I think that the use of our bond markets by for-
eign companies would not increase dramatically except for companies
that deem it necessary to come to the market every year. That is
one of the reasons why governmental issues predominate. You swallow
the first front-end costs, and from that point onwards that cost is
already sunk. You do subsequent issues all the time, and it becomes
relatively easy. For a corporation that is going to issue on a one-
time-only basis, the Eurobond market will always be more attractive.
MR. FRIEDMAN: In spite of the cost differential?
MR. COLES: The cost on a one-time issue, if you figure in
the front-end out-of-pocket costs, will always be higher here than
in the Eurobond market. How many European non-governmentally owned
companies come to the market for a bond issue every year? Relative-
ly few.
I believe my firm is engaged at the moment in preparing for
registration a major foreign company which sees the U.S. market as
an insurance policy. As a continuous user of dollars, the company
is concerned that somewhere down the road this may be the only game
in town for dollars, and it wants to have access to this market. It
turned out to be a very expensive insurance policy.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Problems of this nature impose an important
discipline because they make us think anew about whether some of the
disclosures that we require are really so essential. There is a use-
ful fallout effect for our domestic disclosure system. Nevertheless,
I think it is a fair question to ask whether it is worth going
through this process for foreign issuers if there are not going to
be substantial numbers of them in our markets.
MR. COLES: I think that the greatest expansion would be in
317]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
M. I. Coles I Foreign comptaies raising capital in the U.S.
equity securities, and this is the area that would benefit U.S. in-
vestors the most.
MR. FRIEDMAN: I agree with you.
MR. COLES: There are major companies--for example, natural
resource companies or companies with unique positions--that are not
available in U.S. markets, and it would be very useful to have such
exposure here. Again, I go back to my question, do you have a lot
of disclosure from very few, or do you lower the standards somewhat
--I would not want to see them abolished altogether--and admit many
more issuers here?
MR. HAWES: Michael, what are the weights given to the par-
ticular concerns expressed by foreign issuers, for example, account-
ing standards and the disclosure of foreign payments? To what extent
are these issuers frightened of the SEC, or are they simply frightened
that regulations will change every week or every few months?
MR. COLES: The proposal to amend 20-F, even though it was
shelved, did cause an enormous amount of concern.
MR. HAWES: The original proposal...
MR. COLES: The original proposal was to amend 20-F, to bring
it much more in line with 10-K. The reaction of many of our pros-
pective clients was, "They tried it once, they might try it again.
Once we have the securities out here, there is no way we can pull
them back. We issue a twenty year bond in the U.S., and it has ten
years of call protection; then somebody suddenly says that they want
this or this or this in the way of disclosure, and we are stuck with
it." That is still a concern.
The other question of great importance to foreign issuers is
based on the problems of preparing the first registration. Having
lived through it ourselves three times with European companies and
several times with Japanese companies, we can tell you that the
work involved is incredible. It involves bringing in new management
in some cases and new data processing systems. Our clients ask the
question: "We understand the general principle under which you are
operating; but when you get down to that last five percent which
accounts for fifty percent of the cost, is it really necessary?"
MR. FRIEDMAN: Let us assume the Commission were prepared to
do something about that. What kind of a process would one adopt to
identify that last five percent? The last five percent may vary
from company to company and management to management as their sensi-
tivities shift, and it may be difficult to deal with it in a generic
way.
MR. HAWES: What are the major segments of the five percent?
MR. COLES: Your proposal for the--I will call it the S-16--
goes along the right way because, as a U.S. company knows, it is
much easier to prepare a 10-K than it is to prepare an S-1, even
though much of the information is the same. If a company has to
report to the SEC on a regular basis, I think the ability to submit
a short-form registration statement later on will make the initial
burden much more palatable. Anything we could do to cut down the
minutiae that is required in notes to the financial statement would
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help. The length and bulk of our financial statements are incre-
dible.
Many times the question we are asked is, does anybody read it?
MR. HAWES: One possible answer to the concern of foreign
issuers about becoming a reporting company and then having the SEC
increase or drastically change the disclosure requirements would be
a kind of moratorium. The SEC could provide that it would give
foreign issuers the choice of accepting a change in disclosure re-
quirements or of continuing under the old rules for a period, say
five years, which would be adequate to allow the foreign issuer to
withdraw from the market in an orderly way (e.g., through a tender
offer program or redemption).
NOTES:
[I] See The Kingdom of Sweden release, named after the government involved.
Securities Act Release No. 6240, 45 Fed. Reg. 61,609 (1980).
[2] Securities Act Release No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693 (1980). The
International Securities Matters Committee of the American Bar
Association wrote a letter commenting very favorably on the possi-
bility of using the concept of world-class companies to categorize
those who might be permitted to use simplified registration forms.
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UNITED STATES COMPANIES RAISING
CAPITAL ABROAD
Michael von Clemm
1. FINANCING CAPITAL SPENDING
There is a Fortune 500 company, which may indeed be represent-
ed here today, whose financing priorities were described to me dur-
ing the first quarter of 1980 as being size, flexibility, and cost--
in that order. The timing is significant: it was the quarter in
which the U.S. prime rate reached an unprecedented twenty percent,
the quarter in which there was no fixed rate U.S. dollar financing
in the Euro-market. There were few companies of any size that felt
then that they could afford to put the cost of funds as their third
priority.
A. Timing and Cost
In increasingly volatile securities markets, the trade-off
between flexibility of timing and the cost at which it is possible
to finance capital spending has become ever more importaht. For com-
panies whose cash flow permits, it is possible to wait out periods
of high interest costs, and to place market offerings when the cost
and volume of funds are closer in line with the yield of capital in-
vestment and the state of balance sheet commitments. But the extent
of available bank credit lines and commercial paper placements is
not limitless. To use credit facilities designed for the short-term
needs of daily cash management for capital financing is to run the
risk of being caught by an outflow of funds for business purposes
and to be forced into the securities markets at a time when the
propsects for fixed rate issues are unpropitious, to say the least.
As it becomes more difficult to predict when a period of
appropriately low interest rates will occur (and just what these
"appropriate" rates will be) the cost of flexible timing of capital
finance reduces the freedom to take business opportunities as they
arise. Increasingly, the demands of current operations will limit
the extent to which a borrower can afford to expand into profitable
activities without taking longer-term high-cost obligations onto a
balance sheet. The size of available short-term credit declines as
it is used for capital finance; and borrowers have reduced freedom
to make choices between long-term funding costs and business deman6s,
making it impossible to extend operations into any area that cannot
guarantee a yield that will compensate for the high cost of long-
term finance.
You will notice that I have avoided the use of the expression
"credit crunch," because I do not want to be quoted as predicting one.
In New York you have to be careful how you are quoted. This was dis-
covered by a former Archbishop of Canterbury who on arriving here
was met by the press at Idlewild. A bright young reporter in the
back row, after the usual questions about the ecumenical movement
0378-721418110000-00001S02.75 ( 1981 Nortlh-Ilolland [ 320 ]
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and so and so forth, stood up and asked the Archbishop, "Sir, while
you are in New York, are you going to visit any of our strip clubs?"
The Archbishop, being well trained for this kind of thing, engaged
in the classic ploy of answering a question by asking another ques-
tion. He said, "Are there any strip clubs in New York?" with holy
innocence on his face . . . which disappeared the next morning when
he opened the daily newspaper and saw the headline, "Archbishop's
first question: are there any strip clubs in New York?"
B. Answers to the Dilemma
There are two solutions to the borrower's dilemma that are
available in the domestic finance markets: to extend the size of
money-market credit lines, and to issue long-maturity debt with an
option to redeem the principal after a relatively short period,
using capital raised at lower costs in an improved securities mar-
ket. Although a borrower is then obliged to pay a high fixed-
interest rate, the period over which it is paid is limited to that
of a medium-term bond. This provides at least some insurance a-
gainst the loss of competitive position that would result from a
company's being locked into high interest costs while other produ-
cers in its industry are able to take advantage of lower interest
costs on later borrowings.
(i) Domestic credit lines
The first of these "solutions" is becoming increasingly dif-
ficult (and expensive) to achieve as Administration policies against
inflation take effect. It is on the banking system, after all, and
the volume of its advances that the pressure of monetary policy
falls. Banks and money-market dealers cannot be expected to expand
their lines of credit as the demand for short-term finance rises.
Indeed, since a large proportion of commercial paper is held by cor-
porations, whose own need for cash to finance their internal re-
quirements can be expected to increase, the prospect for a general
rise in money-market borrowing by corporations is particularly bad.
Further, there is no need for me to remind you that the cost
of borrowing through short-term liabilities reflects the general
expectation that eventually interest rates will fall. It is expen-
sive to issue long-term debt. It is even more expensive to borrow
from the domestic banking system or the money markets in the short-
term, although over the life of a bond issue (even with a relative-
ly short no-call period) the cost of short-term money can be expect-
ed to average out at a similar level to that of the bond, while
allowing the opportunity to switch into long-term debt should the
markets improve. The cost of delaying a securities market financ-
ing is measured in terms not only of business opportunities fore-
gone, but also of the cash premium that has to be paid for short-
term money at the present time.
(ii) Alternative markets
If a borrower has access to a market in bank credit and dol-
lar securities that is genuinely independent of the domestic markets
in which daily cash needs are financed and that takes an independ-
ent view of the U.S. economy and, hence, of the interest yields
appropriate for dollar investments, these problems, even if they do
not disappear, may be lessened. Where securities markets take dif-
ferent views, it may be possible to raise capital at reasonable
rates sooner in one market than in another, thus releasing the
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pressure on cash positions before it would otherwise be possible to
do so.
Further, the cost of banking finance in the alternative
market may also be substantially below that available in the domes-
tic market, making possible the profitable switching of a part of
a cash-management program. Above all, a different general outlook,
combined with the particular use of funds for capital finance, may
make it possible to extend credit lines at relatively low cost
during a period of tight money-market conditions. Rollover credits
organized in the second market may underpin a flexible capital
program without constraining the domestic working-capital program
of a company. Both would cost less in terms of financing costs and
would leave the borrower poised to take advantage of whichever
securities market may be the first to make capital finance available
at the "appropriate cost".
The independence of such a market obviously presupposes free-
dom from the monetary policies and regulations that limit the avail-
ability of funds in the domestic market. In order that the pricing
of funds differ, it is also necessary that the outlook of investors
be different from those in the domestic markets. This cannot be
achieved without crossing administrative boundaries; and increasing-
ly, borrowers who are looking for a source of funds that fits these
criteria have been raising capital abroad.
C. Transnational Financing
The international financial market has developed since 1964
into the second largest source of available funds on earth. The
estimated $1,450 billion of transnational financings break down into
three groups. These are (1) the holdings of equity by non-nationals,
(2) the internationally placed medium-term notes and bonds, and (3)
the syndicated international bank credits. In addition, there is
an international market in the credits of the banking system itself
--including central banks and government placements--which is as
yet of limited relevance to corporate borrowing needs.
The gross foreign purchase of U.S. equities in 1980 reached
$74 billion. This has more than doubled the 1977 total of $26 bil-
lion in only three years and this interest in U.S. equities appears
to be continuously increasing.
During 1980 the total volume of medium-term financing raised
through securities issues and bank-loan syndications placed on an
international basis was over $107 billion, without taking into
account issues organized for foreigners in the domestic markets.
Issues of dollar bonds for international borrowers totaled over
$16.25 billion, of which more than half were placed with investors
in the Euro-market and the remainder were syndicated in various
domestic financial markets around the world. During the peak of
the securities market's explosion of activity in the second quarter
of last year--in June--$5 billion worth of debt issues were placed
in the international market, compared with $7 billion placed in
New York.
In 1980 there were some sixty-seven debt issues by North
American corporations, of which sixty-one corporations were actually
domiciled in the U.S. The value of those issues was $4.1 billion,
and it is interesting to compare that figure to the value of com-
parable borrowings in 1975, the first year after the removal of the
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interest equalization tax and the year of the full effect of the
first big jump in oil price rises. In 1975 U.S. corporations issued
$268 million worth of debt securities abroad--$268 million versus
$4.1 billion last year.
Although figures for the securities markets compare favorably
with the rate of capital formation in any domestic market, they are
dwarfed by the volume of credit syndication over the same period.
In 1979 the equivalent of $102.5 billion was raised in the Euro-
market; in 1980, $89.1 billion. These enormous volumes are inflated
by heavy borrowings by national agencies of countries with large
balance of payments deficits with the U.S. But a large number of
syndications, ranging from a $3 billion credit for Seagrams to cre-
dits for much smaller amounts ($20 million and upwards), have been
arranged for corporate borrowers who have come to realize that the
cost advantages and, more important, the strategic advantages of
borrowing in the international markets are too great to be ignored.
2. THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET
A. The Relationship Between U.S. Markets and Euro-Markets
The different trade-offs between cost and availability of
funds in the domestic and international markets indicate two major
differences of outlook between U.S. and Euro-market investors.
These involve, first, the valuation of a securities portfolio in
terms of the performance of alternative currencies as well as alter-
native investments and, second, the views of various domestic econo-
mic policies taken by investors who have experience with Western
European economic management.
There are also limits on arbitrage between the markets rep-
resented by barriers to the free flow of capital. Until 1974, when
the controls on foreign borrowing in New York that had been imposed
by the Democratic Administration in the early sixties were removed,
a large proportion of the financing of even the foreign operations
of domestic corporations had to be organized abroad. The office of
Foreign Direct Investments limited outflows of capital; and the in-
terest equalization tax was intended to limit the interest advantages
available to foreign investors in New York compared to their domes-
tic markets. The opportunity for domestic investors to buy interna-
tional debt did not exist.
Since 1974, the possibility of arbitrage by domestic investors
has limited the extent to which yields on the Eurodollar market can
be expected to rise above those available in New York. A large in-
crease in income that an investor can gain simply by transferring
dollars into international securities will not continue where there
is no risk at all on the arbitrage.
The really effective barrier to the transfer of international
dollar holdings into the domestic market--which was not abolished
with the interest equalization tax--has been the withholding at
source of the basic rate of domestic income tax on dividends and
interest payments of companies domiciled in the U.S. By reducing
the yield on a foreigner's investment in the U.S. by up to thirty
percent, this tax penalty means that there can be, in theory, a
difference of thirty percent in interest rates before domestic
issues become attractive. The difference has never actually ap-
proached such levels; but, on the other hand, the differentials
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that do open up can be very, very interesting indeed. Just consider
the credit market in May of last year. The difference between
the U.S. prime rate and the London interbank offered rate (the
basis on which all Euro-credits are fixed or priced) widened in
May 1980 to 5.3 percent. This difference was almost one third of
the rate payable in New York at that time. There is an obvious
advantage to raising funds in the international market when this
happens; and discrepancies of this size do not, therefore, last
long.
As borrowers take advantage of the gap, a large number of
consequences develop that can be expected to equalize funding costs.
As we have already seen, this happened in June 1980. The $5 billion
of issues (out of a total of $12 billion) that were placed in the
Euro-market that month peaked at a coupon of 9.5 percent, rates
that were thirty basis points better than the best levels reached
in the domestic bond market when it peaked that same month.
B. Leadership of the International Market
What was important in the bull market of the second quarter
of 1980 was not so much the actual rates that each market ultimate-
ly reached, but the leadership of the international market in re-
acting to the trends in the financial futures markets as the second
quarter began. The first issue to be priced at a substantial dis-
count over that expected in the market was an international issue
for GMAC. It was followed by a highly successful offering for
J.C. Penney which, though priced well below the rates then available
in New York, was increased by one third and remained oversubscribed.
This pattern of the Eurobond market making its own policy decisions
and leading New York is one that--for reasons I shall disduss later
--we may find repeating itself.
It is not possible to attribute this to changes in exchange
rates, permitting investors who value their assets in foreign cur-
rency to make allowance for the capital gain on their holdings when
the dollar appreciates. The increasing liberalization of exchange
controls, together with a growing volume of major-currency holdings
outside the domestic economies of many large OECD nations as they
move into balance-of-payments deficit, has made it increasingly easy
for international investors to move their portfolios from one cur-
rency to another and take advantage of expected changes in relative
exchange rates. As a result, Euro-market participants have come
to value debt holdings not only in terms of the yield on the asset,
but also in relation to their expectations of the trends affecting
rates of exchange. These are not necessarily the same factors as
those that dominate the pricing of finance purely in terms of in-
terest cost on the New York securities market; and they naturally
include a political as well as an economic assessment of a country's
future.
During the drop in interest yields in the second quarter of
1980, this factor brought strong pressure on the Euro-market to
limit its enthusiasm for dollar capital. As interest rates declined,
the dollar exchange rate weakened and then fell dramatically in com-
parison to a variety of European currencies. Far from compensating
for the loss in income, this further penalized holders of dollar
issues, cutting the domestic value of their yields and holdings.
The pressure of demand for securities developed in spite of, rather
than because of, changes in the exchange rate.
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It is in the other priorities of investors in the interna-
tional markets--their view of the outlook for the American economy
and the structure of their portfolios--that an explanation is to
be found. Investors and investment managers represent a spectrum
of needs, while the mix of transnational issuers whose debt is
available also differs from the risks represented by purely domes-
tic borrowers. Since the degree of risk taken by a portfolio
manager is, in part, a function of the variety of issuers represent-
ed in the portfolio--as well as the credit of any individual borrow-
er represented in it--the relative valuation a specific issuer of
debt can make a dramatic difference in the issue's reception.
C. Access to the International Market
(i) Role of the universal banks
The syndication of an international banking credit has one
further advantage as part of a financing program in today's markets.
It is as part of an overall debt portfolio that banking credits are
available in the international market. The institutions that handle
banking finance are also those responsible for the placement of bond
issues in the international market. It is therefore possible to use
a credit as a vehicle through which to approach the bond market.
If you look at a tombstone advertisement announcing the con-
summation of a Euro-market bond issue, you will find it dominated
by universal banks with a commercial-banking arm, which here in the
U.S. would be prohibited under the Glass-Steagall regulations.
These banks are themselves large takers of international debt, both
on their own behalf and on behalf of clients whose portfolios they
manage. They also maintain close relations with the major invest-
ment managers and investors in their markets and, together with the
investment banks of established reputation in the market--of whom
there are relatively few--they are in a position to sponsor new-
comers in placing debt with retail investors.
In the securities market this sponsorship is important be-
cause there is no institutional system for rating credit comparable
to that used in New York. Unless investors receive personal advice
about a borrower's credit, it will not be possible to place debt
with them, for there is no general class of debt assessment in terms
of which it is possible to analyze risk. This means that the rela-
tionship between retail investors and the underwriting and managing
banks in the Euro-markets is as much one of investment advice as
straightforward offers of securities of a particular known quality.
Because few retail investors have the apparatus at their disposal
to assess credit themselves, the banks, acting as sponsors, must
bring the quality of an issuer to their attention. To ensure a
wide and ready market for a company's securities it is necessary
that a representative cross-section of the banks with securities
market relationships be aware of its credit. And there are few
better ways of ensuring that awareness than the syndication of a
banking credit among them.
The importance of personal contact to the international mar-
ket is illustrated by the fate that befell the Eurodollar commer-
cial paper market in the early part of the last decade. Despite
the savings in cost that could be achieved by reducing the depend-
ence of borrowers on banks for their short-term financing, European
companies were not interested in weakening their relationships.
The personal contact with their banker was an asset for which, they
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believed, the reduced interest costs of a commercial-paper market
could not compensate.
In part, because of the nature of their relationship with
borrowers domiciled in Europe, underwriters and managers in the
international market will want an opportunity to meet the senior
executives of an American newcomer. For them the assessment of a
company means coming to know its officers--personally--as well as
the state of its corporate balance sheet. Any investment banker
concerned for the success of the future development of a funding
program in the Euro-market will arrange a series of meetings in
such centers as London, Zurich, and Frankfurt during the syndica-
tion of a credit.
I wish to make one quick point here. At present there are
outstanding 3,243 Eurobond issues, and there are approximately one
thousand Eurobond issues that have already matured. That is about
four and one half thousand separate issues, though a number of
those are repeat transactions for the same borrower. Of that num-
ber of issues there are only eighteen delinquencies or defaults.
Of those eighteen delinquencies or defaults, it is my recollection
that approximately seventeen are by U.S. corporations that are sub-
ject to SEC overview.
(ii) Cost of international funding
The cost of a funding program compares very favorably with
that available in New York. If you compare the rates payable on
three-month drawings of comparable banking credits in Europe and
New York--prime with ten percent compensating balances in New York
against three-month LIBOR plus a three eighths percent margin in
the international market--the average margin in favor of LIBOR over
the past five years has been 147 basis points. At its widest, the
margin has been over 6.75 percent and the LIBOR rate has never been
above that fixed against prime during that period.
For a bond issue also, the cost of raising capital in the
Eurodollar market has been below that in New York on many occasions
during the past two years. The yields on, for example, two GMAC
issues maturing in 1984--one a triple A rated domestic, the other
a Eurobond--have been lower in the Euro-market for over half the
business days during the past two years, including, of course, the
beginning of the bull market in the second quarter of 1980.
The mechanics of an issue are determined by the need to free
investors from tax obligations outside their home countries, and in
particular to avoid the withholding tax on income from the securi-
ties of companies domiciled in the U.S. Obviously this cannot easi-
ly be done for equity issues, for which international investors
have to come to New York. But for a bond or convertible issue it
is possible to arrange a financing subsidiary outside the U.S.
through which the funds can be transmitted to the parent without
incurring a tax liability for the investor. For this, a domicile
that has a reciprocal tax agreement with the U.S. government is
necessary, the most convenient one being the Netherlands Antilles.
A corporation using this market for the first time through a
banking credit would be well advised to establish an issuing sub-
sidiary at the same time, in preparation for opportunities that may
develop at very short notice. With an established reputation and
an organization capable of handling the mechanics of a Euro-issue,
a company has access to an alternative source of capital, which can
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol3/iss3/1
A. von Clewn / U.S. companies raising capital abroad
be used both to supplement present credit arrangements and to
guarantee access to medium-term capital as soon as interest costs
fall to an acceptable level.
(iii) Criteria for participation
I started with the dilemma that occurs when capital-market
interest rates reach a level that forces the financing of capital
expenditure, as far as possible, out of short-term financial instru-
ments, while at the same time the government is tightening monetary
policy. In order to ensure the availability of finance as it is
needed, it would be invaluable to have access to an alternative and
competitive source of capital--one that can be expected to react to
improvements in the economic outlook even more quickly than the
domestic markets. The international market provides just such an
alternative.
MR. HAWES: Do you mean to imply anything by your comment on
the limited number of defaults in the international market?
MR. VON CLEMM: I want to say only that without an SEC and
without 150-page prospectuses, so far the record of the sponsoring
institutions--the universal banks that dominate the Euro-market--
is something that should attract at least grudging admiration, if
not full-scale admiration.
MR. HAWES: Do you attribute that record to bank screening
of issues?
MR. VON CLEMM: There is another side to that question. It
is not too hard to get that kind of a record if you do not do busi-
ness with companies that would be rated in this country below the
level of, let us say, single A. There are some transactions that
have been done for lesser credits, but you can make a fairly good
record if you will not do business with most people in the world.
The Euro-capital market is a completely useless allocator of re-
sources when it comes to young and new ventures. I believe that
is unfortunate and something that ought to be worked on.
However, a great many of the four and one half thousand
names that have been introduced to the international market over
the last fifteen or twenty years were not terribly well known at
the time they were introduced. Without the sponsorship of these
very potent universal banking institutions (they need not be the
lead manager but they have to be well represented in the sponsoring
group) many of those securities would not have been placed. Not
that they could not have been placed at all; it is a question of
relative pricing. U.S. corporations are not going to do an issue
in the Eurobond market unless they can get the money at a cheaper
net cost. We are talking about what it is that opens up the alter-
native capital market by making funds available at a cheaper net
cost than is available elsewhere.
MR. HAWES: Michael, would you pause one moment and charac-
terize either the companies that have come to the Eurobond market,
or the companies that should come, or maybe the ones that should
not? Is there a level of U.S. ratings, for example, that would
suggest that one can make it in the Eurobond market?
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MR. VON CLEMM: Until now it has been the case, by and large,
that companies with less than a BAA rating in the U.S. have not
appeared frequently in our market. That is the line below which
people start to ask a great many questions, the first of which is,
why are they coming to the Eurobond market? The image of the U.S.
company and its banker as being a pair of well-heeled carpetbaggers
is one that does tend to bubble up to the surface of people's minds
from time to time. One has to say, however, that with the U.S.
absence from the market for the whole period from 1974 until about
1979, Euro-investors realized that they were getting shorter and
shorter of U.S. sovereign-risk credits and U.S. corporate credits
in their portfolios, and they have been in a generally hospitable
frame of mind for the last two or three years.
To give some examples of companies that are using the market,
there was a convertible bond issue for Pepsico which was signed in
London about three or four days ago. Again, there is an issue being
introduced to the market for Southern California Edison. This is
very unusual, because in the whole history of the market I think
there has been only one other U.S. electric utility that has come
to the Euro-market--and that was so long ago, the issue has proba-
bly matured by noi. We believe that following Southern California
Edison there will be a substantial number of U.S. utilities that
will learn that this is an alternative market which they should not
ignore. Southern California Edison, by the way, has been very well
accepted. There was a lot of nervousness about whether European
investors even remembered what U.S. utilities were. While a lot of
equity in U.S. utilities was held by foreign investors right after
the war, it tended to be disinvested over the last fifteen years or
so. But this issue and this name have been well received, and there
will be others.
MR. HAWES: We have one last comment by Steve Friedman.
MR. FRIEDMAN: It is actually a question. Michael, what is
the level of straight equity financing in the Eurodollar market?
Is it increasing?
MR. VON CLEWI: To my recollection, there has been one Euro-
equity issue done. There are convertible bond issues with warrants,
but there has been only one pure Euro-equity deal done.
MR. FRIEDM N: Why is that?
MR. VON CLEMM: The One pure Euro-equity was Investors Over-
seas Management.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Are the convertibles seen by their issuers
primarily as equity or debt financings?
MR. VON CLEMM: I think there is no single answer to that.
Certainly, in our view, those who insist on a twenty percent pre-
mium cannot possibly be thinking of them as equity financings.
There are others, most likely non-U.S. issuers of convertibles, who
accept a five percent premium and they obviously do consider those
as equity transactions.
MR. HAWES: I just asked Michael Coles if he had anything to
add. Do you have a comment?
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MR. COLES: I would reinforce what Michael said about timing.
The markets do different things at different times. They act in-
dependently. Going back to June 1980 when interest rates in both
markets came down very, very rapidly--the ability to move on an
almost overnight basis in a rapidly declining market obviously
helped issuers in the Eurobond market as opposed to those in the
U.S. markets.
MR. VON CLEMM: Maybe I should add, since I gave the recent
examples, that the Pepsico deal was decided here late Friday night
and it was introduced to the market in London on Monday morning.
It was signed on Tuesday evening; that is a forty-eight hour turn-
around. It is not terribly pleasant for the people who have to
carry it out, but it is rather a positive feature of the Eurobond
market.
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RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT:
DEVELOPMENTS IN UNITED STATES LAW
David W. Heleniak
MR. HELENIAK: The topic of restrictions on foreign invest-
ments in the U.S. is obviously something that cannot be dealt with
in any detailed manner in this presentation, but I think it is essen-
tial in a conference devoted to discussing the liberalization and
increasing internationalization of capital flows that we remind our-
selves that there remain, and indeed in the future may be more,
restrictions on flows of capital between countries.
My comments will be directed almost exclusively at one type
of investment. Unlike our earlier speakers, I will be principally
focusing on the consequences of direct foreign investment, that is,
the acquisition of controlling equity interests in U.S. corporations
or property. This topic has been of great interest throughout the
seventies and into the early eighties in international economic plan-
ning on the part of the U.S. government. My former Treasury col-
leagues on today's panel and that of yesterday, a number of you in
the audience, and I spent a certain amount of our time during the
previous Administration worrying about the consequences of foreign
investment in the U.S. and whether or not those consequences were
such that one should be doing something different in the policy area.
Bob Mundheim pointed out to me in the corridor yesterday that
the imposition of restrictions on foreign investment remains an idea
of great currency, citing the Canadian-Pacific-Hobart tender offer
which promptly led to Congressional hearings and the Seagram bid for
St. Josephs. Had he had a little more time yesterday morning to
read the New York Times, he would have noted that it has been al-
leged that the Prudential bid for Bache was an effort to preclude
the Belzberg brothers of Canada from acquiring the same target. Two
years ago, when Bob and I first talked about this subject, he was
concerned about the proposed acquisition of the neighborhood Wool-
worth's by Canadian interests. I wonder what the Canadians would
make of this great concern in the U.S. over control of our produc-
tive resources by Canadians.
1. TRADITIONAL POLICY OF LIBERALISM
Although the direction of our policy may be undergoing re-
assessment in light of these acquisitions, the essential fact to
remember is that our country remains relatively open to foreign in-
vestment. Foreign investment has been attracted to the U.S. by the
inherent strength of the U.S. economy, the breadth and resiliency of
U.S. capital markets, and the fundamental protections of our legal
system. These attractions were enhanced in the 1970s by the rela-
tive decline of the dollar and the stagnation'of U.S. equity prices.
Foreign investors have benefited from an essentially open-door poli-
cy for investment in the U.S. and, in some instances, from compara-
tive advantages over competing U.S. domestic suitors of investment
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opportunities.
A. Foundations of the Open Door
The historical liberalism of U.S. government policy toward
foreign investment is rooted in two fundamental premises. First,
the investment process is likely to work most efficiently in the
absence of direct government intervention. Second, investors should
be accorded national or neutral treatment in making investment de-
cisions, receiving neither preferential nor discriminatory treatment.
Once an investment is made here it should be treated on equal foot-
ing with other enterprises.
This policy has enjoyed bipartisan support which has been
based on a pragmatic assessment of the national interest as well as
on philosophic premises. U.S. investment abroad, which far exceeds
foreign investment in the U.S., might be adversely affected by re-
strictions on foreign investment here. As Michael Coles noted
earlier, restrictive policies here can lead to reciprocal treatment
abroad. In addition, foreign capital can play an important role in
increasing productive capacity, competition, and jobs. Many state
governments have found these attractions so appealing that, despite
efforts of the federal government to discourage the practice, they
have competed with one another to attract foreign investment with
various tax and other incentives.
Because of the open door policy, when foreign clients come
to their American lawyers to seek advice on U.S. acquisitions, the
advice generally consists--with a few exceptions that I will men-
tion shortly--of the same advice that is given to a U.S. purchaser
considering making an acquisition. In the case of a foreign client
unfamiliar with U.S. securities laws, the advice is laced with edu-
cational materials trying to explain the vagaries of Mr. Friedman's
Commission. We do not, however, have to concern ourselves with any
national entity that will pass on whether or not a foreign investor
should be allowed to make a particular U.S. acquisition.
B. The Power to Regulate
Although the U.S. has generally pursued a policy of neutrali-
ty with respect to foreign investment, the Congress and the executive
branch have broad powers to regulate such investment under the com-
merce clause of the federal Constitution and under the constitution-
al provisions relating to the maintenance of national defense and
the conduct of foreign policy. To a lesser degree the states also
have power to regulate and restrict foreign investment. These
powers have been exercised sparingly, but to the extent they have
been exercised, they represent pitfalls for the unwary.
C. Exceptions to the Open-Door Policy
The exceptions to our open-door policy, to which I just re-
ferred, relate primarily to licensing requirements and limitations
on foreign acquisitions of real estate or rights relating to real
estate. Foreigners interested in U.S. acquisitions and, more im-
portant, their U.S. counsel must remain alert to legal inhibitions
in these areas in the context of particular acquisition programs.
(i) Federal restrictions in particular industries
The U.S. has a small but important body of law that sharply
restricts, precludes, or requires licensing of, foreign ownership
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in certain sectors of the economy--the aviation, communications,
maritime and nuclear energy industries, and defense contracting
activities. The materials listed in the Bibliography appended to
this chapter should be consulted for a detailed description of such
legislation. Each of these sectors is, or has historically been,
heavily regulated; and, in most instances, obvious and compelling
national security interests dictate separate treatment for foreign
investors. None of the special legislation concerning foreign in-
vestment in these sectors appears to have developed in response to
a particular acquisition or to be directed against investors of a
particular nationality.
The requirements of these statutes are complex, made more
abstruse by a labyrinth of implementing regulations and uneven im-
plementation of the regulations. In some matters lawyers have, of
necessity, become so cautious that they are unwilling to give legal
opinions, directing their clients instead to the more cumbersome
process of regulatory rulings. Results appear on occasion to have
been completely unintended by the Congress. For example, leveraged
lease transactions, unheard of when federal aviation and maritime
statutes were enacted, have become a common means of acquisition of
commercial aircraft and maritime vessels. In such transactions, a
financial institution, as owner-trustee, occupies a normally passive
role with respect to the operation of the aircraft or vessels.
Nevertheless, in the case of aircraft, for example, the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 and regulations thereunder have been deemed to
require the substitution of a new owner-trustee when twenty-five
percent of the voting stock of the U.S. corporation acting as owner-
trustee has been acquired by foreign persons.
Given the conglomerate nature of much of American enterprise,
a foreign investor must carefully examine all of the business activl-
ties of a potential acquisition target to determine whether its
business depends materially on government licenses or regulatory
permits that cannot be issued to foreign-owned enterprises. You
will note that most tender offers by foreigners include a prelimi-
nary determination as to the material dependence of the business of
the target corporation on licenses that might be adversely affected
by foreign ownership. If the loss of such licenses as a result of
an acquisition might cause material adverse effects on the business
of the target, the prospective investor must confront serious issues
which will vary according to the means and extent of acquisition.
Where restrictions may be applicable, it is imperative to determine
before making or abandoning an investment whether such restrictions
can be avoided or accommodated (for example, by operating through a
U.S. entity, or establishing a voting trust with U.S. trustees) or
if post-acquisition divestiture is feasible without incurring penal-
ties or losing the benefits of the acquisition.
Some domestic corporations have taken advantage of this dilem-
ma for prospective foreign suitors in their defensive planning a-
gainst takeover bids. For example, Section 5-703(b) of the corpora-
tion law of the State of Maryland deals with Maryland corporations
that conduct business under a federal or Maryland license or grant
of authority which may be restricted, limited, or revoked if a
specified percentage of its voting interests is owned or controlled
by aliens. Such corporations are expressly permitted to adopt a by-
law provision restricting the transferability, ownership, or voting
rights of shares held or to be held by aliens to comply with such
license or grant of authority. Under this statute, corporations
have adopted bylaws prohibiting the transfer or voting of shares of
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their stock by aliens in an amount that would violate the ownership
or control requirements of a particular regulated activity in which
the corporation is engaged or even an activity in which the corpora-
tion intends to be engaged. Such restraints on alienation of voting
securities are not widespread and have not been judicially tested.
Presumably the validity of such provisions will be determined by the
reasonableness of the restrictions imposed, taking into considera-
tion all of an entity's business activities.
(ii) Restrictions on real property ownership
The other significant area where foreign investors meet un-
usual problems relating to their nationality is in the acquisition
of U.S. real estate. At the federal level, far-reaching prohibi-
tions, which are no longer meaningful, were imposed in the nine-
teenth century on land acquisition by aliens in the Western terri-
tories. There remain, however, significant restrictions under the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and related statutes, which provide
that rights of way over federal land for oil pipelines and the ac-
quisition of lease rights or other dispositions of interest with
respect to coal, oil, and various other minerals on federal lands
may be granted, leased, or sold only to U.S. citizens or corpora-
tions. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 prohibits
the sale of public lands to aliens or corporations not subject to
the laws of the U.S. or of any state.
Real property law in the U.S. is generally a matter of state
law and is not uniform. Alien land laws, restricting foreign owner-
ship of land, date from the initial reception of the English common
law by the colonies and are widespread (a majority of the states
have such laws), particularly with respect to agricultural land.
Recently, states have been enacting new or further restrictions.
The power of the states to impose restrictions on alien land owner-
ship has been upheld in both federal and state courts against
attacks under the equal protection clause of the federal Constitu-
tion and applicable treaties. Nevertheless, the prohibitions may
often be avoided, for example, by operating through a U.S. corpora-
tion; and in some instances they may be susceptible to legal chal-
lenge.
Foreign investors have been following recent developments in
the state of Oklahoma with considerable interest. In September
1979, the Attorney General of Oklahoma withdrew a 1975 opinion of
his office and concluded that an alien, including a corporation,
could not directly or indirectly acquire title to or own land in
Oklahoma under the state constitution, except for limited periods
of time in the case of bona fide residents or through devise, de-
scent, or foreclosure. Title conveyed in contravention of such law
was declared to have escheated to the state. The state then com-
menced escheat proceedings against certain foreign corporations
owning real estate in Oklahoma. A state district court held in
February 1980, that that Oklahoma law was inapplicable to domesti-
cated foreign corporations. That case had been pending on expedited
appeal before the Oklahoma Supreme Court for more than a year. Re-
cently the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held--I have been told, but
have not yet read the opinion--that a foreign corporation that quali-
fies to do business in Oklahoma will be considered a bona fide resi-
dent of that state and entitled to enjoy the same benefits as any
other resident in terms of real estate ownership.
Those are the principal areas, historically, where the U.S.
has imposed restrictions on foreign investment. My topic today
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is to concentrate on current developments in U.S. law with respect
to foreign ownership.
2. POLITICAL CONCERN OVER FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Political concern over foreign investment has increased dur-
ing the past decade, hand in hand with the rising tide of foreign
investment. The decline of the dollar in the new era of floating
exchange rates facilitated an acceleration in foreign investment in
the U.S. through most of the 1970s. Dollar-denominated assets be-
came relatively inexpensive; and in some instances, competitive, or
political necessities dictated that foreign producers establish
production facilities in the U.S. to preserve market shares other-
wise threatened by the increasing dollar prices of their exports to
the U.S. or by proposed trade protectionist measures. The emerging
wealth of OPEC countries further contributed to the flow of funds.
This concern reflects, to varying degrees, (1) xenophobic
pressures and prejudices against some nationalities, (2) responses
to competitive threats or takeover pressures (particularly in the
banking industry, where artificial geographic limitations on domes-
tic bank expansion have limited the exposure of medium and large
banks and bank holding companies that are potential takeover targets
for foreign banks, it has been suggested that some domestic banks
want to inhibit acquisitions by foreign banks in order to preserve
domestic takeover targets for a time when geographic limitations on
bank expansion are liberalized), and (3) grappling with the complex
and historically difficult problems of the accommodation of trans-
fers of real wealth between nations without temporary and-irrational
distortions of international capital markets.
The U.S. Congress and state legislatures have seen a spate of
legislative proposals over the past decade designed to respond to
these concerns. The prescriptions for the perceived ills of foreign
investment have included such varied approaches as (1) imposing di-
rect limits on the percentage of foreign ownership of public com-
panies in general or companies in particular industries, (2) estab-
lishing a commission to prohibit or screen certain foreign invest-
ments or to review foreign investments in general, (3) attempting to
eliminate advantages foreign investors have been accorded inadvertent-
ly over domestic competitors, (4) proposing state legislation to
enable corporations to restrict the transfer of their voting stock
to foreigners where such transfers might adversely affect the ability
to compete in certain business activities, (5) imposing further lim-
itations on alien land acquisition at both federal and state levels,
(6) implementing investment moratoriums to permit studies on the
effects of foreign investment, (7) providing for disclosure and re-
porting of foreign investment and collection of data with respect
thereto, and (8) instituting a reciprocity requirement restricting
foreign investors to the same types of investments in the U.S. as
U.S. investors may make in their home countries.
3. RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
I am delighted to report that at the federal level successive
Congresses, with the strong encouragement of Republican and Democra-
tic administrations, have resisted the more draconian proposals.
The legislation that has been enacted at the federal level during
the past few years, I think fits into two broad categories. The
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first category represents an effort to enhance the statistical base
available to policy planners; and the second is the area that Bob
Carswell referred to previously as trying to make the playing field
even--that is, addressing areas of U.S. legislation that have ac-
corded disparate treatment between U.S. and foreign investors with
a view to removing the differences.
A. Reporting Requirements
The origin of reporting statutes can be traced to the early
seventies when dollar-denominated assets began to look increasingly
attractive and there was concern within the Congress about possible
OPEC acquisitions. The executive branch, in trying to make some
intelligent decisions as to whether or not the level of investment
was substantial enough to warrant some concern, and to be able to
document its views on the subject in a sensible way to the Congress,
discovered that we did not have a good statistical base within the
U.S. concerning the degree of foreign investment. Beginning with
the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974 the U.S. government com-
menced the arduous task of compiling a statistical base on foreign
investment. The International Investment Survey Act of 1976 [IISA]
has established a permanent basis for providing every five years a
survey of foreign direct investment (acquisition of ten percent or
more of the voting securities of a business enterprise) and port-
folio investment in the U.S. The Treasury Department has recently
published the results of the first portfolio survey, which was con-
ducted in 1980. In January the Commerce Department published for
comment an instruction booklet and regulations for the conduct of
the first direct investment survey, which is scheduled for the first
half of 1981, together with amendments proposed for quarterly and
other reporting forms.
In addition to the reporting requirements imposed under lISA,
the Commerce Department has established numerous periodic and extra-
ordinary reporting requirements under IISA applicable to enterprises
in which foreigners invest and to persons assisting such investment.
The reports that have been required have been criticized because
they appear to go beyond the informational needs to which the stat-
ute is addressed--this despite the express statutory provision that
it is not intended to inhibit foreign investment here in any way.
In particular, reporting requirements have in the past required
identification of the name of an acquirer, whereas only the home
state of the acquirer seems necessary for policy planning purposes.
In the regulations proposed for the first lISA survey, the Commerce
Department has asked for comments on its ability to dispense with
the name requirement in favor of simply a nationality requirement.
IISA itself has also been criticized for the detailed reporting in-
formation it requires.
Similarly, detailed reporting requirements have been imposed
under the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978
[AFIDA] with respect to foreign ownership and acquisition of land
used for agricultural, forestry, or timber products. Unlike IISA
which effectively limits disclosure of particular acquisitions to
the federal government alone, AFIDA permits public disclosure of
information filed with respect to particular acquisitions. AFIDA
imposes an obligation that, within ten days of the filing of a re-
port of an acquisition, the report must become publicly available
not only in Washington, but also within the state in which the
acquisition occurred. Accordingly, the ability of foreign investors
to assemble significant parcels of land is likely to be adversely
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affected by the disclosure of partial acquisitions and their pur-
chase prices, prior to completion of assembly. Substantial penal-
ties, including civil fines of up to twenty-five percent of the fair
market value of the interest acquired, may be imposed for failure
to report under AFIDA. The results of the first survey under AFIDA,
published by the Department of Agriculture in November 1980, indi-
cate that less than one-half of one percent of privately held agri-
cultural land in the U.S. is foreign-owned. The benefits of this
information must be weighed in the context of the costs imposed by
AFIDA on foreign investors.
The Domestic and Foreign Investment Improved Disclosure Act
of 1977, which was enacted with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
has also expanded the reporting requirements imposed on foreign and
domestic investors by increasing the instances in which reports must
be filed with the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 dis-
closing the beneficial ownership of five percent or more of each
class of an issuer's equity securities. I will discuss the report-
ing requirements of the newly enacted Foreign Investment in Real
Property Tax Act of 1980 [FIRPTAI in a moment.
B. New and Proposed Legislation
The other broad area I want to touch on briefly is new legis-
lation designed to make the playing field even: in particular, two
recently enacted pieces and one proposed piece of legislation. I
will limit my remarks on the first: the International Banking Act
of 1978 [IBA] about which you have heard a great deal. Let me un-
derscore the previous comment that in enacting the IBA the Congress
passed up the opportunity to be pro-competitive by eliminating arti-
ficial restrictions imposed on domestic institutions in this country.
Instead, a second dual banking system was created where one is dif-
ficult enough to understand.
(i) Banking
Prior to enactment of the IBA, the vagaries of our bank regu-
latory system, with separate federal and state bank regulators,
presented opportunities to foreign banks operating in the U.S. that
were not available to their domestic counterparts. In particular,
foreign banks could establish branches or agencies in as many states
as permitted such entry and could establish securities affiliates
here. Similar activities were not available to U.S. banks because
of the McFadden Act and the Glass-Steagall Act. The IBA redressed
this imbalance by imposing similar limitations on foreign bank ac-
tivity here while creating a separate dual banking system for foreign
banks, which as a result may now establish either federal or state
branches or agencies. Although the IBA fashioned a politically ac-
ceptable compromise to some issues surrounding foreign investment in
the domestic banking system, controversy continues to rage concerning
foreign acquisitions of U.S. banks and even--as has so often been
the case with banking regulation in this country--about the scope of
authority of federal regulators in granting branch licenses to for-
eign banks in states with more restrictive legislation, regulation,
or lore than appears to be consistent with such licensing on the
federal level. A three-month moratorium on the approval by federal
bank regulators of applications in connection with takeovers of U.S.
banks by foreign persons was enacted as part of the Depository In-
stituions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980.
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(ii) Real estate
In the tax and real estate areas, and in response to the
dictates of the Revenue Act of 1978, the Treasury Department com-
pleted a study of the federal tax treatment of income from, and
gains on the sale of, interests in U.S. property held by non-resi-
dent aliens and foreign corporations. The study concluded that
such persons, unlike their domestic counterparts, rarely incurred
capital gains tax on disposition of their U.S. properties because
of various techniques designed to change such property from being
"effectively connected-, with a U.S. trade or business to not being
so connected. Such devices converted capital gains on real estate,
which were ordinarily taxable, into gains on other assets which were
not. To rectify this apparent inequity, FIRPTA was enacted in the
closing days of the 96th Congress. FIRPTA generally provides that
any gain or loss realized by a foreign person from the disposition
of U.S. real property will be taxed as "effectively connected" with
a U.S. trade or business. FIRPTA also imposes significant report-
ing requirements as to foreign beneficial owners of non-public U.S.
companies, which may be avoided if adequate security for tax col-
lections is provided. Congressional efforts to impose a withhold-
ing tax on gains from the disposition of U.S. real estate were un-
successful.
(iii) Margin requirements
Legislation has been proposed in the 97th Congress to extend
the application of margin regulations to stock acquisitions by for-
eign entities that are not controlled by U.S. persons. Section 7
of the Securities Act of 1934 does not at present authorize this
extension, presumably because of concern over the jurisdictional
reach of our laws. Currently, only domestic borrowers and most
domestic lenders are subject to Federal Reserve Board Regulations
G, T, U and/or X imposing generally a fifty percent margin require-
ment on secured loans, the proceeds of which are to be used to pur-
chase stock. Accordingly, a foreign borrower may borrow from a
foreign lender to make a U.S. acquisition without the imposition of
margin requirements. The difficulties of national regulation of an
increasingly international capital market exemplified in this in-
stance were perhaps even more strikingly presented during much of
1980, when the Federal Reserve Board attempted through its powers of
"moral suasion" over domestic banks to allocate credit away from so-
called non-productive uses, such as the acquisition of existing busi-
ness enterprises. The Board's persuasive powers were, of course,
less powerfully employed against foreign lenders.
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RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT:
DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN LAW
Andr6 Bruyneel
MR. HAWES: Now, we would like to hear where Europe--if one
may unitize the term in this fashion (and I am sure one may not)--
where Europe fits on the spectrum of neutrality or antagonism or
welcoming of foreign investment.
1. INTRODUCTION
MR. BRUYNEEL: It is rather awkward, for various reasons, to
treat this topic. First, under the label "European Law" are in-
cluded not only international and EEC regulations but also about
twenty national legal systems from Iceland to Turkey--even after
leaving out East European countries. The documentation we have
collected--though, of course, incomplete--stands three feet high,
while only twenty minutes have been provided for my address.
Second, the topic is but partly a matter of law; for example,
authors rarely comment on the administrative remedies available a-
gainst a decision to refuse an authorization. Basically, the rules
depend on economic policy. Moreover, the sources of the law are
relatively difficult to use. These are either statutory provisions
--frequently complicated and poorly drafted--that are far from the
actual administrative practice [1], or they are descriptions, such
as the OECD documents, prepared on the basis of inquiries made ex-
clusively to national administrations (2].
Third, numerous factors that are unrelated to the usual no-
tion of restrictions on foreign investment influence a decision to
invest abroad. Some of these factors may have a significant re-
strictive effect, for example, tax treatment of branches, antitrust
law 13], possible obligation to launch a public offer after acquir-
ing control of a company [4], intensity of labor involvement in
takeovers and mergers [5], and similar considerations. Thus, it is
essential not to go astray, despite the appeal of such side issues.
The final difficulty is that the topic seems somewhat para-
doxical in a period when the general trend in Europe is character-
ized by some withdrawal of foreign branches and subsidiaries. Be-
cause of this curtailment and, more particularly, in order to
*It is my privilege to thank Mr. Marc Kadaner, member of the
Brussels Bar and teaching fellow at Brussels University, for his
helpful assistance in collecting a major part of the documentation.
I also would like to thank the numerous persons (professors, attor-
neys, civil servants, central bank or bank officials, etc.) who
kindly agreed to answer my questions on their respective national
laws and administrative practices.
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stabilize employment, there is serious competition for systemati-
cally attracting and retaining foreign investment--not for setting
up new restrictions [6]. Rather low stock price quotations (which
can stimulate takeovers under good financial conditions), together
with massive public grants and various other factors, explain the
persistence of an important though reduced flow of foreign invest-
ment in Europe [7].
I shall try to meet the challenge of my topic, however, by
immediately making clear three limits on my discussion. I shall
consider only (1) significant and direct restrictions on foreign
direct investment--thus investments abroad and portfolio investments
will be excluded; (2) general rules--thus restrictions specific to
any particular economic sector, with the exception of banking, will
be disregarded; (3) the most prevalent restrictions--because it
would be difficult and tedious to describe the regulations existing
in about twenty different countries. I shall endeavor to sketch,
on the basis of some examples, the main types of investment restric-
tions before trying to evaluate their development and effectiveness.
Prior examination of some international and EEC aspects will be
necessary.
2. INTERNATIONAL AND EEC INFLUENCES
EEC law must, of course, be given precedence. However, it is
useful first to have a look at certain rules established by the OECD
to create a more traditional--and less explicit--framework for in-
ternational cooperation.
A. OECD Rules
Since 1961, the Member States (except Canada) have adopted
the OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements (8]. According
to articles 1 and 2, the contracting parties commit themselves to
automatic authorization of transactions related to direct investments
in or from other OECD countries (these transactions are included in
OECD lists A/I/A and B). This rule of liberalization allows Member
States to declare reservations or national abrogations, although
these are rare as regards foreign direct investment. Here we find
the justification for a periodic examination and review of the cur-
rent situation by the Committee of Invisible Transactions and Capi-
tal Movements. National practices have consequently become more
open to public view, and they are the bases of an interesting docu-
mentation kept up-to-date and published by the OECD [9].
In addition to the Code on Capital Movements, the Declaration
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises was issued
by the governments of OECD Member States on June 21, 1976 [10]. The
principal contents of the Declaration are (1) a recommendation that
multinational enterprises observe the Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises [11]; (2) a rather general statement on international
investment incentives and disincentives, together with a consulta-
tion procedure (which is never applied) in case of difficulties; and
(3) an endorsement of the principle of national treatment, to be
granted to foreign-controlled enterprises by each Member State.
Information concerning the application of this last principle
--in fields like taxation, governmental grants, access to bank cred-
its and financial markets, procurement contracts, and manufacturing
licenses--has been periodically published [12] and illustrates the
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not infrequent reluctance of national authorities to answer OECD
inquiries with clarity and completeness.
B. EEC Law
With the law of the European Communities, we enter a field
with much greater constraints on the national governments. Article
3(c) of the EEC Treaty provides for "the abolition, as between Mem-
ber States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, ser-
vices and capital," and this general principle is implemented in
title III of the Treaty. The free movement of goods is, of course,
the fourth fundamental EEC freedom [13]. I shall now comment only
on "freedom of establishment" and on "freedom of capital movements."
[141
(i) Freedom of establishment
(In fact, this means equal treatment, rather than a blanket
right of establishment.)
According to article 52, paragraph 1, "restrictions on the
freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the ter-
ritory of another Member State shall be abolished by progressive
stages in the course of the transitional period." The restraints
to be abolished include "restrictions on the setting up of agencies,
branches or subsidiaries" and restrictions on the right "to set up
and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms." [15]
Article 52 was completed by the standstill clause of article
53, which prohibited the imposition of new restrictions, and by the
very important article 54, which established procedures and time
limits for the abolition of existing restrictions, assigned special
duties to the Council and the Commission [16], and authorized co-
ordination provisions [17].
According to the case law of the European Court of Justice
[18], the articles of the Treaty concerning all the freedoms--ex-
cept free movement of capital--are directly applicable to Member
States since the end of the transitional period: January 1, 1970.
This means that all restrictions are automatically abolished with-
out need for further directives. Furthermore, these articles of the
Treaty have created rights that may be enforced in court by indivi-
duals or companies against Member States, other individuals or cor-
porations (19] [20].
Except for capital-movement problems, hereafter discussed,
more restrictions on foreign investments among EEC countries have
been abolished as a result of application of the right of establish-
ment or of the Commission's pressure.
One Belgian example is worth noting. In order to protect
Belgian enterprises against foreign takeovers in conflict with na-
tional policy, the Act on Stock Exchanges was modified in 1967 to
require an authorization by the Minister of Finance in any case of
a public takeover bid launched by or on behalf of foreigners or
Belgian companies under direct or indirect foreign control [21].
On the basis of the right of establishment and the standstill clause,
the EEC Commission soon required the abolition of this new provi-
sion [22]. The Commission, clearly intending to make an example,
rejected all defenses presented by the Belgian government [23] and
threatened to bring the case before the Court of Justice in Luxem-
bourg [241.
[341]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
A. Bnyneel / Restrictions oi foreign investment: Europe
Finally, the law was changed in 1972, and the authorization
system was restricted to public takeover bids launched by non-EEC
foreigners [25]. After 1972--and before then as well--cases of
refusal of authorization were extremely rare [26] [27] [28]. Today,
the Commission is still active in its role of watchdog for the free-
dom of establishment. For example, it takes action against Member
States when it discovers bylaws of important industrial companies
or banks that prevent foreigners from becoming shareholders.
(ii) Free movement of capital
The unrestricted movement of capital involves a difficult
freedom. It is very closely linked to internal financial markets
and to their control--thus implicating economic policies that the
Treaty has basically left to the Member States. Articles 104 to
109 on the balance of payments (29] illustrate the necessary equi-
librium between the free movement of capital and the needs of na-
tional economic policies. These provisions, together with articles
67 to 73 on the free movement of capital [30], have created a situ-
ation which is complex and not uniform in all Member States.
According to article 106, paragraph 1, "each Member State
undertakes to authorize any payments connected with the movement of
goods, services or capital, and any transfers of capital . . . to
the extent that the movement of goods, services, capital and persons
between Member States has been liberalized pursuant to this Treaty."
[emphasis added]. Article 106 has thus automatically freed nearly
all current payments connected with the basic freedoms: the move-
ment of goods, workers, and services; and the right of establishment.
The situation is different for capital movements because ar-
ticle 67 is not directly binding on Member States [31]. However,
two directives of 1960 and 1962 [32] have eased restrictions on
many foreign exchange transactions, but to an extent that differs
according to four categories of transactions. For the first cate-
gory (list A of Annex I), transactions between EEC residents are
unconditionally freed; and the transactions of list A include direct
investments and real estate investments. [33]
Unfortunately for the principle of free movement and for list
A, in the Treaty there are also three safeguard clauses. Article
108 provides for Community response to difficulties in one Member
State as regards balance of payments; article 109 allows national
action in case of a sudden crisis in the balance of payments; and
article 73 deals with disturbances in the functioning of the capital
market.
The EEC achievements in the field of capital movements can
hardly be considered satisfactory. The situation differs from one
Member State to another, because list C includes only certain coun-
tries and because of the use of safeguard clauses in favor of France,
the U.K., Ireland, Denmark,and Italy [34]. Even for liberated trans-
actions, nothing has been done to reduce formalities, paperwork, and
stamps [35]. And, finally, the Commission did not succeed with its
1964 proposal for a third directive in the field of capital move-
ments [36].
At this moment, I should like to tell you an interesting
French story that demonstrates perfectly the vicious interaction
that is possible between exchange control objectives and the regu-
lation of foreign direct investments.
In 1967, exchange control was abolished in France, but at the
same time a system for controlling foreign investments was set up.
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Prior notification was required and the Minister of the Economy
retained a right of refusal (droit d'ajournement) for two months
after notification [37]. Then, for political reasons, France was
obliged to reinstitute exchange controls, first in May 1968 and then
on November 24, 1968. These measures were a posteriori legalized at
the EEC level--on the basis of the article 108 safeguard clause [381
--and they still remain in force.
However, the EEC Commission refused to accept the droit
d'ajournement as far as control of foreign direct investment was
concerned. An action was initiated in 1969 against France, for
(obvious, in my opinion) violation of article 52 freedom of estab-
lishment (39]. Finally, in 1971, the French government agreed to
cancel the droit d'ajournement; but, at the same time the exchange
control regulations were completed by the addition of an authoriza-
tion procedure for foreign direct investments [40).
As you can imagine, this authorization procedure was not in-
frequently used for purposes other than exchange control. There
were a number of cases of denial or failure to answer--which takes
longer for the applicant but has the legal effect of a refusal.
Some of these cases are well-known (like the Ferodo case) and have
created new difficulties between Paris and Brussels: in effect,
this authorization system, as applied, was contrary to the right of
establishment and was also a misuse of the exceptional safeguard
measures granted to France in 1968 in the field of exchange control
only.
The (perhaps temporary) end of the story came with the very
important Decree of August 4, 1980 [41], which has replaced--but
only for direct investments inside the EEC--the authorization sys-
tem by a mere notification that is supposed to be exclusively for
statistical purposes [42].
3. RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS
I would be going beyond my topic if I were to draft a cata-
logue of all existing restrictions [43]. But it seems worthwhile
to reduce my three-foot-high documentation to a short list of the
main types of restraints that I have discovered. These are the
most common restrictions: (1) exchange control restrictions, legi-
timate or misused, for the purpose of controlling foreign invest-
ments (e.g., Ireland, Italy, U.K. before 1979) [44]; (2) monetary
policy measures prohibiting any acquisition of national securities
(e.g., Switzerland in 1978-1979) [45]; (3) restrictions on acquisi-
tion of land and buildings (e.g., Finland, Switzerland since 1961)
[46].
As far as takeovers and the establishment of branches and
subsidiaries are concerned, these requirements are frequently en-
countered: (4) discretionary authorization--that is, the power to
prohibit (e.g., France for non-EEC investments, U.K., Spain, Norway,
Portugal) [47]; (5) special discretionary authorization in the
field of public takeover bids (e.g., Belgium for non-EEC investments)
[481; (6) prior notification for reasons of industrial policy (e.g.,
Belgium) [49]; (7) notification for statistical purposes--prior,
subsequent, or periodic (e.g., France for EEC investments, Germany)
(50]; (9) business permit for setting up a branch (e.g., Germany
for non-EEC investments, Spain) [51].
One could also mention a variety of other regulatory mandates:
[343]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
A. Broyneel / Restrictions on foreign investntent: Europe
special permits (industrial, regional, pollution) [52], foreign
joint venture laws in Eastern Europe [53], compulsory residence for
the manager of a branch [54], residence, work, and foreign merchant
permits [55], consultation with professional councils [56], require-
ments applicable to transfer-of-technology agreements [57], and
rules for specific economic sectors such as national defense, trans-
portation, energy, nuclear industry, pharmaceutical industry, agri-
culture, insurance companies, and banks [58].
That is not all, because restrictions can also be found in
corporate law, specifying the nationality of founders [59], share-
holders [60], directors [61] or managers [62]. Less significant,
of course, are provisions requiring the mention of foreign directors
on the letterhead of the company [63] or the compulsory reporting
to the company of any shareholding in excess of twenty-five percent
[64].
Finally, purely private restrictions in company bylaws should
be mentioned as prohibitions against foreign shareholding [65]. For
example, the Swiss practice of titres nominatifs lies [66] grants
the board of directors the discretionary power to refuse new share-
holders. Thus, it is extremely difficult to achieve a successful
takeover against the wish of the board. In the field of private
restrictions, comment could also be added about U.K. situations (or,
more exactly, City situations) such as membership in Lloyd's [67]
or the membership of the Accepting Houses Committee [68].
4. DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF RESTRICTIONS
I do not want to leave you, after such a catalogue, with the
misleading impression that European thinking is basically hostile
to a liberal or neutral approach to the movement of capital. Some
very brief comments on recent developments and on the effectiveness
of restrictions may help you to understand where we really stand
on the other side of the Atlantic.
A. Developments
The only recent developments that can be considered very
significant are the 1979 abolition of exchange control in Great
Britain and the 1980 liberalization in France, mainly for EEC in-
vestments. In the long run, the principal trend is certainly to-
ward the reduction--in law and in fact--of existing restrictions.
As far as EEC countries are concerned, this trend has been stimu-
lated by EEC law on the right of establishment. Often in Member
States, the abolition of one or another restriction for EEC invest-
ments was extended to all foreign investments.
However, there is also a trend in the other direction, linked
to the development of more interventionist industrial and regional
policies in several countries. The application of such policies
rarely remains completely neutral with regard to equal treatment of
foreign investments.
B. Effectiveness
First of all, it should be kept in mind that many authoriza-
tion or prohibition devices--although very impressive as statutory
or regulatory texts--are never or very rarely applied [691.
Second, it should be noted that the effectiveness of statu-
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tory authorization or prohibition devices is not altogether evident.
Certainly, the private Swiss device of titres nominatifs 1i6s has
played a protective role for Swiss corporations that is much more
efficient than any governmental control of foreign direct invest-
ments [70].
Another example of the circumvention of official regulation
may be found in France. In November 1980--thanks to the abolition
of the authorization procedure for EEC investments--the Italian
group Ferruzzi took control of Beghin-Say, the number one French
sugar company. One month later, because of extremely heavy pres-
sures from the President, the French government, and French agri-
cultural circles, a "French solution" was found in agreement with
Ferruzzi [711. The Italian group had properly read the Circular of
1980, but apparently it forgot that the agriculture and food sector
had become private turf for the French.
Other examples of "national solutions" may be found in the
British or the German practice of takeovers [72], which are con-
trolled without the assistance of restrictive regulations.
Finally, with all their complicated regulations, are the
European governments better equipped than the British Foreign Office
was in 1890 when it simply said "no" to shareholders who were in-
tending to sell a controlling interest in the North-West Africa
Company to Leopold II, as King of the Congo [731? I leave the an-
swer to each of you, and I come to the last topic: restrictions
on foreign direct investment in the field of banking.
5. RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN BANKS
First, let me point out that up to now neither the EEC nor
any individual European country has established a corpus of national
and international banking regulations as complicated as that of the
U.S. (and I hope it will never happen). Even for a specialist, U.S.
rules can be reasonably characterized as a legal nightmare [74].
Before ending with some examples of restrictions in non-EEC coun-
tries, I shall consider foreign investments in EEC banks.
A. Within the EEC
The right-of-establishment principles which were discussed
earlier with regard to corporations [75] are also applicable to
the banking sector of the EEC. However, in a business that has
traditionally been protected and closely supervised, liberalization
is not so easy. As a matter of fact, right-of-establishment prob-
lems in banking are entangled with problems of freedom to render
services [76] and problems of capital movements [77]. From the
point of view of the EEC Treaty, most of the principal banking oper-
ations--such as granting credit, accepting deposits, issuing bonds,
buying and selling securities--are not services but are movements
of capital. Therefore, they are not yet fully liberated. Moreover,
national supervisory systems are usually based on the site of es-
tablishment [78].
Although this situation has not prevented achievements such
as the merger of the London and Dublin Stock Exchanges, the move-
ment of German banks to Luxembourg, or various examples of coopera-
tion between European banks in the seventies, it can be improved
only by means of the coordination procedures established by the
EEC Treaty [79].
[3451
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In the banking field [80] two directives have been adopted.
The first one is the "Council directive of 28 June 1978 [81] on the
abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment and freedom
to provide services in respect of self-employed activities of banks
and other financial institutions." The second directive is the
"(first) Council directive of 12 December 1977 on the coordination
of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the
taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions" [82].
The present situation, resulting from the two directives and
their implementation [83], can be summed up in three comments.
(1) As regards the right of establishment, there are no longer any
significant restrictions on the formation in EEC Member States of
branches or subsidiaries of EEC credit institutions [84]. (2) There
remain, however, transitional difficulties to be solved concerning
the standard "economic needs of the market" and its application[851.
(3) Article 9 of the 1977 Directive deals with branches of credit
institutions whose head offices lie outside the Community [86]. On
the one hand, Member States may not apply a more favorable treatment
than the EEC treatment to such branches; on the other hand, the
Community may, through agreements with third countries on the basis
of reciprocity, accord to such branches identical treatment through-
out the EEC territory.
Presently no agreement of this kind exists, but it may be
said that the EEC freedom of establishment and the implementation
of banking directives have generally encouraged equal treatment of
branches and subsidiaries of EEC and non-EEC credit institutions.
This is perfectly illustrated by the U.K. Banking Act of 1979 which
made no distinction between EEC and non-EEC foreign banks [87].
As a matter of fact, current legal and practical banking
issues primarily concern supervision, and cooperation between super-
visory authorities [88], rather than restrictions on foreign invest-
ments in banks. The stronger the cooperation grows, the less im-
portant will be the need for restrictions.
B. Restrictions in Non-EEC Countries
Restrictions on foreign investment in banks still exist, how-
ever, inside the EEC--for non-EEC investors--as well as outside the
EEC--for all investors. In this second category, Switzerland and
Spain are two examples of countries with special treatment of for-
eign banks.
The Swiss situation is typical. The multiplication of for-
eign bank subsidiaries in Switzerland during the sixties led to the
introduction, in 1971 of special rules concerning "banks in foreign
hands" [89]. This statutory regime controlling foreign banking
subsidiaries [90] was built on the basis of two principles: (1)
The granting of a bank licence is subject to the traditional condi-
tion of reciprocity [91]. (2) Precautions must be taken to prevent
the subsidiary from giving the impression, because of its name,
that it is a Swiss bank. Rules are also designed to ensure a sig-
nificant allegiance to Switzerland in matters such as monetary and
credit policies, the residence of managers, and representation of
the subsidiary [92].
The application of such rules turned out--not surprisingly--
to be difficult. There is no clear standard defining a bank in
foreign hands (let us think of the example of a Swiss bank with
forty-five percent foreign shareholding), or the condition of
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reciprocity, which the Federal Banking Commission identifies through
a flexible, case-by-case approach [931.
The Spanish banking law, which had been extraordinarily re-
strictive toward foreign investment, was substantially liberalized
by a Royal Decree in 1978 [94] in accordance with the Spanish open-
door policy after Franco. The classical standard of reciprocity
was chosen, together with a discretionary authorization--based
on national economic interest--to be granted by the Council of
Ministers itself.
Apparently no European country presently has a provision
like the one contained in the Canadian Bank Act of 1967 which, until
1980, required seventy-five percent Canadian control of all federal-
ly chartered banks [95]. Furthermore, there is nothing comparable
to the provision of the Canadian Bank Act of 1980, restricting the
domestic assets of all foreign bank subsidiaries in the aggregate
to eight percent of total domestic assets of all banks in Canada[96].
MR. HAWES: Thank you, Andre. Assume that a client comes
to you wanting to make a direct investment--not a takeover bid,
but just to establish a subsidiary or to buy property. Take Bel-
gium, if you wish, and let us say it is an American company or in-
vestor. Would your approach be to say, "It is quite possible," or
"It is going to be very, very difficult"? Where does it fit in
that spectrum?
MR. BRUYNEEL: No doubt I would answer, "It will be easy, as
far as Belgium is concerned."
MR. HAWES: If you were a French lawyer or a German lawyer?
MR. BRUYNEEL: I would say, "Be very, very, very careful."
NOTES
[I] Sometimes there are very restrictive legal provisions that are never
applied (e.g., article 13 of the U.K. 1975 Industry Act), or there
may be restrictive administrative practices developed with or without
a basis in statutory law.
[2] See particularly, International Direct Investment (policies, pro-
cedures, and practices in OECD member countries), OECD publications,
1979.
[3] E.g., as far as EEC antitrust law is concerned, substantial diffi-
culties can arise with some types of joint ventures. See Lukoff,
Joint Ventures, EEC Theory and Developing Case Law, 2 The Interna-
tional Contract 37-44 (1981). In connection with Article 86 of the
Treaty, see the Continental Can case: Judgment of 21 February 1973,
[19731 ECR 215.
[41 See, e.g., General principle nr. 13 of the City Code on Take-overs
and Mergers (revised edition February 1981). An excellent compara-
tive study on the sale of controlling interest is Lempereur,
Cessions de majoritg et protection des actionnaires minoritaires
en droit compare, 1978 Revue Pratique des Socigt~s (Brussels) 91-187.
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15] E.g., such involvement is very important in the Netherlands with
respect to acquisitions (see Act on Workers' Councils, as amended
September 1, 1979) or public takeover bids and mergers (see
Fusiegedragsregelscode 1975, which is a resolution of the Social
and Economic Council).
[6] The trend will probably and unfortunately be very different in
the field of trade policies, at least for several sensitive sectors.
[7] For a description of the general trends, see the OECD documents
published from time to time by the Committee on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises.
[8] The most recent edition was published in 1978 by OECD publications.
The original 1961 Code was adopted after promulgation of the OECD
Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Transactions. As re-
gards current payments, compare the IMF rules and the 1955 European
Monetary Agreement.
[9] International Direct Investment, supra note 2. This document shows,
inter alia, that national authorities do not always fully respond
to questions; that every government considers its practice to be
liberal; that exchange control is, as far as foreign investment is
concerned, a basically ambiguous matter; and that national statistics
are extremely difficult to compare--for example, the number of re-
fused authorizations or number of applications withdrawn.
[10] International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD pub-
lications, ed. 1979. (1976 Declaration and Council's Decisions.)
fi] For a well-known application of this non-binding set of rules, see
the Badger case (1977): Blanpain, The Badger Case and the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Kluwer, 1977).
[12] National Treatment for Foreign-Controlled Enterprises, OECD publi-
cations, 1978; International Investment and Multinational Enter-
prises, supra note 10.
[13] EEC Treaty, title I.
[14] The freedom of movement for workers (articles 48 and 51) and the
freedom to provide services (articles 59 to 66) within the Com-
munity do not involve, at least directly, restrictions on foreign
investment. For a detailed description of EEC law on the four
freedoms, see Mclgret and others, Le droit de la Communaut6 econo-
mique europdenne, volume 3 (Brussels, 1971).
[15] Article 52 refers to the article 58 meaning of companies or firms
and to chapter 4 provisions on the free movement of capital. EEC
Treaty. The problem of dominion is therefore solved without refer-
ence to a theory of control.
[16] See article 54, para. 3(e)(f) and (h), EEC Treaty.
(17] Article 54, para. 3(g), pertaining to companies, and article 57,
para. 2 concerning the financial sector, EEC Treaty.
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[181 Reyners case: Judgment of 21 June 1974, case 21/74 [1974] ECR
631; Van Binsbergen case: Judgment of 3 December 1974, case
33/74 [1974] ECR 1299; and several subsequent cases aimed at
clarifying points of detail.
1191 The application of these principles concerning the right of estab-
lishment was in no respect modified or delayed by the Accession
Treaty of 1972 (Denmark, Ireland, and U.K.) or by the Accession
Treaty of 1979 (Greece).
[20] On the fundamental question of the "direct effect" of EEC Treaty
provisions, see Lecourt, L'Europe des juges 248-263 (Brussels, 1979).
Concerning the less direct effect of EEC directives, see Pescatore,
L'effet des directives communautaires: une tentative de ddmythifi-
cation, chron. XXV (Dalloz Sirey, 1980) (only the lack of implemen-
tation, or inadequate implementation, of a directive may be brought
as a cause of action, and only against a Member State); see also,
Timmermans, Directives: Their Effect Within the National Legal
Systems, 1979 Common Market Law Review 533-555.
[211 Commercial Code, book I, title V, article 108, §2; see Report to
the King, Pasinomie 1967, 1313-1314, pertaining to the traditionally
liberal attitude of the Belgian government and to the OECD Code of
1961.
122] In addition, the Commission was not pleased by the standard "company
under foreign control"--even as elucidated by the "general programmes"
of 18 December 1961: "lien effectif et continu avec l'conomie d'un
Etat membre".
[231 A declaration that article 108, §2 would never be applied to EEC
nationals, except after the procedure established by article 73 of
the EEC Treaty; the claim that enterprises in a small country are
particularly exposed to foreign takeovers; and other arguments.
See the legislative history of the Act of 1972, infra note 25.
[24] EEC Treaty, article 169.
[251 Act of 11 July 1972, Pasinomie 1972, 418-426, including the legis-
lative history and a description of similar restrictions in other
EEC countries. The new text of article 108, §2 is worded as follows:
The same authorization shall be required for any public
offer to exchange or to purchase Belgian securities,
realized by or for the account of:
1. physical persons other than nationals of a member
state of the European Economic Community;
2. corporate bodies, public or private, that are not
formed according to the law of one of these states;
3. corporate bodies, public or private, that are formed
according to the law of one of these states but that
do not have their registered office, administration
office or principal place of business within the
Community.
[26] An interesting case happened in the insurance field. The Minister
of Finance rejected a U.K. public takeover bid for a Belgian in-
surance company because the bidder, unlike another bidder, did not
undertake to maintain full employment in the Belgian company.
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[27] Public takeover bids are under the supervision of the Banking
Commission, which acts in order to protect investors, not in order
to evaluate the takeover. On that supervision, see Bruyneel,
The Belgian Commission Bancaire: Functions and Methods, 1980
DPCI 351-384 (up-to-date revision of an article published in the
Journal of Comparative Corporate Law and Securities Regulation,
1 J. Comp. Corp. L. & See. Reg. 187 (1978)).
[28] The Belgian government was also compelled to propose to Parliament
a modification of article 36 of the Act of 30 December 1970 on
economic expansion, which deals with incentives, grants, employment,
planning, and measures of industrial policy. Article 36 requires
prior notification to the Minister of Economic Affairs, the Minister
of Finance, and the Minister of Regional Economic Affairs in case of
sale to foreigners--or Belgian companies under direct or indirect
foreign control--of more than one third of the capital of a Belgian
enterprise with an equity of at least BF 100 million. The solution
finally adopted (Act of 17 August 1973) was not to lift the restric-
tion for EEC investors as with article 108; but instead, the prior
notification system was extended to all sales, even to Belgian nationals.
[29] Chapter 2 of title II of the EEC Treaty.
[30] Article 67: principle; articles 68 and 69: program, procedure, and
directives; articles 70 and 72: coordination of the exchange poli-
cies towards third countries; article 71: standstill clause;
article 70, para. 2 and article 73: safeguard clauses. See also
article 221: national treatment respecting participation in the
capital of companies or firms.
The consistency and combination of the two sets of rules (67 to
73; 104 to 109) is a difficult matter: see M1gret et al., supra
note 14, volume 3, at 173-259; Heenen, La libre circulation des
capitaux, in Novelles, Droit des Communaut6s europ~ennes 755-772
(Brussels, 1969).
On escape clauses, see Manin, A propos des clauses de sauvegarde,
1970 Rev. trim. dr. eur. 1-42; Seidel, Escape Clauses in European
Community Law-', 1978 Common Market Law Review 283-308 (uith special
reference to capital movements).
[31) Mdgret et al., supra note 14, volume 3, at 177. The European Court
of Justice will soon deal with this problem.
(32] First directive of 11 May 1960 (JOCE nr. 43 of 12 July 1960);
second directive of 18 December 1962 (JOCE nr. 9 of 22 January 1963).
[33] Compare list B, where transactions such as portfolio investments in
quoted securities are unconditionally made free on the basis of
general exchange authorizations; list C, where transactions are
conditionally made free-i.e., only in Member States (Germany, Belgium,
Luxembourg) where such freedom already existed in 1960; and list D,
where transactions that might involve speculative capital movements
are not necessarily freed by the Member States. The four lists were
based on the corresponding liberalization work of the OECD Code of
1961.
[34] See also article 49 ff, 1979 Accession Treaty with Greece.
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[351 For example, it must be determined whether a transaction is to
be found on list A or on another list. The same odd practice
exists in systems of two-tier exchange markets--as in Belgium.
[36] See N1gret et al., supra note 14, volume 3, at 210-215. The EEC's
rather minimal achievement in the field of capital movements can
be explained by various factors: treaty objectives are less pre-
cise than for the other freedoms; there is a lack of clarity and
consistency between articles 67 to 73 and articles 104 to 109;
political will was weak and there was no precise conception of an
ideal European capital market. This situation led to the "Rapport
Segre": Le d~veloppement d'un marche europgen des capitaux, EEC
publication nr. 8.181 (1966) which is at the origin of EEC efforts
in other directions: inter alia, coordination in the banking field,
securities markets, and economic and monetary union. See MNgret
et al., supra note 14, volume 6 at 29-134.
137] Decree nr. 67-78 of 27 January 1967 and subsequent decrees and
circulars issued according to Act nr. 66-1008 of 28 December 1966.
[381 Decree nr. 68-1021 of 24 November 1968 issued according to Act No.
66-1008, id. EEC decisions of 23 July 1968 (JOCE nr. L 178 of 25
July 1968) and of 4 December 1968 (JOCE nr. L 295 of 7 December
1968). The validity of the application of articles 108 and 109 of
the EEC Treaty has been contested, but not successfully. See
Judgment of 2 February 1976, Tribunal de grande instance de Lille,
Dalloz Sirey [1979] jur. 241-245, note Minet.
[391 Appeal nr. 66/69 filed, but never heard, at the European Court of
Justice. See NWgret et al., supra note 14, volume 3 at 218-228;
see also the EEC answer to a parliamentary question in 1969: 1970
Rev. trim. dr. eur. 183-184 (which refers to articles 52-58 (and
directives), article 221, and article 67 (and 1960 directives)).
[401 Decree nr. 71-144 of 22 February 1971 replacing article 4 of Decree
nr. 68-1021, supra note 38; see also Decree nr. 74-721 of 26 July
1974, introducing a new article 4 bis in Decree nr. 68-1021.
[41] Journal officiel of 5 August 1980. Article 4 bis of Decree nr.
68-1021 is now worded as follows:
10 Les investissements directs effectugs Vint'rieur
de la Communaut6 6conomique europ~enne qui repondent aux
deux conditions suivantes sont libres
with three exceptions:
Les investissements effectues dans des activitfs participant
en France, m~me A titre occasionnel, i l'exercice de l'auto-
rit4 publique; les investissements mettant en cause l'ordre
public ou la sant4 publique ou la s~curit4 publique, ainsi
que ceux r~alises dans des activit9s de production ou de
commerce d'armes, de munitions et de materiels de guerre;
les operations ayant pour effect de faire 6chec l'applica-
tion des lois et r~glementations francaises.
[ 3511
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[42] On the basis of the Decree of 4 August 1980, there has been
published a very comprehensive new Circular of 6 August 1980,
Journal officiel of 9 August 1980. The Circular is interesting
in many respects: it gives a detailed and extensive definition of
control; it excludes EEC companies under foreign control; and
it contains other measures liberalizing small-sized foreign
direct investments in France.
[43] Attempts to draft such a catalogue were made in the two OECD
documents referred to in notes 9 and 12 supra. Other interesting
sources include a booklet published by Abecor in 1976: Investisse-
ments etrangers en Europe; the Tax Management series; and booklets
published for each country (Investment in ... ) by firms like Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
Such introductory sources must be complemented by an examination
of the legal texts and also by meetings designed to provide a satis-
factory understanding of administrative practices. I bad such con-
tacts in several countries but, due to lack of time, I cannot comment
on the various interesting discoveries I made and the conclusions
that can be drawn.
[44] Also problems of repatriation of income or investment. The
misuse of exchange control is particularly clear when the control
was established in order to avoid excessive outflow of capital.
1451 The abolition of the Federal Council Decree on investment by non-
residents in Swiss securities became effective on 24 January 1979.
[46] "Lex Furgler": Decree of the Federal Assembly of 23 March 1961;
Federal Council Decree of 21 December 1973. The system, which is
presently under review, has apparently never been used to prevent a
subsidiary or a branch from buying land and buildings necessary for
its industrial activity.
[47] France: see section 2B(ii) supra at 144 and notes 37 to 42.
U.K.: see article 13 of the 1975 Industry Act concerning change
of control contrary to the interests of the U.K. or any substantial
part thereof. Spain: see Decrees of 31 October 1974 and Royal
Decree of 26 November 1976, pertaining to foreign direct investment
in excess of 50% of the capital of a Spanish company. Norway: see
International Direct Investment, supra note 2. Portugal: see
Foreign Investment Code: Decree-Act nr. 348/77.
[48] Article 108, paragraph 2 of the Act on stock exchanges. See
section 2B(i) supra at 143 and notes 25 to 27.
[49] Article 36 of the Act of 30 December 1970: see supra note 28.
[501 France: see section 2B(ii) supra at 144 and notes 37 to 42. Germany:
see Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (AWG), §1.
[51] Germany: see Gewerbeordnung (GewO), §12. The permit may be refused
for lack of reciprocity. Spain: authorization of the Ministry of
Commerce: see Decree of 31 October 1974 articles 13-14.
[52] E.g., in the Netherlands.
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1531 E.g., in Yugoslavia, see the Act of 30 March 1978 on foreign
investments (comprehensive commentary in 1980 DPCI 385-415).
See in general, Florescu, Les socigtos rixtes dans les pays
socialistes, nouvelle forme de coop6ration 4conomique interna-
tionale, 1978 DPCI 243-267.
154] Frequently required by tax regulations.
(55] In all countries, except for EEC nationals in Member States.
A particularly restrictive policy in this respect has been
followed by Switzerland for several years; see Revaclier,
Obstacles 2 l'implantation d'entreprises 6trang<res en Suisse:
les dispositions limitant le nombre des trangers qui exercent
une activit6 lucrative, 1976 DPCI 89-99.
[56] E.g., in Austria.
(571 E.g., in Spain.
[581 As far as banks are concerned, see section 5 infra at 147.
[591 E.g., in Denmark at least two founders must be Danish (Company
Act, article 11 for A/S), but this requirement has been lifted
for EEC nationals.
160] E.g., in Finland the bylaws may limit foreign shareholdings to
20% of the capital: International Direct Investment, supra note 2,
at 23.
[611 E.g., in Denmark at least half of the directors must be Danish
(Company Act, article 52 for A/S), but this requirement has been
lifted for EEC nationals. In Switzerland a majority of the
directors of an S.A. must be Swiss nationals residing in Switzer-
land, with a possibility of exemption for holding companies (Code
des obligations, art. 711, para.2).
[62] E.g., in Denmark (Company Act, article 52 for A/S), but this re-
quirement has been lifted for EEC nationals.
163] U.K. Company Act of 1948, article 201. This requirement has been
lifted for EEC nationals.
[64] German Aktiengesetz, article 20. The company is in turn obliged
to publish any information it receives on such shareholding in
excess of 25 percent.
(65] See section 2B(i) supra at 143 for the position of EEC nationals.
[66] Stimulated by the Federal Council as far as banks are concerned.
[67] However, Lloyd's has had foreign "names" since 1968.
(68] Anthony Gibbs, after becoming a subsidiary of the Hong Kong and
Shanghai Bank, withdrew from the Committee.
[ 3531
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[69] E.g., article 13 of the U.K. 1975 Industry Act has never been applied;
also it apparently was never cormnunicated to the OECD. See Weinberg,
On Take-over and Mergers (nr. 1505, 1979 ed.). In Belgium, article
108, para. 2 of the Act on stock exchanges, supra note 48, has been
applied only extremely rarely. See also the statistical data pub-
lished in International Direct Investment, supra note 2. It should
be noted, however, that the length of the authorization procedure
has sometimes in fact resulted in the prevention of an investment.
(70] Compare, for example, the rather minor importance of branches and
subsidiaries of multinational enterprises in Switzerland with the
very high figures for Belgium. It is interesting to note that the
investments of Belgian Multinational Enterprises abroad are also of
similar great importance.
[71] L'Express (Paris), 6 December 1980; Le Soir (Brussels), 4 December
1980.
[72] In Germany, there is even a gentleman's agreement among the banks,
several business and industry organizations, and the federal
government, which provides that no sale of the control of an
enterprise will be made to foreigners without consultation.
[73] Barbara Emerson, Leopold II: The Kingdom and the Empire, chapter
XXI (London, 1979).
[74] See Yellon and Welsh, Counseling Foreign Banks on United States
Bank Acquisitions: The Foreign Banker Meets His U.S. Lawyers,
2 J. Comp. Corp. L. & See. Reg. 303-333 (1979).
[75] See section 2B(i) supra at 143.
[76] EEC Treaty, articles 59 to 66.
[77] See section 2B(ii) supra at 144.
(78] On these problems, see the very interesting paper presented by Mr.
Troberg, Freedom of Establishment, Freedom to Supply Services:
The Field of Financial Institutions and Their Operation, at the
1980 Brussels Seminar of the International Faculty for Corporate
and Capital Markets Law (available from the editors of this journal].
See also, Judgment of 26 November 1975 (Coenen), (1975] ECR 1547
(as an exception to the general rule, a location and a permanent
address may be required for services of a special nature that need
supervision which can be effected only on the spot).
[79] See, in general, articles 100 and 101, and especially in reference
to banks, articles 57, para. 2 and 61, para. 2; see also articles
54, para. 2 and para. 3, and 63, para. 2 and para. 3.
(80] The EEC directives or proposals or Codes of conduct in the area of
securities markets and regulations will not be treated here, for
they are more closely related to problems of foreign portfolio
investment and foreign issues than to problems of foreign direct
investment. The same is true for directives, and proposals for
directives, in the corporate and accounting fields.
[3S4 ]
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[81] OJEC, nr. L 194 of 16 July 1973. See, as regards freedom to
provide banking services, the interesting Judgment of 24 October
1978 (Socigt G~ngrale Alsacienne de Banque), (19781 ECR 1971.
[821 OJEC, nr. L 322 of 17 December 1977. An excellent and comprehen-
sive comment on the directive of 1977 has been published by Le
Brun, Une premiere etape vers 1'harmonisation europeenne des
r~glementations bancaires, 1979 Revue de la Banque (Brussels) 25-57.
See also the paper presented by Mr. Clarotti, The Harmonization of
Legislation Relating to Credit Institutions, at the 1980 Brussels
Seminar of the International Faculty for Corporate and Capital
Markets Law [available from the editors of this journal].
[83] The time limit for implementation of the 1977 directive was
December 1979; but several Member States have not yet complied.
[84] For an interesting general view on the present situation, see IBRO,
The Regulation of Banks in the Member States of the EEC (1978).
[851 See article 3 of the 1977 directive, and Le Brun, supra note 82,
nr. 2.2.1.4.
[86] See also Le Brun, supra note 82, nr. 2.2.3, and, as regards
branches of EEC credit institutions, nr. 2.2.2.2. With respect
to the subsidiaries of non-EEC credit institutions, an issue not
covered by article 9, see Le Brun, L'harmonisation des ligislations
bancaires et les autorit~s nationales de contrale, in The Develop-
ment of Financial Institutions in Europe, 1956-1976, at 350 ff.
(Sijthoff-Leiden, 1977).
187] Banking Act 1979, chapter 37, HMSO 1979; see also Watson, The
U.K. Banking Act 1979, 1980 DPCI 71-81; and Revell, The Regulation
on Banks and the New English Banking Law, 1981 Revue de la Banque
(Brussels) 5-28.
[88] And even competition among authorities. See Giddy and Allen,
International Competition in Bank Regulation, 1979 Banca Nazionale
des Lavoro Quarterly Review 311-326; compare Revell, The Complemen-
tart Ntature of Competition and Regulation in the Financial Sector,
1980 Revue de la Banque (Brussels) 9-32.
[891 Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks, 8 November 1934, revised on
11 March 1971. By an "urgent" vote, new rules on foreign banks were
first introduced by a Federal Decree of 21 March 1969. A new revi-
sion of the Act is presently in preparation.
[90] As regards branches, see Decree of the Federal Banking Commission
of 14 September 1973.
[911 This requirement can also be found in many other European countries,
including EEC countries. For example, Italy demands reciprocity
for non-EEC subsidiaries and The Netherlands, for non-EEC branches.
See items 25 and 27 of the summary table that forms the annex to
IBRO, supra note 84, and its corresponding chapters. Clearly, the
content and the application of the requirement of reciprocity may be
extremely different from one country to another. Such differences
also result from the degree of independence of the authority in charge
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of granting licences; this may be an independent commission as in
Switzerland or Belgium, the central bank, the Minister of Finance,
or the government itself.
[92] Hirsch, La surveillance des banques en Suisse, in Festschrift fur
Johannes Bgrmann at 467 (Munchen, 1975):
La raison sociale de ces banques ne doit pas permettre
de penser qu'il s'agit de banques suisses. D'autre part,
la banque "en maine Strangires" doit donner Zi la Banque
Nationale 1'assurance qu'elle adh~rera t la politique
suisse en matiere montaire et dans le domaine du credit;
elle est tenue de donner certains renseignements a la
Banque Nationale i cet effet. En outre, la majorit6 des
membres de la direction doit tre domiciliee en Suisse;
ceux qui sont domicili(s a 1'etranger ne peuvent pas
signer individuellement ni collectivement entre eux.
Toutes ces r~gles ne soulevent pas de difficult's.
[93] See Hirsch, supra note 92, at 467-468; Hirsch, La Commission
f & rale des banques en 1974, La socitg anonyme suisse, at 51-53;
Chapuis, Le statut des banques &trangores en Suisse, 1976 DPCI
119-138; Hlller, La surveillance des bangues en Suisse, 1980 Revue
de la Banque (Brussels) 61-76.
194] Real Decreto nr. 1388/78 of June 1978 on foreign banks in Spain;
see Fernandez Rozas, La nouvelle r4glementation de la banque
6trang~re en Espagne, 1978 DPCI 363-381. The first draft of the
decree was still significantly restrictive.
[95] See Engle, International Investment, 9 Harv. Int'l L.J. 305-317 (1968).
[96] Bank Act 1980, chapter 40; see Robinson, Hoffstein and Thompson,
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RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT:
DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPANESE LAW
Misao Tatsuta
MR. HAWES: Now, I would like to have Mr. Misao Tatsuta from
Kyoto tell us about the Japanese situation.
MR. TATSUTA: Thank you, Doug. Since the age of the gods,
Japan has repeatedly opened and closed its door. According to leg-
end, sunshine returned to our ancestors when the Goddess of the Sun
peeped through a crack by the rock door of a cave where she had
locked herself. After three hundred years of isolation under the
Shogun, Japan opened its door wide and achieved rapid modernization
in the twentieth century--thanks to the advanced civilization and
technologies of the Western countries.
Japanese entrepreneurs, however, found it difficult to launch
their own ventures. When the time was ripe in terms of the national
economy, they found that foreign capital and technology already con-
trolled the main industries, and markets were hard to enter [1].
This pre-war experience prompted our country to maintain a restric-
tive policy toward foreign investment in post-war times, when our
economy had to be rebuilt from almost nothing.
1. EXCLUSIONARY LAW AND ITS DEMISE
The Foreign Investment Law of 1950 [2] prohibited the inflow
of foreign capital but made exceptions for selected desirable in-
vestments [3]. Gradually the exceptions were broadened, especially
after 1964 when Japan joined the OECD [4]. In May 1973, the govern-
ment replaced the previous fifty-fifty principle for foreign capital
investment with a one hundred percent liberalization [5], in accord-
ance with the OECD Code. The original statutory structure, however,
remained unchanged; and the very existence of this prohibitive stat-
ute, combined with its procedural complexity, gave the impression
that Japan still maintained a closed-door policy. Criticism from
abroad grew louder as overseas activities by Japanese enterprises
attracted more attention.
The Foreign Investment Law was finally abolished and replaced
by the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law of 1979 [6],
which took effect December 1, 1980. This new statute reversed the
former exception-to-the-rule emphasis and imposed restrictions only
in exceptional cases. Rules and regulations under the statute pro-
vided for streamlined procedures [7]. For example, a written con-
tract and its time-consuming translation are no longer required with
an application for validation. Furthermore, notification procedures
are now free from conditions or terms formerly imposed through the
exercise of administrative guidance.
0378.7214/8110000-000$01S2.75 ( 1981 North-Holland [ 357 ]
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2. ACQUISITION OF SHARES BY ALIENS
Under the new regime acquisitions of corporate shares by
foreigners are classified according to three categories: (1) port-
folio investment, (2) direct domestic investment, and (3) acquisi-
tion of controlling ownership.
A. Portfolio Investment
When a non-resident's holding, after purchase, is less than
ten percent of the aggregate outstanding shares in a listed cor-
poration, such purchase is denominated portfolio investment [8].
This type of transaction is subject to a notice requirement and
a twenty day waiting period [9]. Practically speaking, however,
these requirements can be disregarded since insofar as the purchase
is made through a designated securities company there is no need to
notify the Finance Minister of the transaction [10]. There are
twenty-six designated securities companies, including four foreign
brokers (11].
It is true that in emergency cases (such as those specified
in article 7 of the OECD Code) the Finance Minister may impose
special regulations [12]. However, in its policy announcement of
December 16, 1980 [13], the Foreign Exchange Council emphasized
that resort to such emergency regulations should be confined to a
necessary minimum, and that international harmony should always be
borne in mind.
B. Direct Domestic Investment
Direct domestic investment occurs when a foreign investor's
holding after purchase will be ten percent or more of the aggregate
outstanding shares in a listed corporation, or when a foreign in-
vestor plans to acquire any number of shares in an unlisted corpora-
tion [14]. Prior to this type of transaction, the buyer must file
a notification statement with the Minister in charge of the industry
involved. A statutory waiting period of thirty days follows, but
it may be accelerated in normal circumstances to about fifteen days
[15]. The same requirements apply if a foreign company wishes to
establish a branch or make a substantial change in its business [16].
If the government finds it necessary to determine whether the trans-
action might imperil the national security or cause substantial ad-
verse effects in related Japanese industries, the waiting period
may be extended to five months. And if the government decides that
it is probable that these adverse consequences will take place, it
may order the transaction altered or suspended (17].
The Cabinet Decision of December 26, 1980 states that with
regard to direct domestic investments the government shall adminis-
ter the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law in accordance
with the OECD Code [18]. It directs, furthermore, that for the
moment the government shall continue to deal cautiously with direct
domestic investments in primary industries (i.e., agriculture, for-
estry and fisheries, mining, oil, leather, and leather products
manufacturing) while it maintains efforts to loosen restrictions on
investments in these industries in response to future variations in
the social and economic circumstances of the country [19].
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol3/iss3/1
il. Tatsuta I Restrictions on foreign iniestnent: Japan
C. Acquisition of Controlling Ownership
With respect to acquisition of controlling ownership, the
government retains the power to screen acquisition of corporate
shares by foreigners through the selection of certain issuers for
special treatment. The government may designate issuers for this
special screening process if it seems necessary to determine whether
share holdings of twenty-five percent or more by foreigners might
imperil the national security, disturb the maintenance of public
order, hamper the protection of public safety, or cause substantial
adverse effects in the national economy [20].
There were hot debates on whether this sort of regulation
should be retained. The argument that prevailed was as follows:
those who have been accustomed to the previous regime still need
time to prepare themselves for its complete dismantlement [21].
Since this rationale seems to be less than indisputable, the special
control continues "for the time being" only and is specified not in
the body of the law, but in supplementary provisions [22]. It would
be fair to say that the Cabinet Decision of December 26, 1980 [23]
(which I have mentioned in connection with direct domestic invest-
ment) applies to this restriction--that is, the government must
make efforts to liberalize acquisition of controlling ownership, as
well as lesser purchases, in the primary industries. Under the old
regime, one of the tests for a case-by-case scrutiny was whether the
incumbent management consented to the foreigner's acquisition. Un-
der the present statute, however, designation may be made irrespec-
tive of management approval.
In an announcement on November 28, 1980 [24], the government
designated eleven corporations [25] for this special screening pro-
cess. It is reported that a Hong Kong investor who has a substan-
tial holding in one of these corporations, Katakura Industries Co.,
brought a suit against the Japanese government alleging that the
selection of that company was unwarranted and therefore unlawful
[26]. We are much concerned about the outcome of this suit.
A foreigner who plans to acquire shares in a designated cor-
poration must first use a resident agent to file a confirmation
request with the Minister of Finance, via the Bank of Japan. Within
forty days prior to the planned transaction, the foreigner must ob-
tain a confirmation declaring whether or not the planned acquisition
falls within the shareholding limit [27]. In addition to the con-
firmation request, the foreigner must file a notification statement
in the same manner [28]. If the Minister finds it necessary to
determine if the acquisition might cause one of the adverse effects
that I mentioned earlier, the planned transaction is subject to the
same process of review that is used with a direct domestic invest-
ment [29].
3. OBSTACLES TO A TAKEOVER
Once a foreigner has cleared the hurdle of foreign investment
restrictions, he or she toes the line along with domestic investors.
Issuers may not restrict the transfer of listed shares due to self-
regulation by stock exchanges [30]. There are, however, several
obstacles for an investor, domestic or foreign, to overcome before
gaining control of a target company.
[ 3s9 ]
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A. Tender Offer Legislation
The tender offer provisions in the Securities and Exchange
Law tend to support incumbent management. A buyer must file a
tender offer statement with the Finance Minister and then observe
a ten-day waiting period. During this time, a copy of the state-
ment is sent to the target company [31]. These rules resemble some
state tender offer statutes in the U.S. [32].
B. Stock Exchange Reporting Requirements
If the stock exchange suspects that a buyer is secretly pur-
chasing a substantial number of shares, which might cause extraor-
dinary price movement in a particular stock, the exchange may
require special reporting of such stock. Member firms are then
obliged to report the details of transactions in that stock. When
the exchange deems it necessary, it gives member firms relevant in-
formation about the stock [33]. Thus, it becomes difficult to buy
the stock anonymously.
This rule originated to cope with a maneuver in which a pur-
chaser would acquire a large holding--thereby driving up the price--
and would then try to sell the shares to management at the heighten-
ed price. The buyer's intention to sell rather than to acquire is,
however, hard to prove. Therefore, the rule may be applied in
various situations; and it may often have the effect, perhaps con-
trary to the stock exchange's intent, of tipping the scales in favor
of the incumbent management.
C. Cumulative Voting
Under the Commercial Code, as amended in 1974, cumulative
voting is not mandatory [34], and virtually all corporations have
adopted charter provisions that dispense with it. Thus, it is al-
most impossible for minority shareholders to have representatives
on the board of directors.
D. Qualification of Directors
The former attitude of Japanese management toward foreign par-
ticipation is exemplified by the following case. In 1968, Toyota
Motor Co., Ltd. added a new provision to its charter requiring that
directors and supervisors be of Japanese nationality. A Japanese
shareholder brought an action alleging that the charter amendment
was void, but the district court held that a nationality require-
ment was not unreasonable discrimination in contravention of the
equal protection clause of the constitution. Furthermore, it was
held that such matters should be left to corporate autonomy [35].
The plaintiff did not appeal, and contemporary commentators support-
ed the court's decision. Such discrimination is, however, obviously
inconsistent with the national policy of liberalizing capital move-
ments; and it is doubtful that a court would render the same opinion
today. At any rate, Toyota subsequently deleted the charter provi-
sion in question, and I do not know of any corporation that current-
ly has such a provision.
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4. ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE
The Japanese government is widely known--or notorious--for
its extensive use of so-called "administrative guidance". By means
of this technique the government can attain its policy goals without
explicit statutory authority [36]. This has both advantages and
disadvantages. It insures the governmental flexibility that is
needed for quick response to changing circumstances; and it can
reinforce self-regulation by encouraging each industry to attain
moral standards higher than the statutory minimum. Sometimes the
government avoids coercive measures by issuing warnings or recom-
mendations first, so that an innocent violator may comply without
losing face. By and large, government officials are capable, in-
dustrious, and honest. In most cases they can be relied upon to
select appropriate administrative techniques.
On the other hand, administrative, or non-statutory, guidance
obscures the border between what can be done and what cannot be done.
This results in a low measure of clarity and predictability. It
may happen that the officials in charge are so concerned with their
own regulatory business that they lose a broader perspective. For
example, MITI's [37] administrative guidance could possibly conflict
with the FTC's [38] competition policy [39].
Several years ago, the Hong Kong investor whom I mentioned
earlier tried to purchase a block of shares in a leading paper manu-
facturing company. It was reported that the Securities Bureau of
the Ministry of Finance advised brokers not to accept buy orders
from him [40]. This is one of the shameful examples of administra-
tive guidance. When this investor purchased Katakura shares, how-
ever, the Securities Bureau did not repeat its folly, and I believe
such mistakes will be avoided in the future.
Even with respect to domestic matters, criticism has been
increasing against the official habit of resorting to administrative
guidance [41]. In the context of international business--where for-
eigners are not familiar with this Japanese technique--our govern-
ment should refrain from using administrative guidance. Even the
wise exercise of non-statutory guidance has the potential to evoke
misunderstanding and mistrust.
5. FUTURE POTENTIAL
The new regime that was launched last December attains, both
in form and in substance, a level of liberalization that is consist-
ent with the OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements [42].
The only area open to question is our transitional restriction on
acquisition of controlling ownership. We have to guard against any
unwarranted designation of issuers [431, and we must seek to have
this special restriction discarded as soon as possible.
At the same time, I hope that foreign investors will conduct
adequate investigations before entering the Japanese market. It is
unfortunate and unfair if they regard some of our business practices
as discriminatory just because they are unfamiliar with them. For
instance, the obstacles to a takeover that I have mentioned are not
limited to foreign investors; domestic investors as well find it
difficult to take over an existing enterprise. They face resistance
not only from management, but also from the employees at large.
[361
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Employees regard their jobs as life-long positions and feel as
though they belong to a family. They are likely to be resentful of
an invasion from outside the company; and customers and suppliers
have similar feelings. These facts cannot be altered by legisla-
tion or government policy.
Without a willingness to be integrated into this type of
environment--which takes considerable time--emissaries from abroad,
even with a deep pocket, are not likely to be successful in conduct-
ing continuous business in Japan [44]. 1 hope that the door will
always remain open; so that together, hand in hand in our islands,
we may enjoy the sunshine given by the Goddess of the Sun.
NOTES
[I] For example, the market for soda and other chemical products was
dominated by English and German products until World War I. Toyo Keizai
Shinposha (ed.), Nippon No Kaisha Hyakunenshi (Hundred Years of Japan-
ese companies 196 (1975). Also, when the predecessor of Toshiba Elec-
tric Co. entered the electric bulb market at the beginning of this
century, it could not compete with foreign products and could not
refrain from forming a joint venture with General Electric Co. Seki
(ed.), Toshiba Hyakunenshi (Hundred years of Toshiba Electric Co.)
24-25 (1977). One of the reasons why foreign products dominated
Japanese markets was, in addition to the fact that domestic technolo-
gies were underdeveloped, that Japan did not have the power to fix
tariffs on its own initiative until 1911. 1. Takahashi, Nippon Kindai
Keizai Hattatsushi (Development of Japanese modern economy) 204-218
(1973).
(2] Gaishi ni kansuru Hiritsu, Law No. 163, 1950.
[3] Every foreign investment was dependent upon the validation which was
granted through case-by-case scrutiny by the government. Foreign
Investment Law art. 8 and art. 11.
[41 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Code of
Liberalization of Capital Movements (original 1961). Japan joined
it with several reservations in 1964. See Annex B to the Code.
[5] The Cabinet Decision of June 6, 1967 declared that in certain cate-
gories of industry the competent minister would automatically approve
an application for direct investment in the form of company formation,
if the aggregate foreign holdings did not exceed fifty percent and
certain other requirements were met. The Cabinet Decision of April
27, 1973 (Liberalization of Inward Investment) superseded the earlier
decision and declared that approval of share acquisitions by foreign
investors pursuant to article 11 of the Foreign Investment Law
would be given automatically by the competent minister in accordance
with the OECD Code, except in case of certain categories of industry.
[6] Gaikokukawase ogobi Gaikokubeki Kanrih6, originally Law No. 228,
1949, as amended by Law No. 65, 1979. This amended law [hereinafter
referred to as FECL (Foreign Exchange Control Law)] is appended to




M. Tatsuta / Restrictions on foreign investment: Japan
171 Foreign Exchange Control Order (Gaikokukawase Kanrirei), Cabinet
Order No. 260, 1980 [hereinafter referred to as FEC Order]; Direct
Domestic Investment Order (Tainai Chokusetsutoshi t6 ni kansuru
Seirei), Cabinet Order No. 261, 1980 [hereinafter referred to as
DDI Order]; Direct Domestic Investment Rule (Tainai Chokusetsutashi
t5 ni kansuru Meirei), Prime Minister's Office and other Ministries
Rule No. 1, 1980 [hereinafter referred to as DDI Rule].
181 FECL art. 20 item 5, art. 26 para. 2 items 1 and 3: DDI Order
art. 2 para. 5.
191 FECL art. 22 para. 1 item 3, art. 23 para. 1.
[101 FECL art. 22 para. 1 proviso.
[il The Finance Minister has designated the following firms upon their
application pursuant to FEC Order art. 12 para. 7; Foreign Exchange
Control Rule (Gaikokukawase no kanri ni kansuru Sh6rei), Ministry






















Merrill Lynch International Bank, Inc., Tokyo and Osaka Branches
Vickers, da Costa & Co., Tokyo Branch
Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Japan, Ltd., Tokyo Branch
Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham International, Inc., Tokyo Branch
Kei, Kaisei Gaikokukawase oyobu Gaikokub~eki Kanrih5 no Shika ni tsuite:
Sh~ken kankei o Ch~shin to shite (On enforcement of Amended Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law: focusing upon securities),
33 Kigyo kaikei (Accounting)285 (1981).
[121 FECL art. 23 para. 2 through 8; FEC Rule art. 13.
[131 Gaikokukawase t6 shingikai (Foreign Exchange Council), Yijikisei ni
kansuru kihontekina Kangaekata (Basic policy concerning emergency
control), Dec. 16, 1980.
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[14] FECL art. 26 para. 2 items I and 3; DDI Order art. 2 para 5. "Foreign
investor" is defined by FECL art. 26 para. I and DDI Order art. 2
paras. I and 2.
[15] FECL art. 26 paras. 3 and 4; DDI Order art. 2 paras. 10 through 13; DDI
Rule art. 2 paras. 3 and 4. Fukui (ed.), Atarashii gaikokukawase kanrih5
no kaisetsu (Explanation of the new Foreign Exchange Control Law) 53 (1980).
[16] FECL art. 26 para. 2 items 4 through 7; DDI Order art. 2 para. 6 through
9.
[171 FECL art. 27 paras. I through 4 and 7; DDI Order art. 3.
[181 Tainai Chokusetsut5shi t no Un'y6h~shin ni tsuite (On the policy of
administering direct domestic investments), Cabinet Decision, Dec. 26,
1980.
[19] These industries (as well as retail trade operations) were listed in
Annex I to the Cabinet Decision of April 27, 1973, supra note 5, in order
to indicate that the acquisition of shares of an enterprise, either newly
established or existing, which belongs to any of these industries would
continue to be treated as before, i.e., to be screened on a case-by-case
basis.
[20] FECL Supplementary Provisions art. 2; DDI Order art. 7 paras. 4 and 5.
This restriction applies to acquisition of shares by individual non-
residents, corporations, and other organizations established pursuant to
foreign law or headquartered abroad.
[21] Seki, Foreign Exchange Law; Major Points in the Revision of the Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, 1 Japan Business Law Journal 18
(1980); Fukui, supra note 15, art. 57-58.
[22] See supra note 20.
[23] See supra note 18.
[241] Gaikokukawase oyobi Gaikokubbeki Kanrih6 narabini Tainai Chokuseutst~shi
t-, ni kansuru Seirei no Kitei ni eotozuki Shinsa no Taish5 to subeki Kaisha
ogobi Tokutei no Kaisha ni tsuite tokuni Hitsuyg ga aru to mitomete
sadameru Ritsu o sadameru Ken (Re-designation of corporations subject to
the screening process and designation of ceilings for foreigners' holdings
of shares in certain corporations pursuant to the Foreign Exchange and
Foreign Trade Control Law and the Direct Domestic Investment Order),
Announcement No. 1, 1980, Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Public Welfare;
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery; and Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry.
[25] The designees and respective ceilings are as follows (blanks show that
the ceiling is 25 percent):




Fuji Electric Co. 26
Hitachi Ltd. 30
Tokyo Keiki Co. 32
General Sekiyu K.K. 49
Showa Oil Co. 50
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Designated Issuer Ceiling in Percentage
Mitsubishi Oil Co. 50
Toa Nenryo Kogyo K.K. 50
Koa Oil Co. 50
[26] Nippon Keizai Shimbun (Japan Economic Journal), Feb. 24, 1981, at 15;
id., Mar. 3, 1981, at 2; id., July 3, 1981, at 13; Sh~jih~mu (Commercial
Law Review) No. 899 at 30 (1981).
[27] FECL Supplementary Provisions art. 2 para. 3; DDI Order art. 8 paras. 5
and 6; Ministerial Rule Concerning Confirmation of Stock Acquisitions by
Individual Non-residents and the like (Hikyojiisha dearu Kojin t8 ni yoru
Kabushiki t5 no Shutoku no Kakunin t5 ni Kansuru Shorei), 1inistry of
Finance Rule No. 46, 1980.
[28] FECL Supplementary Provisions art. 3 para. 1; DDI Order art. 8 paras 1
through 4; DDI Rule art. 4.
[29] FECL Supplementary Provisions art. 4 paras. 5 and 6; DDI Order art. 9.
[30] E.g., Tokyo Stock Exchange, Criteria for Stock Listing (Kabuken jojo
shinsa kijun) art. 2 para. 1 item 10; id., Criteria for Delisting of
Listed Stock (Kabuken joj5 haishi kijun) art. 2 para. I item 11.
[311 Securities and Exchange Law (Sh~kentorihikih3), Law No. 25, 1948, as
amended by Law No. 46, 1971, arts. 27-2 and 27-3.
[321 Wilner and Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their
Constitutionality, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 8 notes 37 & 38 (1976).
[33] E.g., Tokyo Stock Exchange, Rule Concerning Stock to be Reported with
Special Requirements (Tokubetsu h~koku meigara ni kansuru Kisoku),
Oct. 11, 1978.
[34] Commercial Code (Shoh5) Law No. 48, 1899, art. 256-3 para. 1. Prior to
the 1974 amendment, cumulative voting was mandatory if holders of one-
quarter of the aggregate outstanding shares requested it.
[35] Ohba v. Toyota Motor Co., Ltd., 22 Kakyi minsh; 549 (Nagoya Dist. Ct.,
Apr. 30, 1971).
[36] The government argues that it has statutory authority in the law stipu-
lating the organization of respective ministries. Reply to the Director,
Legal Bureau of the Cabinet, before the Budget Committee, House of Rep-
resentatives, Mar. 12, 1974, Krsei torihiki, No. 366 at 20 (1981).
[37] Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Tsshosangyosh3).
[38] Fair Trade Commission (Koseitorihiki linkai) in charge of administering
the Law Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of
Fair Trade (Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi kosei torihiki no kakuho ni
kansuru Horitsu), Law No. 54, 1947.
[39] Japan v. Sekiyu Renmei (Ass'n of Oil Refineries) et al., Hanrei jih5 No.
983 at 26 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 26, 1980); Japan v. Idemitsu K6san K.K.
et al., Hanrei jihB No. 985 at 6 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 26, 1980).
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[40] Ky , Honkon no Chosen (Challenge from Hong Kong), Ch d kron, Nov., 1980,
at 266-267.
[411 Yamauchi, Gy6seishido (administrative guidance) 186-196 (1977).
[42] OECD, Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements, Arts. 1, 2, 3, 5,
and 7.
[43] Daiwa Un'yu K.K., a trucking firm, failed to be designated as the twelfth
corporation (supra note 25), due to reluctance on the part of the Finance
Ministry, though the Transportation Ministry supported the company's
position. The Katakura litigation (supra note 26) may have some effects
on the government policy. Nippon Keizai Shiabun (Japan Economic Journal),
June 3, 1981, at 1.
[44] Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of
Representatives, United States-Japan Trade Report, at 16 (Sept. 1980).
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APPENDIX XII
FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND FOREIGN TRADE
CONTROL LAW (FECL)
CHAPTER V DIRECT DOMESTIC INVESTMENTS, ETC.
(Notice, etc., of direct domestic investments, etc.)
Article 26. A "foreign investor" shall mean any one of those mentioned below,
which performs any one of the direct domestic investments, etc., mentioned
in each Item of the next Paragraph:
(1) A natural person who is a non-resident;
(2) A juridical person or other organization established under foreign
legislation, or a juridical person or other organization having its main
office in a foreign country;
(3) A company of which the number of stock or the amount of capital
subscription directly owned by one or more of those mentioned in Item (1)
and/or the preceding Item, and/or the number of stock or the amount of
capital subscription designated by a Cabinet Order as being indirectly
owned by the above-mentioned through another company or other companies,
equal(s) or exceed(s) in the aggregate one-half (1/2) of that company's
total stock issue or total subscribed capital; or
(4) Other than those mentioned in the preceding two Items, a juridical
person or other organization of which a majority number of board members
(which mean directors and other similar posts, which shall apply in this
Item) or board members having representing power is occupied by persons
mentioned in Item (1).
2. A "direct domestic investment, etc." shall mean an act which falls
under any Item below:
(1) Acquisition of any company's stock or share (except for the acquisi-
tion by transfer from any one mentioned in each Item of the preceding
Paragraph, and the acquisition of the stock of companies which is listed
on the stock exchange defined by Article 2, Paragraph 11 of the Securities
and Exchange Law, or the stock of companies which is designated by a
Cabinet Order as being similar to the aforementioned listed one--collec-
tively referred to as "listed companies, etc." in the next Item and Item
(3)--);
(2) Transfer of stock or share(s) of any company other than the listed
companies, etc., which was/were acquired by the transferer prior to his
acquisition of non-resident status and has/have been continuously held
by him up till the time of the transfer (limited to only such transfer
as made by a non-resident natural person to any one mentioned in each
Item of the preceding Paragraph);
(3) Acquisition of stock of any one of the listed companies, etc. (limited
to only such instances whereunder either the ratio of the number of stock
of a given company acquired by a given transaction against that company's
total stock issue, or the aggregate ratio of the total number of stock of a
given company which becomes to be possessed by an acquirer after a given
act of acquisition plus the number of stock of the same company possessed
by the juridical person or other organization designated by a Cabinet
Order as having a special relationship with the acquirer through stock or
share holding or other similar ways against that company's total stock
issue equals or exceeds a ratio determined by a Cabinet Order which shall
be not less than ten-hundredth (10/100));
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(4) Consent given to a substantial alteration of the objective of a com-
pany's business (limited to only such consent as given by one or more
stockholder(s) or shareholder(s) who own(s) in total one-third (1/3) or
more of that company's total stock issue or total subscribed capital);
(5) Establishment of a branch, etc., in Japan, or substantial alteration
of the type or the business objective of a branch, etc., existing in
Japan (limited to only such establishment and alteration as designated
by a Cabinet Order, which is to be made by any one of those mentioned in
Item (1) or (2) of the preceding Paragraph);
(6) Money lending to a juridical person having its main office in Japan
in excess of an amount determined by a Cabinet Order (except for those
lendings made as a business by a bank or other financial institution
designated by a Cabinet Order, and lendings in our currency made by any
one of those mentioned in Item (3) or (4) of the preceding Paragraph), of
which the term exceeds one year; or
(7) Any other act designated by a Cabinet Order as being similar to any
one of those mentioned in each of the preceding Items.
3. Any foreign investor who wants to make a direct domestic investment,
etc., mentioned in any Item of the preceding Paragraph (except for those
cases determined by a Cabinet Order, in consideration of such instances as
inheritance, legacy, amalgamation of juridical persons, etc.) shall give a
prior notice, as a Cabinet Order provides for, to the Minister of Finance
and the Minister(s) in charge of the industry involved of those matters
designated by the Cabinet Order such as the objective of the business, amount,
time of execution, and others concerning that direct domestic investment, etc.
4. Any foreign investor who has given a notice under the provisions of the
preceding Paragraph concerning the direct domestic investment, etc., mentioned
in Paragraph 2 (hereinafter referred to as "direct domestic investment, etc.,")
shall not execute that direct domestic investment, etc., until a pdriod of
thirty (30) days has elapsed, counting from the day of receipt of the notice
by the Minister of Finance and the Minister(s) in charge of the industry in-
volved. However, the Ministers may shorten this period when they deem it not
specifically harmful, judging from the objective of the business, etc., of
the direct domestic investment, etc., under notice.
5. Any person other than a foreign investor (including a juridical person
or other organization, which shall also apply to Paragraph 1 of the next
Article) who performs any transaction or act tantamount to a direct domestic
investment, etc., on behalf of a foreign investor but not in the latter's
name shall be deemed as a foreign investor, and the provisions of the preced-
ing two Paragraphs shall apply to such a person.
(Screening of the conditions of direct domestic investments, etc., and
recommendation of alteration thereof, etc.)
Article 27. When a notice is given to the Minister of Finance and the Minis-
ter(s) in charge of the industry involved under the provisions of Paragraph 3
of the preceding Article (including a notice given by a person other than a
foreign investor who is deemed as a foreign investor under the provisions of
Paragraph 5 of the same Article, which shall also zjiply to the next paragraph
and Paragraph 8), and the Ministers deem it necessary to make an inquiry in
order to determine whether the direct domestic investment, etc., under notice,
if executed, would cause apprehensions as to the occurrence of any of the
consequences mentioned in Item (1) or (2), or whether the direct domestic
investment, etc., under notice falls under Item (3) or (4), the Ministers may
extend the period during which the execution of that direct domestic investment,
etc., is prohibited uD to four (4) months, counting from the day of their re-
ceipt of the notice:
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(1) It might imperil the national security, disturb the maintenance of public
order, or hamper the protection of the safety of the general public;
(2) It might adversely and seriously affect activities of our business
enterprises engaging in a line of business similar or related to the one
to which the direct domestic investment, etc., is to be made, or the
smooth performance of our national economy;
(3) Because it is made by a foreign investor with whose country no treaties
or other international agreements are concluded by our country in regard to
the direct domestic investments, etc., its particulars are required to be
altered, or its execution is required to be suspended, so as to make conditions
substantially equal to those allowed to our national's direct investment ac-
tivities (which mean those tantamount to direct domestic investment, etc.,
mentioned in each Item of Paragraph 2 of the preceding Article) in that
country; or
(4) When seen from its purpose of the use of funds and others, it falls under,
in whole or in part, the capital transactions upon which an obligation to
obtain a license is imposed under the provisions of Article 21, Paragraph 2,
and therefore its particulars are required to be altered, or its execution
is required to be suspended.
2. When a notice is given to the Minister of Finance and the Minister(s) in
charge of the industry involved under the provisions of Paragraph 3 of the pre-
ceding Article, the Ministers deem that, if the direct domestic investment, etc.,
under notice were executed, it would cause apprehensions as to the occurrence
of any one of the consequences mentioned in Item (1) or (2) of the preceding
Paragraph, or that the direct domestic investment, etc., under notice falls un-
der Item (3) or (4) of the same Paragraph, they may, upon hearing the opinion
of the Committee on Foreign Exchange and Other Transactions mentioned in Article
55-2, recommend the party which gave that notice, as a Cabinet Order provides
for, either to alter the particulars of that direct domestic investment, etc.,
or to suspend the execution thereof, provided that such a recommendation is
given within the period mentioned in the same Paragraph, or within the extended
period provided in the next Paragraph, counting from the day of their receipt of
the notice.
3. When the Committee on Foreign Exchange and Other Transactions mentioned
in Article 55-2 is asked for its opinion for the inquiry provided in Paragraph
1, and tenders its intimation that to form its opinion within the period of
four (4) months as provided in the same Paragraph is difficult due to the nature
of the subject matter, the period provided in the same Paragraph during which
the execution of the direct domestic investment, etc., is prohibited shall be-
come five (5) months, irrespective of the provisions of the same Paragraph.
4. The party who is given recommendation under the provisions of Paragraph 2
shall inform the Minister of Finance and the Minister(s) in charge of the in-
dustry involved whether it accedes to the recommendation or not within a period
of ten (10) days, counting from the day of its receipt of the recommendation.
5. The party which has informed its accession to the recommendation under
the provisions of the preceding Paragraph shall execute the direct domestic
investment, etc., concerning the recommendation in accordance therewith.
6. The party which has informed its accession to the recommendation under
the provisions of Paragraph 4 may execute the direct domestic investment, etc.,
concerning the recommendation, before a period of four (4) months (or five (5)
months when the period is extended under the provisions of Paragraph 3) has
elapsed, counting from the day when he gave the notice thereof, irrespective
of the provisions of Paragraph I or Paragraph 3.
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7. When the party which has been given recommendation under the provi-
sions of Paragraph 2 either fails to inform or informs its non-accession
thereto under the provisions of Paragraph 4, the Minister of Finance and the
Minister(s) in charge of the industry involved may direct it to alter the
particulars of the relevant direct domestic investment, etc., or to suspend
the execution thereof, provided that such a directive is served within the
period provided in Paragraph I or the extended period provided in Paragraph 3,
counting from the day of their receipt of the notice thereof.
8. Mhen the Minister of Finance and the Minister(s) in charge of the
industry involved deem that, due to the change of economic situations or any
other reason, apprehensions as to the occurrence of the consequences mentioned
in Item (1) or (2) of Paragraph 1 cease to exist even if the direct domestic
investment, etc., notifed under the provisions of Paragraph 3 of the preceding
Article were executed, or that the direct domestic investment, etc., under
notice ceases to be considered as falling under Item (3) or (4) of the same
Paragraph, they may withdraw, in whole or in part, their recommendation to
alter the particulars of the said direct domestic investment, etc., given
to the party who has informed its accession thereto under the provisions of
Paragraph 4, or their directive to alter such particulars served under the
provisions of the preceding Paragraph.
9. In addition to those provided in each of the preceding Paragraphs,
a Cabinet Order shall provide for the procedures of the recommendation to
alter the particulars of the direct domestic investment, etc., or to suspend
the execution thereof, and other necessary matters concerning the recommenda-
tion.
Supplementary Provisions
(Date of coming into force)
Article 1. The date of the coming into force of this Law shall be determined
article by article by Cabinet Orders, which shall be not later than June 30,
1950.
(Special rules regarding acquisition of stock by non-resident natural
persons, etc.)
Article 2. For the time being, when the Minister of Finance and the Minister(s)
in charge of the industry involved deem it necessary to make an inquiry in
order to determine whether apprehensions as to the occurrence of any of the
below-mentioned consequences might ensure from the possession of certain com-
pany's stock, etc., in excess of a certain quantity (which mean the stock of
the listed companies, etc., mentioned in Article 26, Paragrph 2, Item (1), and
other securities designated by a Cabinet Order, which shall apply hereinafter)
by any non-resident natural person, and/or juridical person or other organiza-
tion established under foreign legislation, and/or juridical person or other
organization having its main office in a foreign country (hereinafter collec-
tively referred to as "non-resident natural persons, etc."), the Ministers
may designate, as a Cabinet Order provides for, certain companies which issue
such stock, etc., as those subject to such an inquiry:
(1) It might imperil the national security, disturb the maintenance of
public order, or hamper the protection of the safety of the general public; or
(2) It might adversely and seriously affect the smooth performance of our
national economy.
2. "The Minister(s) in charge of the industry involved" given in the pre-
ceding Paragraph shall be the one determined by a Cabinet Order as being in
charge of the business being carried out by a company, of which stock, etc.,
is to be acquired as mentioned in the same Paragraph.
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3. "Stock, etc., in excess of a certain quantity" given in Paragraph I
shall mean stock, etc., of a certain company of which the number (in the case
of stock, the number thereof, and in the case of other securities, the number
thereof translated into a stock equivalent in accordance with a formula pro-
vided by a Cabinet Order, which shall apply in this Paragraph) already
possessed by non-resident natural person(s), etc. (including those possessed
by any person--including a juridical person or other organization, which
shall apply hereinafter--other than non-resident natural persons, etc., on
behalf of the latter but not in the latter's name, and excluding those having
been acquired by any non-resident natural person, etc., prior to his acquisi-
tion of non-resident status and continuously possessed thereafter), plus the
number of stock, etc., of the same company to be newly acquired by any non-
resident natural person, etc. (including those to be acquired by a person
other than a non-resident natural person, etc., on behalf of the latter but
not in the latter's name) equals or exceeds a ratio determined by a Cabinet
Order which shall be not less than twentyfive-hundredth (25/100) of that
company's total stock issue.
Article 3. When the designation of companies has been made under the provi-
sions of Paragraph 1 of the preceding Article, and any non-resident natural
person, etc., is to acquire thereafter stock, etc., in excess of the certain
quantity of any one of such designated companies (except for the acquisition
of stock of the listed companies, etc., mentioned in Article 26, Paragraph 2,
Item (3)), he shall, unless a Cabinet Order otherwise provides for, give a
prior notice, as a Cabinet Order provides for, to the Minister of Finance
and the Minister(s) in charge of the industry involved of those matters as
designated by the Cabinet Order such as the quantity of stock, etc., to be
acquired and others, and for such acquisition the provisions of Article 22,
Paragraph 1 shall not apply.
2. Any non-resident natural person, etc., who is to acquire stock, etc.,
of any company designated under the provisions of Paragraph I of the preced-
ing Article shall request the Minister of Finance, as a Cabinet Order pro-
vides for, to confirm whether or not the intended acquisition falls under
the stock, etc., in excess of certain quantity as mentioned in the same
Paragraph.
3. Any non-resident natural person, etc., who has given a notice under
the provisions of Paragraph I concerning his acquisition of stock, etc., in
excess of the certain quantity as mentioned in Paragraph 3 of the preceding
Article, shall not acquire the stock, etc., in excess of the certain quantity,
under notice, until a period of thirty (30) days has elapsed, counting from
the day of receipt of the notice by the Minister of Finance and the Minister(s)
in charge of the Industry involved. However, the Ministers may shorten this
period when they deem it not specifically harmful, judging from the quantity
of the stock, etc., to be acquired in excess of the certain quantity and other
matters mentioned in the notice.
4. When any person other than a non-resident natural person, etc., is to
acquire stock, etc., in excess of the certain quantity on behalf of the latter
but not in the latter's name, the former person shall be deemed as a non-resi-
dent natural person, etc., and the provisions of the preceding three Para-
graphs shall apply to such a person.
5. When a notice is given to the Minister of Finance and the Minister(s)
in charge of the industry involved under the provisions of Paragraph I (in-
cluding a notice given by a person other than a non-resident natural person,
etc., who is deemed as a non-resident natural person, etc., under the provi-
sions of the preceding Paragraph, which shall apply also to the next Paragraph),
and the Ministers deem it necessary to make an inquiry in order to determine
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whether the acquisition of stock, etc., in excess of the certain quantity, if
made, would cause apprehensions as to the occurrence of any consequences men-
tioned in either Item of Paragraph I of the preceding Article, they may extend
the period during which the acquisition thereof is prohibited up to four (4)
months, counting from the day of their receipt of the notice.
6. The provisions of Article 27, Paragraph 2 through Paragraph 7, and
Paragraph 9 shall be applicable mutatis mutandis to the notice given under the
provisions of Paragraph 1, and a Cabinet Order shall provide for the techni-
calities of such mutatis mutandis application.
Article 4. 14hen any person other than a non-resident natural person, etc.,
is to acquire any stock, etc., on behalf of the latter but not in the latter's
name (except for the acquisition of the stock, etc., falling under the provi-
sions of Paragraph 4 of the preceding Article), the former person shall, unless
a Cabinet Order otherwise provides for, give a prior notice to the Minister
of Finance, as a Cabinet Order provides for, of those matters as designated
by the Cabinet Order such as the quantity of the stock, etc., to be acquired
and others.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN HARMONIZATION OF
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
LeRoy J. Herbert
MR. HAWES: We are now going to shift gears a bit and talk
about special legal and accounting problems in multinational activity.
The first talk in that field will be on the harmonization of account-
ing standards, and the second will be about comparative disclosure
and possibilities of harmonization in that area. We should listen
to Roy Herbert's discussion of accounting harmonization in order to
see what it portends for other kinds of harmonization, because cer-
tainly the accountants have been at harmonization efforts as long as
anyone.
1. HARMONIZATION
MR. HERBERT: The issue of harmonization of accounting stand-
ards has received growing attention over the last decade. The pro-
cess has been speeded up by a variety of interest groups, including
(1) The users of financial statements. The impact of many companies
on capital markets, commodity markets, on labor, etc., goes beyond
national borders. Information included in the financial statements
of these companies is, however, of only limited value to users in
other countries if they are not familiar with the accounting standards
underlying these statements.
(2) International and multinational companies operating in several
countries and having their shares quoted on several stock exchanges.
These companies must comply with the different accounting rules and
standards applicable in countries in which they operate, which makes
their financial reporting increasingly difficult and costly.
(3) Groups making efforts to harmonize accounting standards and com-
pany-law in connection with a greater economic and political integra-
tion of a given geographic area, e.g., the EEC.
(4) Other national interest groups in various countries who are pri-
marily interested in more stringent reporting requirements for inter-
national companies, with the objective of exercising more control
over multinational companies.
As you can see from the background material that I have in-
cluded as an Appendix to this Chapter, there are basically two dif-
ferent types of international organizations working to harmonize
accounting standards. First, there are the bodies organized by gov-
ernments, such as the United Nations, the OECD, and the EEC. Second,
there are the international organizations set up by independent pro-
fessional accounting bodies, such as the International Accounting
Standards Committee and the International Federation of Accountants.
I would like to concentrate for the next few moments on the
efforts of, and problems encountered by, the two organizations that
have so far produced the most tangible results: the EEC and the In-
ternational Accounting Standards Committee.
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2. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMJUNITY [EEC]
The EEC is striving to create a common market with a free
flow of capital, labor, and merchandise within its boundaries. In
that context, company-law is being harmonized, and this involves
harmonization of company financial reporting. The vehicles for har-
monization are directives issued by the Council of Ministers to be
incorporated in national laws of the member states. The Fourth
Directive (on company accounts) was promulgated in 1978, and the
Seventh Directive (on consolidated accounts) is in preparation.
These directives have a significant impact on company reporting in
the member states (the Fourth Directive will affect more than 1.5
million companies) and they are a considerable contribution to
harmonization within, and probably outside, the EEC.
At the same time, the directives demonstrate the difficulties
encountered in the harmonization process. It took more than ten
years from the time that the Fourth Directive was first conceived
to its final approval. In order to achieve agreement between member
states on a number of issues, options had to be allowed to member
states in enacting their national legislation and also certain op-
tions were left to companies. With such wide latitude given, the
Fourth Directive is more of a guideline than an agreed standard.
The directive had to accept the fact that in some member states,
financial statements are influenced by tax considerations, since in
those countries taxation is based on statutory accounts. Further-
more, the Fourth Directive does not deal with all accounting issues,
especially in the field of measurement. For example, there is
nothing specific in it on translation of foreign currencies, on ac-
counting for the effects of changing prices, or on deferred taxation.
It is expected that with the passage of time the gaps will
be filled and the options will gradually be reduced. For the time
being, however, financial statements of companies operating in dif-
ferent countries in Europe will still differ significantly. As an
example, the proposed new national accounting legislation in Germany,
resulting from the Fourth Directive, is likely to leave German com-
panies out of line with other European and international practices
in several key areas. (1) German company accounts will continue to
incorporate tax-based rather than commercial valuations. (2) Con-
solidation will continue to be required on a domestic basis only,
although this will change when legislation to comply with the EEC's
Seventh Directive is introduced. (3) It is expected that Germany
will continue to adopt a hostile approach to any form of accounting
for changing prices, and the government will not propose the enabl-
ing legislation which would make inflation accounting compatible
with the Fourth Directive.
3. INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COmMITTEE [IASC]
Compared to the EEC the IASC has undertaken an even bigger
task--the harmonization of accounting standards on a worldwide basis.
The IASC was formed in 1973 by the leading accounting bodies of ten
countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, The
Netherlands, the U.K., Ireland, and the U.S. Today it represents
fifty-nine professional accounting bodies in forty-seven countries.
Its objectives are "to formulate and publish, in the public interest,
standards to be observed in the presentation of audited financial
statements and to promote their worldwide acceptance."
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So far the IASC has issued thirteen Accounting Standards and
six Exposure Drafts. A number of additional topics are presently
under study. The standards are similar in format to the pronounce-
ments issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB] here
in the U.S., and they cover topics such as inventories, consolida-
tion, contingencies, and income taxes. Due to the variety of ac-
cepted accounting treatments worldwide, the international standards
are, in general, broadly phrased and they allow options, i.e., dif-
ferent treatments for the same type of transactions.
Options are considered necessary in order to account for
differences in economic conditions and for differences in national
objectives for financial reporting around the world. Obviously,
when options are allowed they reduce the degree of uniformity in
financial reporting. As a result, the International Accounting
Standards [IAS] represent an attempt to find common ground among
national standards in areas where the standards of reporting are
already highly developed, as opposed to an effort to standardize
financial reporting. The degree of harmonization greatly depends
on the degree of compliance with the IAS.
In this regard it is important to consider the authority of
the IAS. Within each country local regulations govern, to a greater
or lesser degree, the issue of financial statements. The IAS pro-
mulgated by the IASC do not override these local regulations. The
IASC pronouncements are somewhat in the nature of recommendations
and lack direct or supranational authority.
It was realized when the IASC was established that the IAS
could not be imposed with the authority of law or of professional
requirements; but it was hoped that compliance could be achieved by
IASC member bodies influencing the business community. IASC member
bodies committed themselves to the support of the IAS, to the use
of their best endeavors in persuading all parties concerned that
financial statements should comply with international standards, and
to the requirement that auditors report non-compliance in their opin-
ions. It now appears that these pressures are insufficient. The
IASC has realized that compliance with its standards is, in fact,
poor.
There are a number of reasons for these unsatisfactory results.
In some countries the profession is not, or is no longer, in control
of the standard-setting process--the FASB for example is not a member
of the IASC. In other countries the professional body has no power
to prescribe what auditors should state in their opinion; and in yet
other countries, auditors are not allowed to say anything in their
opinions beyond what is required by law. So the road is obviously
more difficult than it was thought to be in 1973.
In an effort to improve its standing and to increase the level
of compliance with its pronouncements, the IASC has approached the
U.N. and the OECD with a suggestion for greater cooperation in the
area of standard setting. In addition, the IASC is trying to in-
crease its liaison with national standard-setting bodies, and it is
calling on business interests, in particular the international and
multinational companies, to give more support to the work of the
IASC by making reference to compliance with the IAS in their annual
reports.
One result of the IASC's work which should be mentioned is
that many developing countries that have no established profession
and no standards of their own are adopting the IAS as a national
standard. The harmonization of accounting standards in these areas
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is a significant step forward, but in the final analysis, full com-
pliance with the IAS can be achived only if (1) the various profes-
sional bodies in the industrialized countries of the world give
active support to the quest for international harmonization of
accounting standards, (2) governments support the recommendations
of the professional bodies and initiate the necessary legal changes,
and last but not least, (3) the IAS enjoy the support of the inter-
national business community.
4. FOREIGN CURRENCY TRANSLATION
I have identified certain of the efforts made so far and the
problems encountered by some of the organizations active in harmoniz-
ing accounting standards. Next, I would like to discuss the latest
developments and some open questions relating to an important and
controversial accounting issue: foreign currency translation.
Recent developments concerning foreign currency translation
can serve as a good example of a truly international effort to
speed up the harmonization process in a controversial area. In the
U.S., the FASB has had its statement FASB No. 8 under review for the
past two years. Since FASB No. 8 was issued in 1975, the statement
has been criticized both by management of U.S. companies and by the
accounting profession. Although some accountants believe FASB No. 8
is technically sound, many believe it produces unrealistic results.
Without going into technical details, FASB No. 8 is based on
the temporal method, which uses a mixture of historical and current
exchange rates for the translation of assets, liabilities, income,
and expense items of foreign-based operations. The underlying as-
sumption for the use of a mixture of exchange rates is that the unit
of measurement for the performance of foreign-based operations is
the currency of the ultimate reporting entity, i.e., the U.S. dollar.
As a result, in times of widely fluctuating exchange rates the per-
formance of a foreign-based operation measured in U.S. dollars may
show unsatisfactory results, although the performance reflected in
the local (foreign) currency financial statements is exceptionally
good--or vice versa.
During the time the FASB had its statement No. 8 under recon-
sideration, the U.K. and Canadian institutes were also considering
the issuance of standards on the subject. In 1980 a number of meet-
ings were held among the FASB and the U.K. and Canadian institutes
in order to exchange views on developments in each country and to
explore ways to achieve a degree of harmonization in the standards
to be published in each country. These meetinqs and what followed
marked a significant step forward toward achieving international har-
monization. It was the first time, to my knowledge, that the stand-
ard-setting bodies of these three countries (as contrasted with the
IASC) had met with the objective of arriving at a common standard.
The exposure drafts that were issued by the FASB and the U.K.
Accounting Standards Committee in October 1980 demonstrated this
intention to agree. These two proposals are considered to be similar
in all important aspects, although there are some material differ-
ences in the exceptions provided by the two drafts. Both drafts
require the current-rate method; and for the U.S. this would be a
revolutionary change from the presently applicable temporal method
under FASB No. 8.
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Canada and Ireland are presently holding back on issuance of
standards, awaiting the outcome of these proposals in the U.S. and
the U.K. Should the U.S. and U.K. approve the proposed statements,
the current-rate method would, in all probability, also be used by
other countries influenced by the U.K. and the U.S.
5. THE INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING FIRMS
I shall close with a few remarks about the modus operandi of
the major international accounting firms and about the role they can
play in the process of harmonizing accounting standards. With their
experience in the multinational environment, members of these firms
can and do make significant contributions, either by participating
in or by commenting on the work of various organizations active in
the field of harmonization. In order to maintain a high profession-
al standard throughout their worldwide practice, these firms encour-
age their clients to adopt the highest standards for accounting and
reporting procedures in their financial statements. In certain
areas or countries where such standards are not stringent, however,
the influence of the international accounting firms is limited.
The international financial press has suggested that inter-
national firms should contribute to the upgrading of accounting and
reporting standards by not allowing their names to be associated,
without qualification, with financial statements that do not meet
certain minimum standards. In my view this suggestion is not fea-
sible or practical because the firms cannot and should not attempt
to move themselves into a quasi standard-setting position. Setting
of standards is clearly the responsibility of the professional or
governmental accounting bodies in the various countries--not that of
the accounting firms themselves.
Furthermore, international firms cannot easily step out of
line with the legal and professional requirements of the country
where the financial statements are being drawn up. They are bound
to observe the accounting and reporting standards required in each
country. Where there is an established local profession, the in-
ternational firms are normally members of this group, and they must
follow its conventions. A deterioration in relations with the local
profession could result in jeopardizing a firm's right to practice
in the country or to practice in its own name.
The international firms can and will continue to make their
contributions to the harmonization process by participating in
various organizations, by rendering their professional expertise,
and by using their best efforts to encourage their clients to do
more on a voluntary basis.
MR. HAWES: The New York Stock Exchange says there are three
hundred companies worldwide that would comply with its alternate
listing standards. Using those standards, would investors (and I
am talking of sophisticated analysts) have a problem comparing those
three hundred companies today--any significant problem?
MR. HERBERT: If those companies are audited by what I refer
to as one of the major international firms, the investors would not
have a problem. I am not denigrating my professional colleagues in
other countries. We have different standards; it is as simple as
that. But if the audit is performed according to some local account-
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ing systems in those foreign countries, I strongly suggest that in-
vestors should look very, very carefully at what is taking place.
Let me give you an example, without naming the country be-
cause their representative is here and I do not want to get in any
trouble. We want to continue our practice in that country. A very,
very major company--by any standard--employed us to perform an audit
in one of the highly industrialized countries of the world because
they were considering issuing securities through the Frankfurt mar-
ket. We spent an enormous amount of time trying to do this engage-
ment.
We came down to a relatively simple item called depreciation
and we said, "Fellows, you have to take depreciation. That is the
name of the game."
And they said, "Well, we had a bad year. Next year we are
going to have a terrific year, and then you can take five times as
much depreciation, but you cannot take it this year."
Now, I am not kidding when I tell you that we spent over
seventy hours in partner time with the top management of this firm,
trying to convince them that they had to take depreciation. In the
final analysis we said, "If we cannot do it, then we are going to
back off this engagement. We will not go ahead." That is the only
way we got it done.
These were highly sophisticated businessmen in their own
community. They truly believed what they said, because that is the
way it is done locally. They thought we were out of our minds,
telling them that they must further depress earnings by putting in
this crazy thing called depreciation.
MR. HAWES: We will let Steve Friedman have the next question.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Granted the problems with harmonization, is
there a middle ground that would make financial statements prepared
in different countries with somewhat different conceptual systems
useful to investors without a full re-statement? Is there a way to
develop an explanation of differences in accounting treatment that
would help investors interpret financial statements prepared in a
different system, or are we on a thousand year journey?
MR. HERBERT: It may not be a thousand years, but it is a
long journey. The IASC is trying to do what you are describing.
But think about it in reverse. Think about explaining LIFO inven-
tories and its ramifications to people in a foreign country who
never heard of LIFO and do not have the slightest clue as to what
LIFO means. That is a difficult task. The financial press would
say it is simple: you can easily explain a thing like that. I
very much disagree with their position. But to answer your question
directly, I think what you have described--that middle ground--is
the best we can hope for in any short-range period.
[3781
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APPENDIX XIII-A
ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVE IN SETTING INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
United Nations (UN)
For many years the UN has been active in the field of international
accounting. An intergovernmental working group of experts was established in
May 1979. This group is composed of 34 representatives from the following areas:
African States, 9 members; Asian States, 7 members; Latin American States, 6
members; Western European and Other States (including the United States), 9 mem-
bers; and Eastern European States, 3 members. The group was directed to research
further steps to be taken in the field of international standards of accounting
and reporting and to formulate priorities. A report to the Commission on Trans-
national Corporations is due in May 1981.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
The OECD, which is based in Paris, is the world's largest group of in-
dustrialized countries and comprises 19 European countries, the United States,
Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Participation in this organization
is restricted to government representatives.
Based on the recommendations of a previous ad hoc working group, the
OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises
established an apparently permanent working group on accounting standards.
International business and labor interests, the IASC, and the Group of European
Accountants are asked to participate in the work of this working group through
regular consultations. The objective of this group is to seek ways to energize
existing activities in setting international accounting standards.
European Economic Community (EEC)
Based on a statement of the Council of Ministers of the EEC, one of
the aims of the common market's industrial policy is the creation of a unified
business environment. This involves the harmonization of company law and
taxation, and the creation of a community capital market. The Fourth Direc-
tive of the EEC Commission provides the framework for a common standard of
accounting and reporting. It requires adoption by the EEC member countries
by 1982.
A revised Seventh Directive dealing with consolidated financial state-
ments was recently proposed. Approval of this Directive by the Commission is
expected in 1981.
African Accounting Council (AAC)
The AAC was formed by 27 African countries in June 1979. Its objectives
are to assist in the establishment of bodies entrusted with accounting standardi-
zation in African countries and to promote and carry out studies in the field
of accounting standardization. This organization is still in the formative stage.
Asian Federation of Accountants (AFA)
The AFA was formed during 1977 jointly by the accountancy bodies of
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The objective
of this organization is to improve professional standards in South East Asia.
In 1979 the first in a series of accounting standards was issued by the Federa-
tion. These standards deal with fundamental accounting principles.
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International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)
The IFAC is an organization of world accountancy bodies engaged in
developing international auditing, educational, and ethical guidelines.
International accounting standards are now issued by the International
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), an organization independent of the
IFAC. There is a possibility that IFAC and the IASC may merge and it is for
this reason that IFAC is included in this summary.
IFAC was formed in 1977 and started its operations in 1978. At January
1981, the membership of IFAC comprised 76 accountancy bodies in 58 countries.
The Federation has formed committees on the subjects of auditing, education,
ethics, management accounting, planning, regional organizations, and a com-
mittee to organize the 1982 International Congress in Mexico. The Auditing
Practices Committee of the Federation has been authorized by the Council to
issue guidelines on international auditing matters.
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC)
The IASC was formed in 1973 by the leading accounting bodies of
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, The Netherlands, the
United Kingdom and Ireland, and the United States. The Committee represents
59 professional accountancy bodies in 47 countries. Its business is conducted
by a board consisting of two representatives of each of the nine founder mem-
bers and two representatives each from not more than two other member bodies.
The IASC has the responsibility and authority to issue, in its own name, pro-
nouncements on International Accounting Standards.
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APPENDIX XIII-B
SUMMARY OF STATEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND
EXPOSURE DRAFTS ISSUED BY THE IASC AS OF JANUARY 1, 1981
International Accounting Standards
1. Disclosure of accounting policies
2. Valuation and presentation of inventories in the context of the
historical cost system
3. Consolidated financial statements
4. Depreciation accounting
5. Information to be disclosed in financial statements
6. Accounting responses to changing prices
7. Statement of changes in financial position
8. Unusual and prior period items and changes in accounting policies
9. Accounting for research and development activities
10. Contingencies and events occurring after the balance sheet date
11. Accounting for construction contracts
12. Accounting for taxes on income
13. Presentation of current assets and current liabilities
Exposure Drafts
14. Accounting for foreign transactions and translation of foreign
financial statements
15. Reporting financial information by segment
16. Accounting for retirement benefits in the financial statements of
employers
17. Information reflecting the effects of changing prices
18. Accounting for property, plant and equipment in the context of the
historical cost system
19. Accounting for leases
Other Topics Under Consideration
The following additional topics are presently under study by the IASC.
Exposure drafts have, however, not yet been issued on these subjects.
Accounting for Business Combinations
Revenue Recognition
Accounting for Interest Costs
Disclosures in Financial Statements of Banks
(Discussion paper issued)
Accounting for Government Grants
Related Party Transactions
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APPENDIX XIII-C
COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS WITH ACCOUNTING
RULES AND PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE IN CERTAIN MAJOR PRACTICE AREAS
AROUND THE WORLD
The following comparison has been prepared in order to identify contro-
versial issues between the IAS and local rules and principles. It has been
restricted to situations in which financial statement prepared in accordance
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Provisions of the Fourth
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MR. HAWES: Continuing our previous theme, the special legal
and accounting problems in multinational activity, we now take on
the other half of the disclosure question--the legal concepts. Bob
Pozen will talk primarily about other disclosure aspects and the in-
ternational developments in that area.
MR. POZEN: We should begin by recognizing that the disclo-
sure requirements in the U.S. are higher (or some would say more
burdensome) than the disclosure requirements in most other countries,
with a few exceptions which I will touch upon later. Thus, as a
practical matter when we talk about the international harmonization
of disclosure requirements, there are really only two possibilities:
first is that the U.S. will make some accommodations in its disclo-
sure requirements; and second is that other countries will signifi-
cantly increase their disclosure requirements.
1. RECENT HARMONIZATION INITIATIVES IN THE U.S.
Let us begin by looking at the SEC's willingness to make
accommodations in U.S. disclosure requirements for foreign issuers.
Within the last few years, the SEC has shown considerable flexibili-
ty in this area. As many of you know, in Form 20-F the SEC evolved
new standards for annual reporting by foreign issuers [1]. In so
doing, the SEC made four main accommodations for foreign issuers.
A. SEC Form 20-F
The first is allowing foreign issuers to use their own finan-
cial statements, but then requiring them to disclose the material
differences between those financial statements and generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP], if any. This goes to what Steve Fried-
man was suggesting. The SEC has stated that it is not going to re-
quire, at least in Form 20-F, every foreign issuer to use GAAP;
rather, such issuers can use whatever financial statements they want
and then explain as clearly as possible any material differences.
A second major innovation in Form 20-F was on segment report-
ing, where the SEC allowed a modified version of segment reporting
by foreign issuers--on a revenue basis only--plus a discussion of any
material difference in the respective contributions of profits and
revenues by segment. This recognized that in most countries the type
of segment reporting we have in the U.S. is not required.
A third area of accommodation in Form 20-F was management re-
muneration. There the SEC allowed aggregated disclosure rather than
the type of detailed disclosure for individual executives that is
required for executives of American issuers [2].
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The fourth main area was interested transactions. There the
SEC said, basically, that a foreign issuer must disclose to the SEC
what it is required to disclose by foreign law or exchange rules or
otherwise. But if it is not required to disclose very much by those
other rules, the SEC will not independently require that the foreign
issuer follow the disclosure rules on interested transactions that
apply to American domestic issuers.
B. 1933 Act Disclosure
More recently than Form 20-F--in the ABC release [3] and the
other releases that are part of the integration program--the SEC
has begun what is probably an even more important look at foreign
issuers, from the viewpoint of disclosure requirements of the Secu-
rities Act of 1933. While 20-F, in addition to being an annual
report form, is called a registration form, this is somewhat mis-
leading. In fact 20-F is only a registration form under the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 with respect to listing on an exchange.
When most of us think of registration forms, we think of registration
forms for 1933 Act filings. If special 1933 Act registration forms
for foreign issuers are to be adopted, they will be developed as an
outgrowth of these integration releases.
The SEC has historically taken a somewhat stricter view to-
wards disclosure in the 1933 Act context than in the 1934 Act con-
text, on the theory that the 1933 Act filing is a very special event
on which investors will focus. But it is probably true that the
1934 Act disclosure documents, such as Form 20-F, have a greater
impact on investors than the 1933 Act documents. The 1934 Act docu-
ments, the annual and periodic reports, affect all the trading in a
stock over a significant period of time, while the 1933 Act disclo-
sure documents affect only the people who are buying in that partic-
ular offering or trading during a very limited time period. Thus,
it is hoped that the SEC will use the four accommodations in Form
20-F that I just mentioned as models for similar accommodations in
the forms that are evolved under the 1933 Act for foreign issuers.
As part of the same ABC release, the SEC will be deciding in
which situations Form A can be used by foreign issuers . Form A is
going to be the approximate equivalent of the existing Form S-16 and
will allow a high degree of incorporation by reference rather than
require additional disclosures in the prospectus.
In the ABC release, the SEC suggested that Form A will be
available to any foreign issuer that voluntarily files 10-Ks, 8-Ks,
and all other disclosure documents that American issuers are filing.
It seems clear that if a foreign issuer voluntarily files the same
reports as a domestic issuer, the foreign issuer should be entitled
to use Form A on the same terms as a domestic issuer. However, that
is a somewhat limited approach and the SEC should be willing to go
further. Most important, those foreign issuers that are now filing
Form 20-F should be able to piggyback the Form 20-F in 1933 Act fil-
ings, just as the domestic issuers will be piggybacking 10-Ks in
their 1933 Act filings. As long as the foreign issuer is actively
traded on an exchange or on NASDAQ, it should be receiving a high
degree of exposure and investor attention. If the SEC accepts the
basic principles of the efficient markets theory, which underlies
the integration approach, the SEC should be willing to require less
in the way of 1933 Act documents for foreign issuers that are ac-
tively trading on well developed markets and filing Form 20-Fs.
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C. Shelf Registration
Another important development at the SEC, which has not re-
ceived as much attention as the ABC release, is the SEC's proposal
on shelf registration. This is contained in proposed Rule 462A [4].
It is tucked away in the proposals for revisions to the disclosure
guides that were issued during the last few months. The proposal
on its face would allow private foreign issuers as well as foreign
governmental issuers to use shelf registration. This would be an
extremely useful development for foreign issuers which, as discussed
by previous speakers, face very fast-moving time constraints.
As proposed, shelf registration would be available to foreign
issuers even if they have not yet begun to trade actively in the
U.S. I hope the SEC will continue to take a liberal view towards
that group of foreign issuers; at the very least, the SEC should
recognize that there are a number of foreign issuers that are larger
than foreign governments which are now allowed to use shelf regis-
tration [5]. Although such large foreign issuers may not yet have
traded in the U.S., they should be given some preferential treatment
because of the likelihood that their securities are followed in the
U.S. and that there is fairly decent disclosure about their activi-
ties already available in the marketplace.
2. INCREASE IN DISCLOSURE STANDARDS ABROAD
A. Sixth Directive of the EEC
Turning to the second possible approach--that is, reaching
harmonization through an increase in disclosure standards of other
countries--the most significant development within the last few
years has been the adoption of the Sixth Directive by the European
Economic Community. This directive applies to initial offerings of
securities that are immediately thereafter listed on exchanges in
the EEC [6].
in Appendix XIV-A at the end of this Chapter, there is a
detailed comparison of the Form 20-F requirements with the EEC re-
quirements in the Sixth Directive. What is striking is the large
number of similarities between these two sets of requirements. If
other countries move toward the requirements of Form 20-F and the
EEC's Sixth Directive, there would be a tremendous narrowing of the
significant differences in international disclosure requirements.
B. Proposed EEC Directive on Disclosures to Employees
Indeed, in one area of disclosure the EEC is considering much
more extensive requirements than those of the SEC: disclosures re-
lating to the interests of employees as opposed to stockholders.
Appendix XIV-C comprises a recent EEC proposal that would require
semi-annual reporting of multinational firms--including American-
based firms with subsidiaries in the EEC--to employees on a broad
range of subjects (7]. There is an especially interesting proposal
with regard to the duty of the firm to inform employees forty days
in advance of any decision to merge or sell all its assets. The
proposal contemplates that if there is a "substantial effect on the
interests of its workers," they will have the opportunity to consult
and meet with management.
(3941
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol3/iss3/1
R. C. Pozen / Intenzational securities markets
It is unclear, however, what happens after workers and manage-
ment meet if they do not reach an agreement. This proposal, I should
add, has been severely criticized by some international groups, in-
cluding the International Chamber of Commerce; and it is by no means
certain that it will be adopted. But I think it is an important
disclosure proposal worthy of attention and study.
C. Minimum Standards
There have also been other attempts to evolve certain univer-
sal or international disclosure standards. These have occurred at
the United Nations and at other international institutions. Most of
these attempts have been aimed at establishing what I would call
minimum standards: that is, every country should refuse to allow
any issuer to list or offer securities unless specified minimum
standards are met.
In my view, however, the minimum standard approach seems mis-
guided. In essence, minimum standards threaten to drive small and
medium sized companies out of domestic markets. If minimum standards
are set at levels that are reasonable from the viewpoint of an in-
ternational securities market, countries may find that most of their
small and medium sized issuers do not meet these standards. But
these issuers are not the ones that have any interest in using the
international securities markets. Therefore, it seems misguided to
evolve minimum international standards where the issuers primarily
affected are those without any role in the international securities
market.
D. World Class Securities
I suggest that in the future we try to aim any international
standards at the much more limited class of issuers with an interest
in, and a possibility of going into, the international securities
markets [8]. In that regard, we might designate a subcategory of
issuers as world class issuers, and we could spend some time think-
ing about what should be the appropriate standards for designating
companies as belonging to that class. For example, what should be
the appropriate number of shareholders? How closely should these
issuers be follwed by analysts? What types of reports should they
be making, and to whom?
If we evolve standards for identifying world class issuers,
we would in effect be saying that this class of very large, well
seasoned, and closely followed companies should automatically be
listed on any exchange in the world and should have available to it
a very short form registration for primary offerings in any market.
It would be much more fruitful to focus on this class of internation-
ally interested issuers and to help them go in and out of all the
different markets in the world than to set up minimum standards that
actually affect issuers with no international interest.
But I would hasten to add that if we move toward the concept
of world class securities, and if certain issuers have securities
traded on markets in a number of countries, we would then run into
a number of practical and regulatory problems associated with trading
in multiple markets--like the problems in the U.S. caused by certain
securities being traded on regional markets and also in New York.
If we had a truly international securities market in which the same
security is traded in five different countries, we would have to deal
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with problems like best execution. Since we have struggled so long
with best execution in the U.S., we can just imagine how much more
difficult this problem would be on a worldwide basis. I think some
of the other speakers will address the problems that have already
developed as a result of multiple markets in the international se-
curities area.
NOTES
(1] Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,371, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,132 (1979).
[2] See also Securities Act Release No. 6157, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,130 (1979).
[3) Securities Act Release No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693 (1980). The SEC
recently issued another series of releases dealing with disclosure
integration which, among other things, reproposed three basic 1933 Act
registration statement forms, now designated Forms S-1, S-2 and S-3.
See Securities Act Release Nos. 6331-6338, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,901-42,057
(1981).
[4) Securities Act Release No. 6276, 46 Fed. Reg. 78 (1981). Rule 462A
was recently reproposed in Securities Act Release No. 6334, 46 Fed. Reg.
42,001 (1981).
(5] Securities Act Release No. 6240, 45 Fed. Reg. 61,609 (1980).
[6] 80/390/EEC, 03 No. L 100, 17.4.80. On January 13, 1981, a proposed
directive was issued concerning the requirements for a prospectus to
be published when securities are offered for subscription or sale to
the public, OJ No. C 355, 31.12.80, p. 39. The disclosure requirements
contained in this proposal are, in general, equivalent to those con-
tained in the Sixth Directive.
(7] EEC Commission, Proposal for Informing and Consulting the Employees
of Undertakings with Complex Structures in Particular Transnational
Undertakings (Oct. 1, 1980), infra at 218. This proposed directive
is known as the Vredeling Proposal.
(8] See Pozen, Disclosure and Trading in an International Securities Market,
15 Int. Lawyer 84 (1981).
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APPENDIX XIV-A
Author: Douglas W. Hawes
COMPARISON OF SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF SEC FORM 20-F & THE EEC's SIXTH DIRECTIVE
ANNEXES A (SHARES) AND B (DEBT)




b) Jurisdiction of Incorporation
c) Address of Principal Executive
Office
d) Title of Class of Securities
Registered
e) Exchange on which Registered,
if any
Page 2
a) Indicate number of outstanding




A 314a* Registry Number
A 313* Legislation under which company
operates and legal form
A 311 Registered office and principal
administrative establishment,
if different
A 21 Indication whether shares are al-
ready public
A 22 Information concerning shares
A 221 Nature of the issue and amount
thereof and resolutions relative
thereto
A 241 Description of shares
A 225* Stock exchange or exchanges on
which admission is or will be
sought (see also A 21)
A 244* Stock exchanges on which already
listed or
A 245* traded but not listed
A 32 Capital
A 321* Amount of subscribed capital
A 322 Amount of unissued capital, under-
takings to increase capital,
categories of persons having pre-
emptive rights, terms and condi-
tions relating to the above
A 323 Classes of stock not representing
capital
A 323a* Amount of convertible securities
and warrants and conditions
thereof
A 324 Conditions in Charter governing
changes in capital and rights if
more stringent than law
A 325 Summary of operations in last three
years that have changed the capi-
tal stock
A 328* Amount of stock of issuer held by
itself or subsidiary if not shown
separately on balance sheet
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Form 20-F
b) Indicate whether registrant has
been filing reports with the
SEC
Item I: Description of Business
a) Year Organized
b) Bankruptcy, if any




d) Any material change in mode of
conducting business
e) Principal products and services
f) Breakdown of total sales and
revenue (5 years) by categories
of activity and into geographic
markets. If profit contribution
of any category materially dif-
ferent, identify and discuss;
but need not give actual operat-
ing profit if not required by
foreign law
g) New products
h) Research and development expendi-
tures for last two years
i) Describe distinctive aspects of
registrant's operations and
industry





A 512 If more than nine months has elaps-
ed since the end of the fiscal
year in which the financials have
been published, an interim state-
ment covering at least the first
six months shall be included
A 314* Indication of company's purpose
and reference to Charter
A 312* Date of incorporation and length
of life except where indefinite
A 325 Summary of capital stock changes
in last three years
A 325 (See above)
A 411* Description of activities, indi-
cating any new ones
A 417 Where information in 411-416 has
been influenced by exceptional
factors, so state
A 411 Description of main categories of
products manufactured and sold
and/or services performed; also
new products
A 413 Breakdown of net turnover during
the past three years by categories
of activity and into geographical
markets ("homogenous activity
which contributes significantly
to turnover shall be considered a
separate category of activity" -
Council minutes)
B 413 Net turnover for two years (for
debt issue)
A 411 See above (also 43 below)
A 43 Information concerning policy on
research and development over past
three years where significant
A 417 Where the information in 411-416 is
influenced by exceptional factors,
so state
(See 417 above)
A 42* Summary information regarding tha
extent to which the company is
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Form 20-F
n) Cyclicality
a) Energy and raw material supply
No comparable 20-F requirement
No comparable 20-F requirement
No comparable 20-F requirement
Item 2: Management's Discussion and
Analysis of Statements of
Income
No comparable requirement; but
projections now permitted by
Rule 175
Item 3: Description of Property
a) Description of plants, mines,
etc. and basis of ownership
(fee, lease, etc.)
Item 4: Control of Registrant
a) Whether registrant is controlled
by another corporation or
government
Sixth Directive
A 44a Information on any significant in-
terruptions in the company's
business in the recent past
A 45 Average numbers employed by main
business activity and changes
over last three years, if material
A 46 Investment policy
A 461 Description of main investments made
in other companies over past three
years and current year
A 462 Principal investment made other
than in other companies (geogra-
phic distribution and method of
financing)




The company's recent development
and prospects
Except as waived by the competent
authority, general information
and the trend of the company's
business since the end of the
last fiscal year
A 72* Except as waived by the competent
authority, information on the
company's prospects for at least
the current financial year
A 415* Location and size of the company's
principal establishments (those
accounting for 10% of turnover or
production) and summary information
about real estate owned
A 416* For mining, etc., description of
deposits, reserve estimates, eco-
nomic conditions, etc.
A 417* (See above)
A 326 As far as known to company, the
natural or legal persons who, di-
rectly, or indirectly, severally
or jointly, exercise or could ex-
ercise control over the company.
Particulars of the proportion of
capital held by the above persons
giving the right to vote
A 327* If company is part of a group, a
description of group and company's
position
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Form 20-F
b) If voting securities are in
registered form, list owners
of 10% or more and give
holdings
c) Describe arrangements known to
registrant which may, at a sub-
sequent date, result in a
change of control
Item 5: Directors and officers
Item 6: Remuneration of Directors
and Officers
a) Aggregate remuneration of
officers and directors as
a group
b) Pension, retirement plans, etc.
for officers and directors.
If individual information is
published elsewhere, include
that
Item 7: Options to Purchase
a) Securities from registrant or
subsidiaries
Item 8: Pending Legal Proceedings
a) Describe material pending legal
proceedings including the name
of the court or other forum,
date instituted, parties, al-
leged factual basis and relief
sought; also include legal pro-
ceedings known to be contemplated
by governmental authorities
Sixth Directive
A 326a Insofar as known to the company,
list of shareholders who, direct-
ly or indirectly hold a percent
which the member states can fix
at not more than [20%]
A 326 (See above)
A 61 Names, addresses and functions in
the company and principal activi-
ties performed by them outside the
company where significant of fol-
lowing persons:
A 611 members of the administrative, man-
agement or supervisory bodies
A 612 general partners in the case of a
limited partnership with share
capital
A 613 founders if the company less than
five years old
A 61 Interests of the directors, etc.
in the company
A 621 Remuneration paid and benefits in
kind to members of administrative,
management, and supervisory bodies
by group; includes remuneratioa
from other companies in a group
(see 56 relative to a dominant
company in a group)
A 622 Total number of company shares held
by the above and options granted
to them
A 63 Schemes for involving staff in the
capital of the company
A 622 (See above)
A 322 Subscription options granted, cate-
gories of persons having such
rights, and terms and arrangements
relating thereto
A 63 Schemes for involving staff in the
capital of the company
A 44* Information on any legal or arbitra-
tion proceedings which may have
or have had a significant effect
on the company's financial posi-
tion in the recent past
[400]
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Form 20-F
Item 9: Nature of Trading Market
a) Describe nature and extent of
principal non-U.S. and U.S.
trading markets
Item 10: Capital Stock to be
Registered
a) Outline dividend, liquidation,
pre-emptive and conversion
rights, redemption and sink-
ing fund provisions, and
assessability
b) If rights of shareholders may be
modified otherwise than by
vote of majority
c) State whether or not any restric-
tion on repurchase of shares
while dividend or sinking fund
in arrears
Sixth Directive
A 225 Stock exchange or exchanges on
which listing is sought
A 243 Respective dates on which shares
will be listed on or dealt in
A 244 If shares of the same class are
already listed on one or more
stock exchanges, so indicate
A 245 If shares of the same class have
not yet been admitted to listing,
but are dealt in one or more other
markets, which are subject to
regulation, so indicate and de-
scribe
A 22 Information concerning the shares
to be admitted to listing
A 221 Resolutions, etc. creating said
shares; nature of issue and
amount thereof
A 241 Description of shares, number and
par or nominal value
A 221a In a business combination for shares,
indication of where documents
available to public
A 222 Concise description of the rights
attaching to the shares: voting,
dividend,liquidation; time limit
after which dividend lapses and
party who benefits therefrom
A 223 Arrangements for transfer of shares
and any restrictions on negotia-
bility
A 224 Date on which entitlement to divi-
dend arises
A 226 Paying agents
A 230 Pre-emptive rights of shareholders
A 234 Procedure for exercise of pre-emp-
tion
A 23 Information concerning the previous
issue, public or private, of the
shares to be admitted to listing
where effected within one year
A 222 (See above)
14011
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Form 20-F
Item 12: Debt Securities to be
Registered
Outline
a) Provisions with respect to
interest, conversion, maturi-
ty, redemption, amortization,




(asset ratios, etc.), divi-
dend restrictions
d) Provisions relating to issuance
of additional securities, mo-
dification of the terms of
the securities, etc.
e) Particulars relative to the
trustee
f) Name and address of paying
agent
g) Currency in which payable and
basis for determination
h) Relevant laws or decrees
Sixth Directive
[For debt securities Annex B of the Sixth
Directive governs]
B 22 Legal information
B 221 Resolutions creating debt, type of
operation and amount
B 21 Condition of loan
B 211 Amount of loan, nature and denomi-
nations
B 212 Issue and redemption prices and
nominal interest rates
B 213 Procedures for the allocation of
other advantages
B 215 Amortization provisions
B 2181 Period of loan and any interim due
dates
B 2182 Due dates for interest
B 222 Nature and scope of guarantees
(see also Article 8:1)
B 224 Subordination provisions
B 226 Whether registered or bearer cer-
tificates
B 227 Restrictions on transferability
B 323a Amount of convertible debt securi-
ties, etc. and conditions covering
conversion, etc.
B 214 Tax on the income from debt securi-
ties withheld at country of origin
or country of listing
B 219 Indication of yield to maturity and
method of calcualtion
B 221 Number of debt securities which
have been or will be created if
predetermined
B 223 Trustee or other representative of
debt holders, name and office and
conditions of such representation
and conditions relating to replace-
ment; location of contract with
trustee for public inspection
B 216 Paying agents in the country of
admission
B 217 Currency of the loan; if denominated
in units of account, the contractu-
al status thereof; currency option
B 225 Legislation under which debt securi-
ties have been created and courts
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Sixth Directive
i) Default provisions
Item 12: Other Securities to be
Registered
If securities other than capital
stock or long-term debt are to
be issued, outline briefly the
rights evidenced thereby




a) Outline taxes and withholding pro-
visions to which U.S. security
holders are subject under the
laws and regulations of the
foreign country of origin
B 218 Time limits
B 2182 Time limit on the validity of
claims to interest and repayment
of principal
B 225 (See above)
[See Annex C Layout for listing
particulars for the admission of
certificates representing shares--
does not apply if only shares rep-
resented are themselves admitted,
e.g., shares held by a depository]
A 222a*Tax on income from the shares with-
held at source in the country of
origin and/or the country of
listing. Indicate whether the
issuer assumes responsibility for
the withholding of tax at source
Item 15: Changes in Securities and
changes in Security for
Registered Securities
a) Describe material modifications in
any class of registered securities
b) Effect on class of registered secu-
rities of issuance or modification
of other securities if material
c) Describe material withdrawal or sub-
stitution of assets securing a
registered class of securities
d) Names and addresses of any substitute
trustees or paying agents (in last
fiscal year)
Item 16: Defaults Upon Senior Securities
a) State nature of any material default
with respect to any indebtedness
exceeding 5% of total unconsoli-
dated assets
b) State nature of any material arrear-
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Form 20-F
Item 17: Interest of Management in
Certain Transactions
Describe
a) Material transactions in last
three years or any presently
proposed transactions to which
registrant is a party in which
a director, officer, Item 4(a)
security holder, or relative
thereof living in the same
house is a party
b) The extent to which any director,
officer or associate thereof
is indebted to registrant and
the details
Signatures
Item 18: Financial Statements
and Exhibits
Instructions




Any material variation in
accounting principles or
practices from U.S. GAAP
or Form S-X to be disclosed
and to the extent practicable,
the effect of each such vari-
ation given
Sixth Directive
A 623 Information about the nature and
extent of interest of administra-
tive management and supervisory
bodies in transactions which are
unusual in nature or conditions
during preceding and current fis-
cal year as well as executory
arrangements made in prior fiscal
years
A 624 Total of all outstanding loans by
company to the above (623) as well
as any guarantees provided by the
company for their benefit
A 11* Identity of legal or natural persons
assuming responsibility for list-
ing particulars
A 12* Declaration by above persons that
document is in accord with facts
and no omissions likely to affect
its implications
A Ch.5 Information concerning the company's
assets and liabilities, financial
situation, and profits and losses
A 511* Last three balance sheets and profit
and loss accounts set out as a
comparative table. Notes on an-
nual accounts for last fiscal year.
Must not be more than 18 months
old. [B 511 only 2 years plus in-
terim]
A 56* Where company is dominant entity in
a group, details in Ch. 4-7 shall
be given for whole group
B 514 As of recent date:
a) total loan capital outstanding
guaranteed and not guaranteed
b) other indebtedness
c) contingent liabilities
A5lla* If company prepares consolidated
accounts only, it shall include
those accounts; if both consoli-
dated and unconsolidated, include
both (competent authority may per-
mit omission of one if they do
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2. SEC may permit omission of one
or more statements or the
substitution of comparable
statements. SEC may also
permit omission of one or




Instructions As to Exhibits
A. Registration Statements to
Include
1. Charter and by-laws
2. Copies of acquisition, re-
adjustment or succession
described in Item I or 8
3(a)Specimen copies of securities
to be registered and of
instruments defining rights
of long-term debt holders
(b)Certain instruments may be
omitted
4(a)Copies of every material execu-
tory contract not in the ordi-
nary course of business entered
into not more than two years be-
fore. See Rule 24b-2 for confi-
dential treatment.
Sixth Directive
A514a* Source and application of funds
for three years
A 511b Per share amounts for three years
adjusted for increases or de-
creases in shares showing details
A 511c Amount of dividends per share for
three years
A 512* If more than nine months has elaps-
ed since the end of last fiscal
year, an interim financial state-
ment covering at least the first
six months. Any significant change
since last fiscal year or interim
must be described in a footnote
A 513* If unconsolidated or consolidated
accounts do not comply with EEC
Council Directives and do not give
a true and fair view of the com-
pany's assets and liabilities,
financial position and profits and
losses, more detailed or addition-
al information must be given
A 551* Consolidation principles applied
(including equity accounting)
A 52* Details relative to the company's
participation in a group (equity
accounting type interests)
[A 521-531 give details]
A 54 Some details for investments not
covered by A 52 where company
owns at least 10% of capital
A 73* Names, addresses and qualifications
of the official auditors who au-
dited company's account for the
last three years; any qualifica-
tions or refusals to report
A 315* Indication of where documents re-
ferred to in the listing applica-
tion may be inspected
Article In a business combination the docu-
10 ments describing the transaction
must be available at the office
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Sixth Directive
4(b) Certain contracts of regis-
rants in ordinary course
of business must also be
filed :
(1) where directors, officers
or promoters are parties
(2) it is of such materiality
as to call for reference
under Item 1, 3 or 17, or
(3) registrant's business is
substantially dependent
upon it, e.g., require-
ment's contract
[The Sixth Directive at Sections
A 232-A 239 and B 241-B 1247 contains
items relating to the particular
distribution such as underwriting
arrangements which in U.S. would be
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APPENDIX XIV-B
OUTLINE OF CURRENT DISCLOSURE ISSUES
I. RECENT HARMONIZATION INITIATIVES
A. SEC Form 20-F
1. Almost all non-North American issuers may use Form 20-F to list and regis-
ter a class of securities on a national securities exchange, and may also file
annual reports on Form 20-F. Thus, it is unique in that it is an initial regis-
tration and periodic filing form.
2. As proposed in 1977, Form 20-F would basically have required foreign
issuers to follow the rules applicable to domestic issuers. These proposals
were severely criticized by the commentators.
3. After studying the various disclosure guidelines of the OECD, EEC and the
UN, the SEC adopted Form 20-F with substantial revisions in recognition of the
special situation of foreign issuers. Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 16371
(Nov. 29, 1979).
a. Description of Business: Proposal would have required foreign issuers
to report the revenues, income and assets for each industry and geogra-
phic segment. As adopted, Form 20-F requires quantitative disclosure
on a revenue basis only, plus a narrative discussion if revenue and
profit contributions of the respective segments differ significantly.
In addition, Form 20-F requires the disclosure of sales and revenues
by geographic markets.
b. Remuneration of Directors and Officers: Proposal would have required
identification of three highest paid directors or officers and the dis-
closure of the aggregate remuneration as well as similar benefits paid
to these three persons. As adopted, Form 20-F limits disclosure to
aggregate remuneration and similar benefits paid to all directors and
officers as a group.
c. Interest of Management in Certain Transactions: Proposal would have
required a description of material transactions between the issuer and
its management. As adopted, Form 20-F requires these disclosures on
interested transactions only to the extent such information is already
made public pursuant to foreign laws or otherwise.
d. Financial Statements: Financial statements of foreign issuers do not
have to comply with GAAP or Regulation S-X; instead, a discussion of
any material differences from GAAP or Regulation S-X must be included,
and quantification is encouraged to the extent feasible.
B. Sixth Directive of EEC
1. The Sixth Directive contains disclosure requirements for securities when
they are first listed on a stock exchange of an EEC member state. (80/390/EEC
OJ No. L 100, 17.4.80).
a. A detailed comparison between the Sixth Directive and Form 20-F is attached
as Appendix A to this chapter. While the similarities between the specific
disclosure items in these two sets of rules are striking, there are some
significant differences in general coverage.
[4071
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b. The Sixth Directive requires a prospectus to be disseminated to investors;
Form 20-F is a form to be filed with the SEC. The Sixth Directive re-
quires.a prospectus to be delivered when a new class of securities is
listed, and when a new issue of securities of the same class is sold
because such a new issue must itself be listed according to the Listing
Directive, described below. By contrast, Form 20-F is filed when a new
class of securities is listed and annually with regard to such class,
but not in the event that new securities of such class are issued because
such a new issue is subject to the disclosure requirements of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933. Thus, a comparison should also be made between the new
issue requirements of the Sixth Directive and the disclosure requirements
of the Securities Act of 1933. See, also, Proposal for a Council Direc-
tive coordinating the requirements for the drawing up, scrutiny and
distribution of the prospectus to be published when securities are
offered for subscription or sale to the public, OJ No. C 355, 31.12.80,
p. 39.
2. The Listing Directive of the EEC has two main parts: it sets minimum re-
quirements to be met before securities may be listed on stock exchanges in EEC
member states, and prescribes the continuing obligations of the issuers of such
listed securities. (79/279/EEC, OJ No. L 66, 16.3.79).
a. The first part is roughly analogous to the criteria proposed by the SEC
for qualified securities to trade in the national market system.
Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 15,926 (June 15, 1979). That is, the
requirements go mainly to the characteristics of the issuer and its
trading market.
b. The second part is roughly analogous to the annual reporting requirements
in Form 10-K for domestic issuers (or Form 20-F for foreign issuers).
But the information required by the Schedules of the Listing Directive
must be made publicly available in a widely distributed newspaper; this
is closer to the annual report to shareholders in the United States.
On the other hand, the Listing Directive is limited to listed securities,
while the 10-K requirements apply to listed securities and OTC securities
meeting Section 12(g) standards--500 shareholders and $1 million in
assets. In addition, the Listing Directive has a requirement, analogous
to Form 8-K requirements, to apprise shareholders of significant develop-
ments affecting security prices.
3. The proposed Information Directive would require companies whose securities
are admitted to official listing on a stock exchange in an EEC member state to
publish a half-yearly report. (OJ No. C 29, 1.2.79). It has been proposed in
revised form. (23 OJ No. C 210, 10.19.80). This Directive is roughly analogous
to the requirements of Form IO-Q for domestic issuers (and Form 6-K for foreign
issuers).
ii. TWO SPECIFIC ISSUES OF CURRENT IMPORTANCE
A. 1933 Act Disclosure
1. While the revisions in Form 20-F under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
are laudable, they need to be matched by similar revisions in the 1933 Act forms.
Form 20-F pertains only to reporting standards for already issued securities of
foreign issuers; therefore, they are of much less utility if the standards for
issuing these securities in the first place are unduly stringent.
2. The SEC has provided some relief in 1933 Act filings by allowing:
a. foreign issuers to make only aggregate disclosure on management
remuneration, Securities Act Rel. No. 6157 (Nov. 29, 1979);
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b. foreign issuers filing Form 20-F to use Form S-16 for rights offer-
ing to existing U.S. shareholders, Securities Act Rel. No. 6156
(Nov. 29, 1979);
c. foreign governments and political subdivisions thereof to file an
annual shelf registration statement with a core prospectus that can
be supplemented quickly by post-effective amendments at the time of
the offering, Securities Act Rel. No. 6240 (Sept. 10, 1980).
3. However, there are still significant constraints on 1933 Act filings which
are not present in Form 20-F:
a. Description of Business--in 1933 Act filings, foreign issuers still
must comply with the full industry and geographic segment disclosure
requirements, although these have been significantly reduced in Form
20-F;
b. Interest of Management in Certain Transactions--in 1933 Act filings,
foreign issuers still must disclose material transactions between the
registrant and its management, although such disclosures are required
by Form 20-F only if already being made public, pursuant to foreign
laws or otherwise; and
c. Financial Statements--in 1933 Act filings, foreign issuers must go much
further than in Form 20-F not only to discuss material differences be-
tween GAAP and foreign accounting principles but also to reconcile such
differences in a quantitative manner. Reg. 4-01(a); Securities Act Rel.
No. 6233 (Sept. 2, 1980).
4. In connection with its integration proposals, Securities Act Rel. No. 6235
(Sept. 2, 1980), the SEC asked several questions about the application of such
proposals to offerings by foreign issuers. The integration proposals envisage
three filing modes:
a. Form A for S-16 issuers, which would have a high degree of incorpora-
tion by reference;
b. Form B for middle-tier companies along the lines of S-7 issuers which
could either deliver an ann ial report along with the prospectus, or
include certain information from the report in the prospectus; and
c. Form C for all the remaining companies which is basically a streamlined
version of Form S-1. See Securities Act Rel. No. 6331 (Aug. 6, 1981), in
which these forms have been reproposed as Forms S-1, S-2 and S-3.
5. The SEC questions about the applicability of these integration proposals
to foreign issuers included:
a. Whether the criteria for Forms A and B should be used for foreign
issuers or whether a different classification system is appropriate;
b. Whether the present distinctions between North American and other
foreign issuers should be maintained;
c. Whether the existence of a primary market outside the United States
should lead to different disclosure requirements for foreign issuers;
d. Whether foreign laws impede or restrict the information foreign
issuers may file with the SEC;
e. Whether the composition of investors in foreign securities are different
than investors in domestic securities and, if so, the implications for
disclosure requirements; and
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f. Whether the information required by Form S-1 that is not required by Form
20-F is important for investors, analysts, or other interested persons.
B. Proposed EEC Directive on Disclosure to Employees
1. In many European countries, there are legal requirements for consultation
by corporate directors with labor unions or appointment of labor representatives
to corporate boards.
a. For discussion of Dutch requirement for consultation with labor
representatives before entering merger agreements, see International
Faculty for Corporate and Capital Market Law, Annual Report 1980 at 6.
b. For discussion of German experience with labor representatives on
corporate boards, see Vagts, "Reforming the Modern Corporation:
Perspectives from the German," 80 Harv. L. Rev. 23 (1966).
C. See also EEC Directive of February 2, 1975, providing for disclosure
and consultation by corporations with labor unions in cases of col-
lective dismissals; and EEC Directive of February 14, 1977, provid-
ing for similar procedures in cases of relocation of enterprises.
2. On October 1, 1980, the EEC Commission approved "Proposal for Informing
and Consulting the Employees of Undertakings with Complex Structures, in
Particular Transnational Undertakings".
a. An unofficial English translation of the proposal follows this outline.
b. Proposal has been submitted to the EEC Council and now must undergo
lengthy review process in EEC institutions and by member states.
3. Firms Covered by Directive
a. ultinational firms headquartered outside an EEC member state,
with at least one subsidiary in an EEC member state having at
least 100 employees.
b. Multinational firms headquartered within an EEC member state,
with at least one subsidiary in an EEC member state having at
least 100 employees.
c. National firms headquartered within an EEC member state and with
at least one subsidiary having at least 100 employees within that
same state.
d. Does not apply to EEC firms with no subsidiaries in EEC member
states (e.g., divisions only), or to American firms doing business
in EEC member states through means other than subsidiaries (e.g.,
agents only).
4. Periodic Disclosures (at least every 6 months)
a. Management of parent company must forward certain information to
the management of its subsidiaries which in turn must communicate
without delay to employees' representatives in each subsidiary.
b. Such information shall in general be sufficient to give "a clear
picture of the activities of the dominant undertaking and its
subsidiaries taken as a whole."
c. In specific, the information shall cover the following subjects:
structure and manning, economic and financial situation, probable
development of business, probable employment trends, rationalization
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plans, introduction of new working methods, and "all procedures
and plans liable to have a substantial effect on employees' in-
terests."
5. Important Decisions
a. These are generally defined as: closure or transfer of an
establishment; restrictions, extensions or substantial modifica-
tions of activities; major organizational modifications; and the
beginning or ending of long-term cooperation with other firms.
b. Not later than 40 days before the adoption of such decision,
parent management must forward certain information to subsidiary
management, which in turn must forward without delay such information
to the employees' representatives and ask for their opinion in not
less than 30 days.
c. The required information includes the details of the grounds for the
decision, its consequences for the employees concerned, and the
measures planned for such employees.
d. If, in the opinion of the employees' representatives, the proposed
decision "is likely to have a direct effect on the employees' terms
of employment or working conditions", subsidiary management must
consult with these representatives on the measures planned for the
affected employees.
6. Enforcement and Administration
a. If subsidiary management does not comply with requirements outlined
in paragraphs 4 or 5 above, employees' representatives first have
recourse to management of the parent. In addition, "appropriate
penalties" are to be established by EEC member countries.
b. Employees' representatives must "maintain discretion as regards
information of a confidential nature," and may not divulge "secrets
regarding the undertaking or its business." EEC member countries
"shall impose appropriate penalties in cases of infringement of the
secrecy requirement."
c. Proposed directive contemplates possibility of a body representing
employees of all subsidiaries of a corporation in EEC member countries--
that is, a genuinely transnational union.
d. Proposal contemplates that each EEC member country will "introduce the
laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply
with the Directive," thus leaving the details to be worked out by each
country.
III. GENERAL APPROACHES
A. Current Approach of Voluntarism
1. Regulation is increased as the degree of voluntary entry by the foreign
issuer into the domestic securities markets increases.
2. Maximum regulation if foreign issuer registers securities offering in
domestic country and lists on domestic exchange.
3. Minimum regulation if securities of foreign issuer are traded in the OTC market
of the domestic country without any participation or support by foreign issuer.
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B. Voluntarism in the U.S.
1. Securities of all foreign issuers are, in the view of the SEC, subject
to the antifraud prohibitions in Sections 10(b) and 14(3). SEC Amicus Curiae
Brief, Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
2. Securities of foreign North American securities-primarily Canadian issuers:
a. In general, are treated the same as U.S. issuers.
b. Thus, the exemptions and special reporting forms mentioned below
are generally not available to foreign North American issuers.
3. Securities of foreign issuers listed on a U.S. exchange.
a. Subject to reporting requirements in Section 13(a) of the 1934 Act,
thoughcan use Forms 20-F and 6-K.
b. Subject to FCPA-Sections 13(b)(2) and 30A of the 1934 Act.
c. Subject to tender offer provisions in Section 14(d) of the 1934 Act.
d. Exempt by Rule 3a12-3 from the short-swing trading provisions in Section
16 and the proxy provisions in Sections 14(a), 14(b), 14(c), and 14(f)
of the 1934 Act.
4. Securities of foreign issuers subject to continuous reporting obligations
solely because of Section 15(d) of the 1934 Act which applies to securities
issued pursuant to a registration statement filed with the SEC.
a. Reporting obligations can be fulfilled by filing Forms 20-F and 6-K.
b. Subject to FCPA-Sections 13(b)(2) and 30A.
c. Like domestic 15(d) issuers, foreign 15(d) issuers are not subject to
Sections 14(a), 14(b), 14(c), 14(d), 14(f), or 16.
5. Securities of foreign issuers whose securities are traded on the OTC mar-
ket in U.S., but which have neither been listed on an exchange nor issued in an
offering registered with the SEC.
a. In general, Section 12(g) of the 1934 Act imposes obligations, similar
to those for listed issuers, if the issuer of the OTC securities has
more than 500 shareholders of record and $1 million in assets.
b. However, Rule 12g3-2(a) exempts from all these obligations a foreign
issuer if it has fewer than 300 U.S. shareholders of record even if
it has more than 500 total shareholders.
c. Rule 12g3-2(b) exempts from all these obligations a foreign issuer,
regardless of the number of its U.S. shareholders of record, if it
furnishes to the SEC for public inspection copies of the material
investor information it makes public in its local jurisdiction or
sends to its shareholders either voluntarily or pursuant to foreign
law or exchange requirements.
d. Query: what are the obligations of Section 15(d) foreign issuers that
also meet the criteria of Section 12(g) in light of Rule 12g3-2(d)?
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C. Limits of Voluntarism
1. No international coordination
a. Each country applies its own laws to the extent that foreign issuer
enters the domestic market.
b. Possible incentive for each country to set standards of relatively
low level to attract foreign offerings.
2. Role of U.S. standards
a. U.S. standards have been relatively high and have been used as a
model by other countries to some degree.
b. The ability of U.S. to retain relatively high standards was premised
on very strong desire by foreign issuers to tap the U.S. capital
markets.
C. But the dominance of the U.S. as the source of capital has declined
as a result of the growth of European and other markets.
d. To the extent that international capital raising and securities
trading move outside the U.S. boundaries, it will become more
difficult for U.S. regulators to oversee these markets.
D. Minimum Standards
1. Explanation
a. This approach would involve an international agreement on minimum
regulatory standards to be applied by all signatory countries,
though each country could impose additional standards.
b. EEC Directive on listing sets minimum standards for trading of
securities on exchanges in member countries, though each country
may impose additional non-discriminatory standards.
C. The International Federation of Exchanges has tried to establish
minimum standards for listing on the major exchanges in the world.
2. Evaluation
a. It would reduce the incentive for each country to lower standards so
as to attract more foreign capital, and would provide a starting
point for creating an international trading market in securities.
b. But there is great pressure to set minimum standards quite low so
that exchanges would not have to delist a substantial number of
issuers.
c. Noreover, most issuers that might have to be delisted because of
minimum standards are relatively small and not interested in foreign
trading.
E. Maximum Standards for World Class Securities
1. Explanation
a. This approach would involve an international agreement on maximum
regulatory standards which, if met, would automatically entitle the
issuer to distribute stock in any country and to list on any exchange
in the world. Once maximum standards were set, no regulatory body
or exchange could impose additional standards.
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b. The standards would be designed to cover securities of world class
issuers. The standards would therefore be fairly high, perhaps at
the level of securities trading on the NYSE or IEX.
2. Evaluation
a. Maximum standards would be an important first step toward an inter-
national securities market since they would be aimed at the very
large issuers which might have an interest in issuing securities
and trading in various countries.
b. But the maximum standards approach would fall far short of an in-
tegrated international market system with composite quotation,
reporting, and clearing systems. At the same time, an increase in
multiple trading locations for the same security would create
additional regulatory problems such as in the area of best execution.
c. Maximum standards would not require delisting of small companies
since an exchange could set lower standards for securities other
than world-class securities.
d. But maximum standards could not be so high that they could be
utilized only by U.S. issuers. On this point, the results of an
informal survey of selected countries are shown below:
[414]
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FOREIGN ISSUERS THAT MEET LISTING REQUIREMENTS
FOR NE14 YORK OR AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
Country Companies which meet NYSE or AMEX Listing Requirements
United Kingdom NYSE - estimated 220 British companies
AMEX - estimated 400-450 additional British companies
Sweden NYSE - 14 Swedish companies appear to meet all criteria
AMEX - 15 additional Swedish companies appear to meet
all criteria
Belgium NYSE - 11 Belgian companies appear to meet all criteria
other than those relating to number of public share-
holders and value of publicly-held shares
AMEX - 15 additional Belgian companies appear to meet
all criteria other than those relating to number of
public shareholders and value of publicly-held shares
(All shares issued by Belgian companies are bearer
certificates, so information about the number of public
shareholders and the aggregate market value of publicly-
held shares is not available)
Japan NYSE - 260 companies listed meet net tangible assets
- 80 companies listed also meet pre-tax income
- 250 companies listed meet requirements re aggre-
gate market value of publicly-held shares
AMEX - 660 companies listed meet net tangible assets
- 200 companies listed also meet pre-tax income
- over 600 companies meet requirements on aggre-
gate market value of publicly-held shares
(The response from Japan did not indicate whether in-
formation was being provided only with respect to Japanese
companies or for all companies listed on the Stock Ex-
change, including foreign companies)
Luxembourg NYSE - 7 listed companies meet net tangible assets
- none meet requirements for pre-tax income
AMEX - 11 listed companies meet net tangible assets
- 8 listed companies meet requirements for pre-
tax income
(All shares listed are bearer shares, so information
about the number of public shareholders and the aggre-
gate value of publicly-held shares is not available)
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APPENDIX XIV-C
PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE ON PROCEDURES
FOR INFORMING AND CONSULTING THE EMPLOYEES OF UNDERTAKINGS WITH
COMPLEX STRUCTURES, IN PARTICULAR TRANSNATIONAL UNDERTAKINGS
The Council of the European Communities,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and
in particular Article 100 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
Whereas the Council adopted on 21 January 1974 a Resolution concerning a social
action programme [1];
Whereas in a common market where national economies are closely interlinked it
is essential, if economic activities are to develop in a harmonious fashion, that
undertakings should be subject to the same obligations in relation to Community
employees affected by their decisions, whether they are employed in the Member
State to whose legislation the undertaking is subject or in another Member State;
Whereas the procedures for informing and consulting employees as embodied in
legislation or practiced in the Member States are often inconsistent with the
complex structure of the entity which takes the decisions affecting them; where-
as this may lead to unequal treatment of employees affected by the decisions of
one and the same undertaking; whereas this may stem from the fact that the in-
formation and consultation procedures do not apply beyond national boundaries;
Whereas this situation has a direct effect on the operation of the common market
and consequently needs to be remedied by approximating the relevant laws while
maintaining progress as required under Article 117 of the Treaty;
Whereas this Directive forms part of a series of directives and proposals for
directives in the field of company and labour law;
SECTION I - SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
Article 1
This Directive relates to:
- procedures for informing and consulting employees employed in a Member
State of the Community by-an undertaking whose decision-making centre is
located in another Member State or in a non-member country (Section II);
- procedures for informing and consulting employees where an undertaking has
several establishments, or one or more subsidiaries, in a single Member
State and where its decision-making centre is located in the same Member
State (Section III).
[4161
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Article 2
For the purposes of this Directive the following definitions shall apply:
(a) Employees' representatives
The employees' representatives referred to in Article 2(c) of Council
Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the Laws of the
Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses [1].
(b) management
The person or persons responsible for the management of an undertaking
under the national legislation to which it is subject.
(c) Decision-making centre
The place where the management of an undertaking actually performs its
functions.
Article 3
1. For the purposes of this Directive an undertaking shall be regarded as
dominant in relation to all the undertakings it controls, referred to as sub-
sidiaries.
2. An undertaking shall be regarded as a subsidiary where the dominant un-
dertaking, either directly or indirectly (a) holds the majority of votes relating
to the shares it has issued, or (b) has the power to appoint at least half of
the members of its administrative,management or supervisory bodies where these
members hold the majority of the voting rights.
SECTION II - INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION PROCEDURES IN TRANSNATIONAL
UNDERTAKINGS
Article 4
The management of a dominant undertaking whose decision-making centre is
located in a Member State of the Community and which has one or more subsidiaries
in at least one other Member State shall be required to disclose, via the manage-
ment of those subsidiaries, information to employees' representatives in all
subsidiaries employing at least 100 employees in the Community in accordance with
Article 5 and to consult them in accordance with Article 6.
Article 5
1. At least every six months, the management of a dominant undertaking shall
forward relevant information to the management of its subsidiaries in the Com-
munity giving a clear picture of the activities of the dominant undertaking and
its subsidiaries taken as a whole.
2. This information shall relate in particular to:
[4171
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(a) structure and manning
(b) the economic and financial situation
(c) the situation and probable development of the business and of produc-
tion and sales
(d) the employment situation and probable trends
(e) production and investment programmes
(f) rationalization plans
(g) manufacturing and working methods, in particular the introduction of
new working methods
(h) all procedures and plans liable to have a substantial effect on employees'
interests.
3. The management of each subsidiary shall be required to communicate such
information without delay to employees' representatives in each subsidiary.
4. Where the management of the subsidiaries is unable to communicate the
information referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) to employees' representatives,
the management of the dominant undertaking must communicate such information to
any employees' representatives who have requested it to do so.
5. The Member States shall provide for appropriate penalties for failure to
comply with the obligations laid down in this Article.
Article 6
1. Where the management of a dominant undertaking proposes to take a decision
concerning the whole or a major part of the dominant undertaking or of one of its
subsidiaries which is liable to have a substantial effect on the interests of its
employees, it shall be required to forward precise information to the management
of each of its subsidiaries within the Community not later than 40 days before
adopting the decision, giving details of:
- the grounds for the proposed decision,
- the legal, economic and social consequences of such decision for the
employees concerned,
- the measures planned in respect of these employees.
2. The decisions referred to in paragraph (1) shall be those relating t6
(a) the closure or transfer of an establishment or major parts thereof,
(b) restrictions, extensions or substantial modifications to the activities
of the undertaking,
(c) major modifications with regard to organization,
(d) the introduction of long-term cooperation with other undertakings or
the cessation of such cooperation.
3. The management of each subsidiary shall be required to communicate this
information without delay to its employees' representatives and to ask for their
opinion within a period of not less than 30 days.
4. Where, in the opinion of the employees' representatives, the proposed
decision is likely to have a difect effect on the employees' terms of employment
or working conditions, the management of the subsidiary shall be required to hold
consultations with them with a view to reaching agreement on the measures planned
in respect of them.
5. Where the management of the subsidiaries does not communicate to the em-
ployees' representatives the information required under paragraph (3) or does
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not arrange consultations as required under paragraph (4), such representatives
shall be authorized to open consultations, through authorized delegates, with
the management of the dominant undertaking with a view to obtaining such infor-
mation and, where appropriate, to reaching agreement on the measures planned
with regard to the employees concerned.
6. The Member States shall provide for appropriate penalties in case of
failure to fulfill the obligations laid down in this Article. In particular,
they shall grant to the employees' representatives concerned by the decision
the right of appeal to tribunals or other competent national authorities for
measures to be taken to protect their interests.
Article 7
1. Where in a Member State a body representing employees exists at a level
higher than that of the individual subsidiary, the information provided for in
Article 5 relating to the employees of all the subsidiaries thus represented
shall be given to that body.
2. The consultations provided for in Article 6 shall take place under the
same conditions with the representative body referred to in paragraph (1).
3. A body representing all the employees of the dominant undertaking and its
subsidiaries within the Community may be created by means of agreements to be
concluded between the management of the dominant undertaking and the employees'
representatives. If such a body is created, paragraphs I and 2 shall be appli-
cable.
Article 8
Where the management of the dominant undertaking whose decision-making
centre is located outside the Community and which controls one or more subsi-
diaries in the Community does not ensure the presence within the Community of
at least one person able to fulfill the requirements as regards disclosure of
information and consultation laid down by this Directive, the management of the
subsidiary that employs the largest number of employees within the Community
shall be responsible for fulfilling the obligations imposed on the management of
the dominant undertaking by this Directive.
Article 9
1. The management of an undertaking whose decision-making centre is located
in a Member State of the Community and which has one or more establishments in
at least one other Member State shall disclose, via the management of those
establishments, information to the employees' representatives in all of its
establishments in the Community employing at least 100 employees in accordance
with Article 5 and consult them in accordance with Article 6.
2. The management of an undertaking whose decision-making centre is located
in a non-member country and which has at least one establishment in one Member
State shall be subject to the obligations referred to in paragraph (1).
3. For the purposes of applying this Article, the terms "dominant undertak-
ing" and "subsidiary" in Articles 4 to 8 shall be replaced by the terms "under-
taking" and "establishment" respectively.
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SECTION III - PROCEDURES FOR INFORMING AND CONSULTING THE EMPLOYEES OF UNDER-
TAKINGS WITH COMPLEX STRUCTURES WHOSE DECISION-MAKING CENTRE
IS LOCATED IN THE COUNTRY IN WI1ICH THE EMPLOYEES WORK
Article 10
The management of a dominant undertaking whose decision-making centre is
located in a Member State of the Community and which has one or more subsidiaries
in the same Member State shall be required, via the management of its subsidia-
ries, to disclose information to employees' representatives in all subsidiaries
employing at least 100 employees in that State in accordance with Article 11 and
to consult them in accordance with Article 12.
Article 1
1. At least every six months, the management of a dominant undertaking shall
forward relevant information to the management of its subsidiaries in the Core
munity giving a clear picture of the activities of the dominant undertaking anG
its subsidiaries taken as a whole.
2. This information shall relate in particular to:
(a) structure and manning
(b) the economic and financial situation
(c) the situation and probable development of the business and of produc-
tion and sales
(d) the employment situation and probable trends
(e) production and investment programmes
(f) rationalization plans
(g) manufacturing and working methods, in particular the introduction of
new working methods
(h) all procedures and plans liable to have a substantial effect on
employees' interests.
3. The management of each subsidiary shall be required to communicate such
information without delay to employees' representatives in such subsidiary.
4. Where the management of the subsidiaries is unable to communicate the
information referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) above to employees' representa-
tives, the management of the dominant undertaking must communicate such informa-
tion to any employees' representatives who have requested it to do so.
5. The Member States shall provide for appropriate penalties in case of
failure to fulfill the obligation laid down in this Article.
Article 12
1. Where the management of a dominant undertaking proposes to take a decision
concerning the whole or a major'part of the dominant undertaking or of one of
its subsidiaries which is liable to have a substantial effect on the interests
of its workers, it shall be required to forward precise information to the manage-
ment of each of its subsidiaries within the Community not later than 40 days
before adopting the decision, giving details of:
- the grounds for the proposed decision
- the legal, economic and social consequences of such decision for the
employees concerned
- the measures planned in respect of these employees.
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2. The decisions referred to in paragraph (1) shall be those relating to:
(a) the closure or transfer of an establishment or major part thereof,
(b) restrictions, extensions or substantial modifications to the
activities of the undertaking,
(c) major modifications with regard to organization,
(d) the introduction of long-term cooperation with other undertakings
or the cessation of such cooperation.
3. The management of each subsidiary shall be required to communicate this
information without delay to its employees' representatives and to ask for their
opinion within a period of not less than 30 days.
4. Where, in the opinion of the employees' representatives, the proposed
decision is likely to have a direct effect on the employees' terms of employment
or working conditions, the management of the subsidiary shall be required to
hold consultations with them with a view to reaching agreement on the measures
planned in respect of them.
5. Where the management of the subsidiaries does not communicate to the
employees' representatives the information required under paragraph (3) or does
not arrange consultations as required under paragraph (4), such representatives
shall be authorized to open consultations, through authorized delegates, with
the management of the dominant undertaking with a view to obtaining such in-
formation and, where appropriate, to reaching agreement on the measures planned
with regard to the employees concerned.
6. The Member States shall provide for appropriate penalties in the case of
failure to fulfill the obligations laid down in this Article. In particular,
they shall grant to the employees' representatives concerned by the decision
the right of appeal to tribunals or other competent national authorities for
measures to be taken to protect their interests.
Article 13
1. Where in a Member State a body representing employees exists at a level
higher than that of the individual subsidiary, the information provided for in
Article 11 relating to the employees of all the subsidiaries thus represented
shall be given to that body.
2. The consultations provided for in Article 12 shall take place under the
same conditions with the representative body referred to in paragraph (1).
3. A body representing all the employees of the dominant undertaking and its
subsidiaries within the Community may be created by means of agreements to be
concluded between the management of the dominant undertaking and the employees'
representatives, unless provision is made for it by national law. If such a
body is created, paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be applicable.
Article 14
1. The management of a dominant undertaking whose decision-making centre is
located in a Member State of the Community and which has one or more establish-
ments in the same Member State shall be required to disclose, via the management
of the subsidiaries, information to the employees' representatives in all its
subsidiaries employing at least 100 employees in accordance with Article 11 and
to consult them in accordance with Article 12.
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2. For the purposes of applying this Article, the terms "dominant undertaking"
and "subsidiary" in Articles 10 to 13 shall be replaced by the terms "under-
taking" and "establishment" respectively.
SECTION IV - SECRECY REQUIREMENTS
Article 15
1. Members and former members of bodies representing employees and delegates
authorized by them shall be required to maintain discretion as regards informa-
tion of a confidential nature. Where they communicate information to third
parties they shall take account of the interests of the undertaking and shall
not be such as to divulge secrets regarding the undertaking or its business.
2. The Member States shall empower a tribunal or other national body to
settle disputes concerning the confidentiality of certain information.
3. The Member States shall impose appropriate penalties in cases of infringe-
ment of the secrecy requirement
SECTION V - FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 26
This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to be taken pursuant
to Council Directive 75/129/EEC of 17 February 1975 on the approximation of the
laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies (1] and Directive
77/187/EEC or to the freedom of the Member States to apply or introduce laws,
regulations or administrative provisions which are more favorable to employees.
Article 17
1. The Member States shall introduce the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive not later than ........ *
They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
2. The Member States shall communicate to the Commission the texts of laws,
regulations and administrative provisions which they adopt in the area covered
by this Directive.
Article 18
Within two years from the date fixed in Article 17, the Member States shall
transmit to the Commission all information necessary to enable it to draw up a
report to be submitted to the Council relating to the application of this Direc-
tive.
Article 19
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
[1] 0J No. L 48, 22.2.75, at 29.
*Date to be specified at the time of adoption by the Council.
[422 ]
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol3/iss3/1
Journal of Comparative Corporate Law and Securities Regulation 3 (1981) 423
North-Holland Publishing Company
INDEX
Bruyneel, Andri, Restrictions on foreign investment: Developments in European lav 339
Buckley, Peter J., The entry strategy of recent European direct investors in the USA 169
Carswell, Robert, Influence of international banking on bank regulation in the United
States 263
Carvalhosa, Modesto, The Brazilian experience with respect to tender offers 103
Coles, Michael H., Foreign companies raising capital in the United States 300
Cooke, W. Peter, Supervising multinational banking organizations: Evolving techniques
for cooperation among supervisory authorities 244
Giddy, Ian H., see John E. Hoffman, Jr. 271
Greene, Edward F., Integration of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act: A case
study of regulation in the Division of Corporation Finance of the United States Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission 75
Hawes, Douglas W., A development in insider trading law in the United States: A case
note on Chiarella v. United States 193
Heleniak, David W., Restrictions on foreign investment: Developments in United States
law 330
Herbert, LeRoy J., Developments in harmonization of accounting standards 373
Hirsch, Alain, Supervising multinational banking organizations: Responsibilities of the
home country 238
Hoffman, John E. Jr. and Ian H. Giddy, Lessons from the Iranian experience: National
currencies as international money 271
Kanazaki, Katsuro, Immobilization of stock certificates: The position of the beneficial
shareholder 115
Lehr, Dennis J. and Cameron F. MacRae III, Foreign banks in the United States: Ac-
quisitions, branching, and other techniques 202
Lorne, Simon M., Attorney-client relationships after Carter and Johnson 151
MacRae, Cameron F. I1, see Dennis J. Lehr 202
Mundheim, Robert H., Introduction 199
Nichols, Bruce W., Lessons from the Iranian experience: Impact on loan syndications
and other international transactions 287
Peterson, Neal L., Supervising multinational banking organizations: Responsibilities of
the host country 225
Pierce, Morton A., The regulation of the issuance and trading of securities in the United
States and the European Economic Community: A comparison 129
Pozen, Robert C., International securities markets: Comparative disclosure requirements 392
Regulation of multinational banking institutions: A symposium 49
Simmonds, Ralph L., Proposals for a securities market law for Canada: A review 31
Tatsuta, Misao, Restrictions on foreign investment: Developments in Japanese law 357
von Clemm, Michael, United States companies raising capital abroad 320
\Vymeersch, Eddy, From harmonization to integration in the European securities markets 1
[423]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
